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Figure 1. Test install of Fearful Symmetry installation in a Tottenham Warehouse, July 2012 
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Figure 2. Fearful Symmetry at the Tate Modern in August 2012. 
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Abstract 
This thesis explores the perception of ‘liveliness’, or ‘animacy’, in robotically driven artefacts. 
This perception is irresistible, pervasive, aesthetically potent and poorly understood. I argue 
that the Cartesian rationalist tendencies of robotic and artificial intelligence research cultures, 
and associated cognitivist theories of mind, fail to acknowledge the perceptual and instinctual 
emotional affects that lively artefacts elicit. The thesis examines how we see artefacts with 
particular qualities of motion to be alive, and asks what notions of cognition can explain 
these perceptions. 
‘Irresistible Animacy’ is our human tendency to be drawn to the primitive and strangely 
thrilling nature of experiencing lively artefacts. I have two research methodologies; one is 
interdisciplinary scholarship and the other is my artistic practice of building lively artefacts. I 
have developed an approach that draws on first-order cybernetics’ central animating 
principle of feedback-control, and second-order cybernetics’ concerns with cognition. The 
foundations of this approach are based upon practices of machine making to embody and 
perform animate behaviour, both as scientific and artistic pursuits. These have inspired 
embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended notions of cognition. 
I have developed an understanding using a theoretical framework, drawing upon literature on 
visual perception, behavioural and social psychology, puppetry, animation, cybernetics, 
robotics, interaction and aesthetics. I take as a starting point, the understanding that the 
visual cortex of the vertebrate eye includes active feature-detection for animate agents in our 
environment, and actively constructs the causal and social structure of this environment. I 
suggest perceptual ambiguity is at the centre of all animated art forms. Ambiguity 
encourages natural curiosity and interactive participation. It also elicits complex visceral 
qualities of presence and the uncanny. In the making of my own Lively Artefacts, I 
demonstrate a series of different approaches including the use of abstraction, artificial life 
algorithms, and reactive techniques. 
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Impact Statement 
Imbued with an autonomy of its own, the material of the built environment is increasingly 
being ‘brought to life’ by robotics. Over a decade of artistic exploration using robotics as a 
medium has led me to conclude that there is a lack of understanding of the aesthetic quality 
of animate behaviour. Understanding why perceptions of life are so irresistible, both in the 
sense of being uncontrollable and aesthetically enchanting, challenges the rationalist 
orthodoxy of engineering approaches to robotic design. Scholarly anxiety about the naïvety 
of these sensations has probably deterred many, particularly from fields of research with an 
aversion for the irrational. Without accepting such sensations, these research cultures are 
excluded from a deeper understanding of interaction relationships, and from exploring the full 
richness of this design space. 
This thesis renews attention to cybernetics as an interdisciplinary field able to take on 
challenging questions that span the design of behaviour and the study of cognitive 
experience. The lively agency of early cybernetic artefacts pioneered by Norbert Weiner, 
Ross Ashby and William Grey Walter, not only represented a revolution in the design of 
intelligent machine behaviour, but also shaped a philosophy of bottom up, situated and self-
organising cognition that resisted the Cartesian philosophies of cognitivism. Cyberneticians 
also pioneered the aesthetic potency of artefacts imbued with a lively agency of their own, as 
seen in the artwork of Gordon Pask’s Musicolour and Colloquy of Mobiles installations, and 
Edward Ihnatowicz’s robotic sculpture The Senster. 
This thesis synthesises a neo-cybernetic approach to aesthetics drawing upon the ‘bottom-
up’ attitude of the field, using a theoretical framework informed by literature on visual 
perception, behavioural and social psychology, puppetry, animation, cybernetics, robotics, 
and interaction design. This thesis can be seen as a contribution to an aesthetic of animate 
behaviour and towards a broader theory of aesthetics of behaviour, that I and other scholars1 
have argued is currently missing and needed. 
This thesis is intended to provide designers working in this area with the theoretical tools and 
concepts to further their practice. It also provides practical techniques for achieving animate 
behaviour in artefacts using robotics. I have interwoven two research methodologies; 
interdisciplinary scholarship of the perception of animacy, and the complementary artistic 
practice of building Lively Artefacts. This artistic practice has resulted in installations, at the 
Centre Pompidou, Paris, Itau Cultural Gallery, Sao Paulo and a commissioned solo 
exhibition at The Tanks, at the Tate Modern in London. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Pervasive Animation 
Motivation 
In his 1976 book Soft Architecture Machines2, Nicholas Negroponte speculates on the 
possibility of buildings able to achieve a variety of uses, achieved through kinetic 
transformation. These spaces, he suggests, might learn about occupant behaviour and start 
adapting their responsive actions accordingly. Negroponte goes as far as to speculate that 
such forms of intelligence might take on a personality of their own, suggesting they “might 
giggle at a funny gesture or be reluctant to be transformed into something else”3. This might 
be surprising comment, considered rather trivial and undesirable behaviour, to those 
interested in the cold logic of computational control. However, as machine makers, 
Negroponte and his team at MIT invariably had moments where their robotic experiments 
moved surprisingly or shook uncontrollably, whether it was because of a short circuit, poorly 
aligned mechanical bearing, or loose poor signal connector. One wonders whether it was in 
those moments of erratic machine behaviour that the human tendency to empathise with 
motion cues might have inspired Negroponte’s tantalising speculations of architectural 
agency with a personality. 
Negroponte acknowledges that such questions of giggling buildings leave researchers 
reluctant, perhaps nervous of the academic seriousness of such perceptions, yet he argues, 
“I strongly believe that it is very important to play with these ideas scientifically and explore 
applications of machine intelligence that totter between being unimaginably oppressive and 
unbelievably exciting”4. 
The possibilities of an increasingly animate architecture remain exciting, and the fears are 
perhaps ever-more present in our minds, with regular examples in the press of the 
unintended consequences of artificial intelligence. In his book Why Things Bite Back, Edward 
Tenner calls this the "the revenge of unintended consequences"5, illustrating how the agency 
of the machines we’ve invented come to possess a sense of emotional motivation in their 
autonomy. 
Extraordinary progress in driverless cars, autonomous flying vehicles and a proliferation of 
other forms of mobile and embedded robotics are poised to enter and cohabit our built 
environment. Today at the Bartlett School of Architecture, where I have pursued this thesis, 
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there are over a dozen robotic arms, countless MakerBots, and abundance of experimental 
machines being built. As robotics become part of the designer’s tool kit, our typical aesthetic 
considerations expand to encompass growing questions about the aesthetics of behaviour. 
Increasingly active, responsive and kinetic, the material of our built environment is being 
animated, imbued with an autonomy of its own, that holds strange and compelling qualities of 
‘life’. 
I am interested in understanding the perception of animacy or liveliness in robotically driven 
objects and spaces because I find this phenomenal quality to be aesthetically potent and 
pervasive. I’ve had the opportunity over the past decade, with colleagues and students at the 
Bartlett, to explore a broad behavioural field of aesthetic possibilities with robotics. From that 
experience I can say, with certainty, that animacy has been the most common quality of the 
behavioural artefacts we have built. This quality is often an unintended by-product of other 
functional and aesthetic goals, but one that usually brings some pleasing contribution to a 
project. In my early work, the quality of animacy was a happy accident, but now it is at the 
heart of my aesthetic explorations in performance and interaction. 
However, I have been surprised to find minimal literature on the aesthetics of animacy in 
discourses on behavioural art forms. For example, in Katja Kwastek’s 2013 book Aesthetics 
of Interaction in Digital Art6 for MIT Press, her “art-historical perspective” claims to provide 
“theoretical and methodological tools for understanding and analysing digital art”, yet makes 
no mention of animacy in interactive art. These omissions are not uncommon as seeing 
things as alive, that are not rationally alive, is often considered a childlike or primitive 
observation, not worthy of discussion or deeper study. Even in literature on the aesthetics of 
puppetry and animation, we find stylistic or socio-political discourses are more often the topic 
of scholarly study, circumventing the ambiguous core experience of non-living artefacts 
having an Irresistible Animacy. The robotics community tends to discuss aesthetics in limited 
terms of physical appearance, without acknowledging that movement has primacy in our 
experience of their Lively Artefacts. 
The motivation of this thesis is to better understand the quality of animacy or liveliness found 
in the behavioural artefacts I have produced, and in the work of other artists. To deepen my 
understanding, I have built new works and developed novel approaches to creating aesthetic 
experiences of, what I like to call, Lively Artefacts. 
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Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Successful art can inspire visceral emotional responses within us that draw our attention to 
our senses. The arts, one might say, are a reminder of the continuity between our physical 
and psychological experience of our world. There are those, however, who disregard the 
embodied nature of these encounters, wishing to discuss art as a strictly intellectual pursuit, 
just as there are those who discuss the interaction of human beings and machines as solely 
a process of mental reasoning. Cartesian notions of cognition as rational and independent of 
the body and environment, are untenable, yet the Cartesian cultural force of computing and 
aligned Computational Theories of Mind (CTM) persist, and heavily influence the way in 
which we discuss human cognition and aesthetic experience. 
Computational Theories of Mind commit what John Dewey has described as 'The 
Philosopher’s Fallacy’, where the intellectualised reading of experience provides a 
disembodied and narrowly rational account of cognition, that is irreconcilable with 
contemporary cognitive science. Across computationally intensive disciplines, such as 
human-computer interaction (HCI) and human-robot interaction (HRI), the reliance on CTM 
explanations limit the ability for designers to better understand and design for interaction 
experiences. Alternative ‘post-cognitivist’ theories of cognition now offer embodied, 
embedded, enactive and extended (4E) understandings of how we performatively construct 
our experience of our world, through continuous and situated interaction. Recent attempts 
have been made to address the cognitive gap in relation to behavioural art forms, with 
Nathaniel Stern’s 2013 book Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as 
Performance 7 describing the unfolding of meaning from the body, in response to worlds 
sensations, concepts and matters enfolding in. Simon Penny’s new book Making Sense: 
Cognition, Computing, Art, and Embodiment 8 critiques Cartesian computational models of 
cognition as “inadequate for addressing performative practices”, arguing that embodied and 
situated approaches open up new understandings of the experience of interactive art, and 
media arts more generally. Penny argues that a “radically interdisciplinary approach” is 
needed, developing his performative aesthetics of behaviour, drawing on philosophy, critical 
theory, biology, psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and 
cybernetics. Penny himself acknowledges that he lays out the “rudiments” rather than a 
completed aesthetic theory, describing it as a step “Towards an Aesthetics of Behaviour”. 
This is a large and complex project because of the heterogeneous nature of behavioural 
media, the heterogeneous nature of contributing disciplines and the challenges it creates in 
synthesising disciplinary knowledge, expertise and technologies. 
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Figure 3. Kenny Chow's representation of the relation between primary and secondary liveliness 9 
 
As a contribution towards an ‘Aesthetics of Behaviour’, this thesis examines the critical sub-
domain of animate behaviour, limiting itself to the visual perception of animacy, drawing on 
some of the aforementioned disciplines that Penny applies, and extends into puppetry, 
animation and visual perceptual science. The thesis further limits itself to exploring the 
aesthetics of individual agents and does not extend into aesthetics that can emerge from the 
interaction of many agents, seen in flocking and dancing. Digital media scholar Kenny Chow 
distinguishes these as primary and secondary orders of animacy. He makes a point of not 
giving prominence to either. In his words, “They represent the two 'sides' of the same coin” 
10. After all, the agency of a single bird may exhibit primary animacy, and the flock of birds 
exhibit secondary animacy. Chow suggests that instead of discussing animacy and 
animation, the term ‘liveliness’ helps to focus attention on perceptual and experiential 
qualities, without association to particular materials, media, or contexts. As the thesis title 
demonstrates, I use both terms interchangeably, though I acknowledge that I find ‘liveliness’ 
suggests more of a qualitative gradient than animacy, which has binary connotations. 
This thesis asks the following three questions: 
1. How do we perceive life in moving human artefacts, and are there notions of 
cognition that explain these perceptions? 
2. Why are perceptions of life so irresistible, both in the sense of being uncontrollable, 
and aesthetically enchanting? 
3. How might one go about making objects that are perceived as animate? 
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A Neo-Cybernetic Approach 
In the context of radical interdisciplinarity and the study of behaviour, cybernetics offers a 
systemic approach to studying the control and communication of animals and machines11, 
with a means to compare and contrast behaviour – natural and synthetic. Its contributions to 
the development of fields of robotics, neuroscience, psychology, ecology, the social sciences 
and cognition, are well documented. As I will discuss, it also holds a particularly important 
place in the history of machine making, and behavioural art. Cybernetics was also the 
progenitor of today’s interdisciplinary field of artificial life (ALife), which features two distinct 
communities, Hard ALife following truly Promethean pursuits of making synthetic life and Soft 
ALife mimicking animate behaviours without making any claims of making life. This thesis 
would therefore fit into the softer approach to mimetic, comparative approaches first 
established in cybernetic research. 
Though cybernetics today exists somewhat on the fringes as an “anti-disciplinary” 
provocateur, promoting a broad spectrum of theoretical and technical synergies, it appears to 
be making a resurgence in popularity. Joi Ito, Director of MIT’s Media Lab, launched their 
new journal Design and Science in 2016, saying in his introduction, “In many ways, the 
cybernetics movement is a model for what we are trying to do — allowing a convergence of 
new technologies to create a new movement that cuts across the disciplines”. Citing Ranulph 
Glanville, he says if “cybernetics is the theory, design is the action” 12. 
Humberto Maturana described cybernetics as "The Art and Science of Human 
Understanding"13, the distinction between art and science, defined as acting with intuition on 
the one hand and acting with practical know-how on the other. Returning to the metaphor of 
the steersman he explains how “the skipper acts both as a scientist and as an artist.” 
Cybernetics as a foundation for this thesis has been useful in a number of distinct ways.  
• It provides precise and thoroughly discussed definitions and relationships between 
the key concepts of behaviour, including control and adaption, agents and 
environments, observers and systems. 
• It can be discussed as lower and higher orders of description – on the one hand 
narrow objective descriptions and on the other subjective description, acknowledging 
the role of the observer. 
• Its original insights into the embodied nature of cognition, provided essential ground 
work for contemporary theories of Autopoiesis, and related Enactive and Performative 
Aesthetics. 
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• A number of cyberneticians have explored its performative and aesthetic potential in 
gallery contexts, including Gordon Pask, Nicolas Schöffer, Roy Ascott, and Ranulph 
Glanville.  
• The cybernetic principle of self-organisation from circular feedback mechanisms, and 
the complex behaviour that emerges from it, offer systemic views of both the nature 
of cognition and life. 
Now, I certainly do not intend to contribute to the thorny debate of what constitutes life. I only 
assert the importance of the cybernetic principle of self-organisation from feedback control, 
an idea that may eventually prove to be more essential to understanding life than that DNA. 
In his 2014 book Life Unfolding14, Jamie Davies describes two current views of life. The first 
is the gene-centred model, where variety comes from a “gene for this” and a “gene for that” 
acting deterministically to construct cells, bodies, or features of behaviour. The second 
model is loop-centred describing cells, bodies and ecosystems constructing themselves 
adaptively in concert with their environment. Davies makes the assertion that “Beyond Earth, 
life without DNA is just about thinkable (one can imagine alternative strategies for storing 
information). Life without feedback loops, though? I have never met any biologist who can 
imagine that” 15. A number of theoreticians, such as Robert Rosen16 and Fritjof Capra 17 who 
have developed systemic views of life that are fundamentally cybernetic. 
The cybernetic abstraction of living systems into feedback loops and adaptive self- 
organisation allows new perspectives on the relationships between subcellular assemblies, 
right up to the co-operating interactions of species in ecosystems. In the field’s early use of 
electro-mechanical machines, life-like behaviour would phenomenally emerge from primitive 
feedback mechanisms. Take, for example, William Grey Walter’s robotic ‘tortoises’, Elmer 
and Elsie (1948-9) 18, who were an instant phenomenon appearing at the Festival of Britain 
and garnering international press attention. The tortoises fame was not due to any 
technological sophistication. By the engineering standards of the day, these machines were 
electro-mechanically primitive, assembled out of war-surplus items and bits of old alarm 
clocks. Wielding Occam’s razor, Walter had built his robots with the simplest of stimulus-
response mechanisms, yet when placed into their environment, they moved with a complex 
and enchanting sense of animacy. Their audiences perceived them as seemingly alive, 
regardless of their crude metallic appearance. 
It is striking that observers were so easily compelled to see life in these primitive machines 
and that these perceptions viewed today by audiences familiar with robotics remain 
irresistible. Studies of how we visually perceive and distinguish between animate and 
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inanimate behaviour have revealed fast stimulus-response reflexes to animacy, forming the 
foundations of our social perception of the world. Their automatic nature offers a 
psychophysical perspective on why - against higher-order cognitive processes of logical 
reasoning – we perceive such strong impression of life in robots. I call this almost 
inescapable perception of life in machines, ‘Irresistible Animacy’ – a feature of human 
psychology that when carefully manipulated, as puppeteers do, can stimulate visceral and 
aesthetic experiences. Irresistible is therefore used both to point to the automatic, reflexive 
nature of primitive animacy perceptions, and to my observation that these can be 
aesthetically potent. 
One can look at the stimulus-response mechanisms of Grey Walter’s tortoises, or 
comparable studies in neuroethology and the growing body of psychophysical research 
around perception of animacy and recognise that there is a compelling case that animate 
behaviour must be understood to be built upon primitive reflexes. Life appears to emerge 
bottom-up both behaviourally and perceptually. This view is contrary, however, to the 
prevailing dogmas of contemporary robotic research, that approach design and analysis of 
experience from the top-down based on reductive rational models. In fields, such as human-
robotic interaction and social robotic research, anthropomorphic approaches – formal and 
behavioural – supported by the rational aesthetics of Computational Theory of Mind, are 
pervasive. Herein lies a critical schism in philosophies to design and aesthetics, between 
bottom-up cybernetic and top-down Cartesian thinking. 
In some ways the schism is comparable to that between the behaviourist and 
anthropomorphic approaches to animal psychology at the turn of the 20th century. 
"In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a 
higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of one 
which stands lower in the psychological scale."19 (Morgan, 1894) 
Morgan argued that, all too often, animal behaviour was explained in terms of human mental 
processes when there was no scientific basis for such anecdotal descriptions. The infamous 
Morgan’s Cannon20, as it came to be known, reversed anthropomorphic rationalism in what 
has been described as an application of Occam's razor to animal psychology. This principle 
supported the development of ‘Behaviourist’ approaches, not only to animal but also human 
psychology, developing the argument that behaviour, no matter how complex, can be 
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reduced to a simple stimulus-response mechanism. Behaviourism in turn helped shape a 
variety of fields, including the formation of neuroscience and cybernetics. Grey Walter, for 
example, built an electrical learning circuit for his tortoise named CORA (‘Conditioned Reflex 
Analogue’), inspired by behaviourist forefather Ivan Pavlov. 
With an analogous critique to Morgan’s Cannon, I strongly believe the field of robotics all too 
quickly turns to anthropomorphism. This is a critique shared and well-argued by leading 
roboticists, such as Rodney Brooks, Hod Lipson and Rolf Pfeiffer. Their critiques, however, 
are limited to matters of designing behaviour and do not address the human observer’s 
experience. A contemporary cybernetic approach I will illustrate must integrally consider the 
observer, and that these experiences can be aesthetic. 
Due to the pervasive anthropomorphist rationalism of robotics, aesthetic experience is all too 
often considered through the complimentary rational cognitivist framework of Theory of Mind, 
otherwise referred to as Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). As I have just touched upon, 
our experience is not entirely rational, and is influenced by reflexes that structure the 
foundations of our social cognition and behaviour. 
I wish to argue that CTM does not give us a satisfactorily complete theory of these 
experiences, just as strictly rational approaches to aesthetic appreciation of art fail to 
recognise the embodied and layered complexity of cognitive processes. As the worlds of 
robotics, art and architecture increasingly intersect, the aesthetic opportunities for new 
synthetic forms of animate behaviour are set to flourish in our built environment. Cybernetics, 
I believe, holds an important role in framing this discourse and resisting reductive Cartesian 
dogmas. As I will discuss in chapter 2, the cyberneticians Grey Walter, Ross Ashby and 
Gordon Pask, demonstrate that the making of performative machines, as embodiments of 
circular feedback mechanisms, encourages a view of interaction as continuous, adaptive, 
embodied and situated. I have interwoven two research methodologies throughout this 
thesis; one is based in academic scholarship and the other in the building of my own 
performative artefacts, that have been exhibited in public gallery contexts internationally.  
My review of various disciplinary perspectives on Lively Artefacts has led me to draw most 
heavily on cybernetic machine makers, puppeteers, pioneers of animation and computer 
agents, and robotics artists to construct a theoretical framework grounded in practice. This 
thesis has given me the opportunity to personally reflect on my own relationship between 
practice and theory and reinforced my belief in the old engineering adage that the difference 
between theory and practice is greater in practice than in theory. I acknowledge in focusing 
on makers of Lively Artefacts, I have omitted some contemporary theoretical frameworks 
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coming from philosophy, namely Actor Network Theory, and the later Agential Realism, 
Speculative Realism and Object Orientated discourses that have emerged in the past 
decade. These later developments appear to show a shift back towards animist, panpsychist 
views of the material world. There are obvious connections to lively art forms I’ve focused on, 
however the contemporary theoretical discourse remains detached from practice.  
Glossary 
Animacy & Liveness 
The phenomenal quality of things that seem alive. By contrast to distinction of living and non-
living, animate and inanimate distinctions are perceptual qualities. A plant for example is 
living but not always perceptibly animate. By contrast Robots are not living but can seem 
animate. Fundamental perceptions of animacy appear to be based on motion perception 
rather than perception of form. Liveliness and animacy are used interchangeably. The term 
‘liveliness’ helps to focus attention on perceptual and experiential qualities, without 
association to particular materials, media, or contexts. Liveliness suggests more of a 
qualitative gradient than animacy, which has binary connotations.  
Performance, Performative, Performativity 
Terms used widely and inconsistently from theatrical and fine arts, linguistics and philosophy, 
through to theoretical and applied sciences. This thesis discusses performance in two 
distinct ways. First notions of staged performance of agentic lively artefacts. This is not 
limited to theatrical contexts, but also encompasses gallery and public art exhibits and then 
out into our built environment. The second notion of performance relates to emergent 
behaviour of situated agents through their embodied, embedded, extended and enactive 
relationship to their environment. This thesis does not relate to J. L. Austin’s “speech act” 
notions of relationships between language and action, nor Judith Butler’s use of 
Performativity in the construction of gender. Richard Schechner’s notions of ritualized 
performance that codify human hierarchies and other relations addresses issues of 
performance at societal scales and is therefore omitted.  
Robotics 
Robotics is an interdisciplinary field primarily situated in the intersection between 
computational, mechanical and electrical engineering. It encompassed the design, assembly, 
operation, and use of robots. The field emerged out of developments in industrial 
automation, advanced by Cybernetic control systems in the mid-twentieth century to build 
machines capable of sensing and purposefully responding to their environment through 
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physical motion. Mobile robotics are built to negotiate environments using a combination of 
sensing, information processing and actuation and will behave differently depending on input 
stimuli. Manufacturing robotics by contrast are often employed to perform repetitive tasks 
and are limited in their responsiveness to their environment. Types of sensing, actuation and 
information processing widely differ depending on application, and approach. Certain sub-
fields of robotics research such as social robots that deal with human machine interaction 
also draw upon fields such of psychology. The word robot comes from R.U.R. (Rossum's 
Universal Robots), a 1920 play by the Czech writer Karel Čapek. The story tells of artificial 
workers, “roboti” being the Czech serf labor. These machine slaves, with human-like bodies 
left a lasting impression on popular conceptions of robots as humanoid, and have been 
reinforced particularly by Science Fiction. In reality, most robots bare little physiological 
resemblance to human beings. To name just a few, autonomous cars, vacuum cleaners, 
responsive building facades, cruise missiles, harness robotics to do a variety of tasks without 
taking on anthropomorphic form.  
Interaction 
Academic definitions of interaction are widely inconsistent. But some principle characteristics 
are shared in literature. Communication of two-way or multiple directions exists through 
media, potentially multi-sensorial. The role of the messenger and receiver can shift between 
interacting agents. These can be human, or machine. The feature of Interactivity grew as a 
buzz word quickly in the 1990’s, both in popular, industry and scholarly press. This led to 
uncritical use of the term, with little reflection for example on difference between reactivity 
and interactivity. Cybernetics pioneered machines with adaptive communicative behaviours. 
This is early work is exemplified by Ross Ashby’s Homeostat and Gordon Pask’s Coloquy of 
Mobiles, both discuss in this thesis. Their model contrasted with master-slave models of 
control, popular in computing that favored one way control rather than circular feedback 
loops of interacting agents. Interaction, as a continuous and adaptive exchange, places 
interactivity between participants rather than a property of any one machine. Work presented 
in this thesis features both reactive and interactive modes of behaviour.  
1.2 Robotic Art Installations 
Contemporary robotics are the progeny of a remarkable history of theatrical automatons, 
from the earliest mechanical birds of Archytas, hydraulic orchestras of Al-Jazari, to the 
Francini Brother’s kinetic grottoes, von Kempelen’s Chess playing Turk and Vaucanson’s 
illustrious Canard Digérateur. These spectacles were the wonders of their time, both 
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artistically and technologically. Driven, I believe, by some irresistible mimetic impulse to 
remake life, the great automaton artists not only produced theatrical innovations, but also 
built the first cogs of the industrial and computing revolutions. More profoundly, their 
machines shaped the intellectual discourse of their time, on the very nature of life itself. 
Today, questions of what distinguishes the inanimate from animate seem all the more 
challenged by the emergence of robotics, artificial intelligence, and synthetic biology. Robotic 
art is a descendent of the performing automaton of the ancients, the modern kinetic art 
movement and the brief but captivating cybernetic arts of the mid-twentieth century. Jack 
Burnham in Beyond Modern Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on the 
Sculpture of This Century21 described kinetic sculpture as “the unrequited art”. Robotics 
suffers from the same status, remaining on the periphery of the arts, though recognition is 
growing with major retrospectives taking place, such as at the Artists and Robots exhibition 
at Grand Palais, Paris (2018), some 50 years since Jasia Reichardt curated the Cybernetic 
Serendipity22 exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Art, London. 
Artist Eduardo Kac argues there is no narrow definition for robotic arts, apart “perhaps, for 
the principle of giving precedence to behavior over form”. Within robotic arts we find a widely 
divergent field of exploration, ranging from anthropomorphic sculptures in the work of Chico 
MacMurtrie, or ‘Cyborgian’ prosthetics of Stelarc, to the autonomous, zoomorphic agents of 
Ken Rinaldo and the artificial ecosystems of Philip Beesley’s responsive installations. What 
brings these works together is no single technology, but rather purposeful behaviour that 
imbues an irresistible sensation of animacy. This makes them quite unlike the work of artists, 
such as Jean Tinguely, whose ‘Meta-Mechanical’ sculptures furiously perform random 
motion, or the mechanical automaton of Arthur Ganson, that perform pre-choreographed 
routines. 
As robotics become pervasive features of the built environment, ‘robotic art’ or ‘robotic 
architecture’ may become an anachronistic term in a similar way that ‘digital media’ or ‘digital 
architecture’ has. However, as artificial intelligence increasingly mediates our lives and 
recognition grows of its rather mercurial nature, and as robotics exhibit more sophisticated 
behaviour, the public’s interest in these new forms of agency, is growing quickly. Questions 
of what constitutes life, and the ethics of AI and robotics have entered public consciousness. 
Leading robotics artists throughout the 20th century were often pioneers in critically exploring 
technologies considered benign by the scientific community. 
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 “The fascination robots exert on the population at large has unexplored 
social, political, and emotional implications. These implications must be 
coupled, if they are to be properly understood in the contemporary art 
context, with the new aesthetic dimension of modeling behavior (the artist 
creates not only form but the actions and reactions of the robot in response 
to external or internal stimuli) and developing unprecedented interactive 
communicative scenarios in physical or telematic spaces.” 23 (Kac, 1997) 
As an artist myself, working with robotics, particularly with custom assembled robotics, I am 
continually negotiating the relationships between computational control systems and a wide 
range of material systems. Artists working with robotics also often hybridise technology with 
a variety of other media, contexts and living systems. Bill Vorn, for example, describes his 
robots, coupled to lighting, projection and audio outputs, as “Theatrical Machines”. The 
landscape of behavioural art forms, be they robotic and/or other emerging media, are 
characterised by innovative new methodologies of production that challenge normal 
disciplinary boundaries between arts and sciences. 
Whereas scientific research into the communicative possibilities of human robotic interaction 
has developed around representational schemas that have emerged from established 
computational models of intelligence, arts practice has circumvented the need for such 
frameworks, focusing instead entirely on the problem of experience, namely how to create a 
coherent experience for people encountering work. While scientific research is assembled 
upon the technological apparatus that builds up around their representational schemas, 
artists, free from methodological rigors draw upon the widest sources of behaviour, be they 
analogue or digital, physical or virtual, centralised or distributed, organic or synthetic. 
This freedom affords fast, cheap, direct routes to manifesting behaviour that may be accused 
of taking ‘short-cuts’ around the ‘state-of-the-art’ in robotic research. But an artist’s work is 
not subject to criticism if, in achieving an intended behaviour, it circumvents established 
methods or scientific theory. The work is ultimately judged on its performance –its ability to 
compel an audience’s emotional and intellectual engagement and, in the case of interactive 
work, draw them into forms of extended exchange that leave lasting impressions. It finds it 
easier to admit the intelligence or life of its machines are illusions, unlike the engineers and 
scientists practicing in artificial intelligence. 
However, the value of such work should not be framed as seeking aesthetic goals alone. 
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This experimental work can often be theoretically and technically pioneering. Take Edward 
Ihnatowicz’s Senster, to robotics, or Myron Krueger's Videoplace, to computer vision. 
Robotics and new media artists have advanced enquiries into areas of communication and 
behaviour generations ahead of scientific study, just as visual artists explored the perceptual 
experience of abstract stimuli decades before psychophysical and cognitive researchers. 
Arts practice can not only can precede scientific enquiry, but also escape the inherent 
reductivism of lab experimentation. Concept and embodied practice are integrated together 
rather than making and performing, serving theorising. Artistic practice acknowledges the 
complexity of the environments in which interactions exist beyond spatial cues, within rich 
cultural spaces whether galleries, public spaces, or places of work, and wrestles with its 
heterogeneous nature. 
“Innovation in the field of robotics could well come from art as well as from 
industrial robotics because the goals of art are not clearly defined and most 
intangible problems could lend themselves to its ad hoc methods. Whereas 
industry may find solutions to numerous finite problems through the use of 
multipurpose robots, it will not deal with effects, illusions or emotive 
principles which belong to art.” 24 (Reichardt, 1978) 
Through built works, I have examined how a deeper understanding of the perceptual factors 
that determine the qualities of animacy, and endow it with emotional, visceral and aesthetic 
potency, can be usefully applied in design practice. It will become evident that the literature 
from visual perception, behavioural and social psychology, puppetry, animation, cybernetics, 
robotics and interaction research have all influenced the conception of the work, however, 
they were not the sole influences. All the works described were site-specific, responding to 
the time and place of their realisation. The very collaborative nature of designing and building 
performative machines has meant that friends and colleagues brought valuable contributions 
that have enhanced the work immeasurably. Some of these contributions are highly relevant 
in the context of this thesis and are discussed. 
Others, although in some cases critical to the success of the work, are omitted. Here I 
provide only a limited description of the technical systems employed. I will resist the 
temptation to talk about the challenges faced in building the world’s largest delta robot or the 
trials and tribulations of installing a kinetic installation within a collection of Picasso’s Master 
Pieces. 
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"The fear of tiring you, Gentlemen, has made me pass over a  
great many little circumstances, which tho' easy to suppose  
are not so soon executed.” 25 (Vaucanson, 1742) 
Successful exhibitions of the work have led to increasingly larger commissions and budgets, 
that have allowed me to build larger and more agile machines, and deal with the ever-greater 
technical complexities that inherently emerge. In stark contrast to the growing complexity of 
realising the installations, the visual and formal aspects of the work have become simpler – 
some have called it minimal. 
This undoubtedly reflects a growing understanding in my practice that, from the perspective 
of the observer, the way things may move is far more important than the way they may 
appear, and that the careful mastery of motion and behaviour was enough to elicit complex 
and engaging responses in the public. Each project will be introduced with a summary of the 
context of its realisation, and an overview of physical design. Details on behaviour will be 
revealed in discussing the work in the context of theories I introduce in later chapters. 
Performative Ecologies 
Performative Ecologies is an investigation into the design of embodied interactive agents. It 
is made up of four autonomous attention seeking robotic ‘dancers’ which search out people 
using cameras in their ‘heads’ and orientate to face inhabitants and begin performing using 
their ‘tails’. The body of each robot is assembled from 3mm thick aluminium sheet, waterjet 
cut into parts and slot fitted together. Each robot features two Hitec HS-805BB Servos for 
orientation and tail motion, two Hitec HS-422 Servos for pan and tilt directional control of the 
head. The tail made of Perspex acrylic rod catches light emitted from the Kingbright 525 
RGB high power LEDs held at its two ends. The head has two forward facing Kingbright 568 
white LEDs and a discretely hidden low light sensitive Sony Digital Pin Hole Camera. In its 
latest incarnation, an onboard ARM-based computer (Raspberry Pi running Linux) executes 
a genetic algorithm (programmed in openFrameworks 0.9.0.) and facial recognition algorithm 
(openCV), which send commands to an Arduino Nano microcontroller that manages head 
direction, body orientation and the performance of the tail’s lighting and motion. 
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Figure 4. Performative Ecologies at the VIDA 11.0 Artificial Life Art exhibition in Madrid 
Each robotic agent autonomously manages its own performances, which are generated from 
a computational gene pool of evolving short ‘dances’, the ‘fitness’ of each are measured by 
how much attention they receive from the public. An on- board camera assesses attention 
levels based on facial orientation of the audience before and after each short performance. 
Over time, successful manoeuvres are saved and recombined to produce new performances 
while less effective ones are discarded. When there are no people around, the robots turn to 
each other and teach their most successful performances to one another, negotiating new 
performances together. Over a wireless network the robots communicate with their 
neighbouring robots, occasionally exchanging data from their individual performance gene 
pools. If their exchanged data share similarities, then the exchanges are accepted. If they 
are too different they are rejected due to ‘artistic differences’. Performative Ecologies has 
been exhibited at Instituto Itaú cultural in Sao Paulo, Beall Centre for Art and Technology in 
California, National Art Museum of China in Beijing, Kunsthaus in Graz and as part of VIDA 
11.0 Artificial Life Art exhibition in Madrid. 
Motive Colloquies 
Commissioned by the Centre Pompidou, Paris, Motive Colloquies was a collaboration 
between the Bartlett School of Architecture and the Royal Central School of Speech and 
Drama, combining expertise in puppetry, performance, robotics and interaction design. The 
result was a responsive installation and performance held within the Pompidou’s Pablo 
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Picasso Gallery in May 2011. The design was based on parallel robot principles. These are 
used extensively in the manufacturing industry, but never in a performance context before 
this work. The final strategy was a novel kinetic structure combining two delta robot 
mechanisms. A delta robot is a type of parallel robot, kinematically assembled around two 
equilateral triangles: a ‘base’ triangle and ‘end-effector’ triangle. The two triangles are 
connected by multiple kinematic chains, which together give it a range of motion while 
maintaining the end-effector’s orientation. 
 
 
Figure 5. Install of Motive Colloquies, Picasso Gallery, Centre Pompidou, Paris 
Built from aluminium box and tube sections, an inverted 2m tall delta robot was developed 
giving the appearance of three legs which met at an elevated end- effector which became 
the platform to suspend a second smaller lighter delta robot whose end-effector held a folded 
aluminium sheet ‘head’. I describe this unorthodox mechanism as a “Double Inverted Delta 
Robot”, and is the first of its kind. The base on the ground sat on a triangular plinth where 
three industrial NEMA 42 worm-geared stepper motors actuated the legs. The suspended 
delta robot was actuated by spur-geared Hitec HS-785HB servos, and the head’s pan and tilt 
mechanism were driven by a pair of Hitec HS-422 servos. 
Sensing of inhabitants of the gallery visitors was achieved using three Microsoft Kinect Xbox 
360 Sensors hidden in the base of the plinth. Together these depth sensors continually 
scanned the gallery and when visitors came into range they triggered a reactive ‘mirroring’ 
behaviour. This primitive reactive algorithm contrasts Performative Ecologies adaptive ability 
to interact. The complexity of Motive Colloquies’ behaviour was a direct reflection of the 
complexity of the environment it was sensing. 
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Fearful Symmetry 
Commissioned by the Tate Modern for the Cultural Olympiad that accompanied the 2012 
London Olympic Games, Fearful Symmetry is the major piece of work synthesising the 
theoretical matters addressed in this thesis. The commission was a result of the success of 
Motive Colloquies at the Centre Pompidou and shares the same approach of using a delta 
robot. The challenge of the commission was the scale of the site. The Tate’s cavernous 
South Tank, 32m diameter, 7m tall, was adjacent to the Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall. The 
space had previously lain dormant for decades cloaked in darkness. In discussion with 
Curator Mark Miller, the idea of a ‘living luminaire’ was agreed upon. The installation would 
reveal the dramatic south tank as it moved through the gallery, interacting with the visiting 
public. 
In form, the luminaire was a primitive tetrahedron, lit by electroluminescent sheet from 
Lumitec AG, and powered by a Enz Electronic EL-Inverter. The sub-structure for the 
electroluminescent sheet was assembled from a combination of custom 3D printed and 
laser-cut plastic parts, and was placed on the delta robot’s end- effector. Similarly to Motive 
Colloquies, a pan and tilt mechanism using Dynamixel RX-64 servos orientated the 
tetrahedral luminaire.  
 
Figure 6. Fearful Symmetry, The Tanks, Tate Modern, London 
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The delta robot control was managed by Maxon EPOS2 Positioning Control Units that 
directed three Maxon 200 Watt RE50 DC Servo Motors, and GP 62 Planetary Gearbox. 
Positioning feedback was provided by Maxon HEDL 5540 encoders. The triangular base of 
the delta robot was an aluminium and steel custom-built rig that tightly packed the motors 
and controllers to keep payload weight to a minimum. 5m tall when fully suspended, the 
assembly was as far as I’m aware, the largest delta robot at the time. Since then, a number 
of large scale delta robots have been built for additive manufacturing of architectural 
structures26. These however are engineered to move slowly depositing clay and other 
construction materials whereas Fearful Symmetry required a faster moving mechanism to 
animate the novel luminaire. Weight was minimised using carbon fibre box and tube sections 
and universal joints were IGUS injection moulded plastics rather than the steel variety more 
typically used. 
The South Tank Gallery’s 32m diameter also afforded us the opportunity to install a 21-metre 
motorised rail on the ceiling that the delta robot was suspended from. A Hepcomotion belt 
driven linear actuator was chosen powered by a large industrial AC Baldor Servo Motor. The 
linear rail greatly increased the operating range of the delta robot and variety of behaviour it 
could exhibit. With the exception of the Dynamixel RX-64 servos, the system ran on a CAN 
(Controller Area Network) 2.0 bus. The integration software was developed in Texas 
Instruments LabVIEW system-design platform. 
An array of Kinect sensors mounted on the travelling robot built a real-time depth map of its 
local environment, detected the public and read their individual movements using gesture 
recognition algorithms. To add a further level of intensity to movement, contact microphones 
were placed on motors, with high pass and low pass filtering, and other acoustic processing 
amplifying every gesture it made. The site installation was exhibited in August 2012 and 
since then has proven difficult to exhibit elsewhere. A smaller tourable version without a 
motorised rail was exhibited in July 2017 at Instituto Itaú cultural, Sao Paulo, using a 
Universal Robotics UR10 robot arm as the manipulator. 
Happy Accidents 
There have been a multitude of small prototypes in my work that are not detailed in this 
thesis, but it is worth mentioning a couple early ‘happy accidents’ that revealed to me how 
‘life’ can burst out of machines at the most unexpected of times. The first was a primitive 2 
axis robotic armature made of acrylic. Its orientation was set by turning a pair of 
potentiometers that were wired to an Arduino Microcontroller that converted the analogue 
signals to digital pulses that steer the armature’s Hitec HS805BB Servos. One afternoon in 
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my basement studio at the Bartlett in October 2006, having assembled the armature, I was 
moving it into position to film it when it suddenly began furiously swinging its arm around as if 
it might be trying to beat me away. I manage to pull my head back just as it flew across my 
face and continued swiping for a few more moments before coming to a halt when I switched 
off power. Fortunately, my camera captured its wild liveliness and the terrified and 
exhilarated look on my face, that turned to laughter a moment later. This was my first truly 
visceral interaction with a robot.  
The source of this temperamental behaviour, fighting off molestation, was the accidental 
disconnection of the two potentiometer circuits to the Arduino controller. The analogue to 
digital converters on the Arduinos input pins, deprived of clean grounded signals read the 
static of the room. The chaotic nature of its movements, noisy electrical emissions from 
heaters, fluorescent lights, mobile phones, laptops all contributing to its personality. This was 
my first hint that the complexity of an environment was an incomprehensibly rich source of 
animate stimulus. 
A few years later in November 2010, I was teaching students from the Bartlett’s MSc 
Adaptive Architecture and Computing programme. We had built a small Delta Robot 
actuated again by Hitec servos, though this time the sensing was a Microsoft Kinect, a depth 
sensing camera that allowed for far greater sensitivity to human gesture. The assembled 
system allowed us to teleoperate the Delta Robot by moving a hand around in front of the 
sensor. The aim of the exercise was to manipulate and potentially stack a pile of small 
cardboard boxes within reach of the Delta Robot.  
A collection of a dozen students had gathered around the robot while I user tested some 
code. When my hand was within the frame of view of the Kinect sensor, the motion of the 
Delta Robot was consistently smooth. I was in complete control, the robot was an extension 
of me, rather than having agency of its own. By chance, a student was filming on their 
phone, at just the moment I tried to pick up one of the cardboard boxes beneath the robot. 
As I reached in to pick up the box, the Delta Robot swung down seeming to intercept my 
hand and protect its pile of boxes. I pulled my hand back and froze still. A moment later the 
students burst into laughter. The cause of this sudden and unexpected protective behaviour 
was my hand disappearing outside of the sensors frame of view and it returning to its home 
position rapidly. The irresistible impression was that the robot had successfully deterred my 
predatory behaviour.  
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1.3 Structure 
Animating Discourses 
This chapter constructs a critique of Cartesian approaches to problems of life and cognition, 
and examines alternatives in theories of embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended 4E-
cognition that I characterise as neo-cybernetic. I draw an historical arch over animated 
machines, recognising how the millennial pursuit to imitate life has shaped philosophical 
discourse between two distinct views on the nature of life and cognition. On the one hand, a 
Cartesian view inspired by mechanical automata and later reinforced by digital computing, 
and on the other, an emergent systemic view that became embodied in cybernetic machines. 
Two machine makers and founders of cybernetics are focused upon, Grey Walter and his 
robotic tortoises, and Ross Ashby and his Homeostat. Andrew Pickering explains in his book 
The Cybernetic Brain (2010) that “One can almost say that everyone can have their own 
history of cybernetics”27 and here I attempt to make one that highlights the under-
acknowledged role machines have had in shaping cybernetic thinking and, consequently, the 
neo-cybernetic theories of autopoiesis and contemporary 4E-cognition. 
I discuss the discoveries and pitfalls of the digital computing revolution and the formulation of 
discrete forms of behavioural complexity that replaced their analogue electro-mechanical 
predecessors. I distinguish between the two by recognising that while cybernetic machines 
had pursued the manageably complex from the chaotically complex, in contrast, 
computational attempts at digital life pursued complexity from simple rules. The same 
contrast is made for the differences between embodied robotics approaches that, again, I 
would characterise as neo-cybernetic and Cartesian symbolic approaches to artificial 
intelligence. The chapter outlines fundamental ways to design machines with animate 
behaviour using primitive sensorimotor reflexes. The central idea of embodied behaviour is 
discussed and I also argue the importance of acknowledging the environment in co-
producing the perceived intelligence of agents, whether human, animal or machine. The 
implication of this is that designing animate behaviour is, both in the design of an agent and 
in the design of the agent’s environment, a strikingly architectural perspective, under-
appreciated in discourse on robotics design. 
I follow this by discussing Gordon Pask’s work as a machine maker, performer, artist, 
educator and leader in the epistemological shift from first-order to second- order cybernetics, 
offering a performative approach to systems research and acknowledging the observer as 
part of the system. Pask who described himself as a ‘‘mechanic philosopher’’28 is most widely 
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acknowledged for developing automated teaching machines, but he also developed a variety 
of experimental performative systems designed to interact in a playful open-ended way with 
musicians and the public. I discuss his Musicolour installation that I consider to be the first 
performative machine that was truly interactive. I make a distinction between two notions of 
performativity, that of staged and cybernetic. 
I introduce my first installation Performative Ecologies and describe how my adoption of neo-
cybernetic approaches to lively machines has also shaped my conception of human 
cognition as embodied and situated. Despite understandings of intelligence as embodied 
being a subject of discourse back to pre-Socratic thought, and found throughout the history 
of philosophy, such ideas have met continuing resistance to scientific scholars whose 
intellect is often traded in words and algorithms, rather than in practices, such as making and 
performance. I conclude by examining neo-cybernetic understandings of aesthetics first from 
Pask’s observation that we are attracted to novelty in our environment compelled to learn 
how to control it 29. 
Life in Motion 
When we enter a room, with the quickest of glances, we can tell whether there are living 
entities present. We are highly attuned to social perception and it is the visual detection of 
motion that appears to be the primary stimuli for making such judgements. Throughout the 
animal kingdom, distinguishing between animate and inanimate motion is critical to detecting 
prey, mates and predators, so our sensitivity to animacy is deep within the primitive 
architecture of our animal brain. Children under the age of three do not demonstrate a theory 
of mind, yet they are capable of recognising the difference between animate and inanimate 
motion, and engaging in a variety of interactions with animate agents. This would suggest – 
and research in the field of human visual motion perception supports – that our experience of 
engaging with animate entities is formed not solely by reasoned acts of anthropomorphism, 
but also powerfully by instinctive, emotional and automatic processes of cognition. However, 
these matters are sometimes overlooked because of Cartesian modes of thinking that 
remain dominant in certain fields, including human-robotic interaction (HRI) where design of 
‘intelligent’ behaviour is typically structured from the top-down, through language and other 
forms of symbolic logic. Theories of human experience in HRI have been built primarily upon 
the complementary logic of Computational Theory of Mind - the idea that we ‘mentalise’, or 
construct rational mental models, of other animate entities, such as animals or robots, in 
order to hypothesise on their beliefs and motivations. The anthropomorphic explanation is 
convincing in as much as we all recognise that we enter into these mental processes 
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naturally when we observe and interact with others. However, such a theory of mind does not 
give us a satisfactorily complete theory of these experiences. 
To address the gap, this chapter takes a counter approach, working bottom-up, beginning 
with reflexive visual processes of animacy perception that appear to be innate. The 
automatic nature of these percepts can partially explain how certain vocabularies of motion 
seem so irresistibly animate. A case study of Edward Ihnatowicz’s cybernetic artwork, 
Senster demonstrates how, unknowingly, artists tune their work into these innate 
psychological responses. Together with a discussion about the neuro-aesthetics of Calder’s 
mobiles, I highlight the role the arts have long played in exploring the hold on our attention 
and imagination animate motion has. 
I identify the primary motion cues that perceptual research has discovered to date and 
discuss the theories of fast heuristic processing of basic behavioural typologies. Social 
scientists hypothesise that these may act as an innate structural skeleton for the 
development of more sophisticated learnt social perceptions. Jean Piaget’s studies of young 
children’s primitive distinctions between animate and inanimate objects are an early example 
of this hypothesis. The naïve connection between motion and life has had a profoundly 
vitalist impact on conceptions of our world. As American psychologist Julian Jaynes explains, 
for millennia, motion and life were bound together, creating a wider field of animacy that 
remain in certain Eastern animist philosophies, but have been largely exorcised in Western 
Philosophy. 
“Motion is now the domain of physics but before the seventeenth century, 
motion was an all-encompassing mystery… Because [the stars] moved, 
the stars were thought by no less a scientist than Kepler to be animated. 
Motion perplexed Gilbert who became convinced that magnets had souls 
because of their ability to move and be moved. And Campanella in his 
Neapolitan prison, when he understood what Copernicus was saying, that 
the earth really moved, exclaimed, "Mundum esse animal, totum sentiens!" 
In a world so sentient and alive, motion is everywhere.” 30 (Jaynes, 1970) 
Complimenting the catalogue of motion cues and behavioural heuristics established by 
scientific research, I will examine the art of animation, and the established principles of 
orthodox forms of Western character animation. I discuss Kenny Chow’s notion of 
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‘Technological Liveliness’ that supports my own view that animation as a field extends out 
into our built environment and draw synergies with his discussion on the experience of 
animation being bound to our embodied knowledge of own animate behaviour. 
Aesthetics 
As I’ve established, visual perception not only constructs the physical structure of the world, 
but also the social and causal nature of the world. This is as under- appreciated and under-
explored topic, particularly contrasted against the enthusiasm the visual arts have shown to 
the aesthetic potential of visual ambiguity in static paintings, sculptures and installations. The 
aim of this chapter is to draw a line between psychophysical understandings of animacy 
perception and their manipulation in arts, using insights from puppetry and robotic arts to 
focus on experiences ‘in the flesh’, whether in a theatre, a gallery exhibition or in the built 
environment. Notions of the uncanny as a term to describe the visceral affect of ambiguous 
motion perceptions of animacy in inanimate artefacts’ motion, are discussed, distinguishing it 
from the uncanny in scientific discourse of robotics that focuses on figurative appearance. 
Over-laps are found between discourses in arts and sciences on the notion of bistable 
experiences of animate motion. I examine how the essentialist pursuits of modern puppetry 
and the related avant-garde conceptualisation of machine theatres, tended towards the 
animation of minimal abstract forms. This also resonates with the techniques employed by 
perceptual scientists in the decades following, creating a surprising methodological link 
between these very different modes of investigating animate behaviour. The chapter 
concludes by examining the role the arts have played in probing the aesthetic field of 
robotics. 
Lively Artefacts 
In the formulation of the thesis, a number of robotic prototypes and publicly exhibited 
installations have been built. This chapter describes a series of experiments synthesising 
ideas drawn out of artificial life, perceptual psychology, animation, robotics and puppetry. A 
particular focus has been made on examining how puppetry can offer alternative approaches 
to robotics design both mechanically and behaviourally. These works demonstrate the 
practical value of a deeper understanding of the perceptual factors that determine the 
qualities of animacy, and that endow it with emotional, visceral and aesthetic potency. 
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2. Animating Discourses 
“It's going to be harder to distinguish: what is alive and what is a machine… 
And that boundary may start to become meaningless.” 31 (Brooks, 1997) 
2.1 Introduction 
At Trinity College Dublin, in 1943, to a packed audience of academics and dignitaries, 
including the then Taoiseach Eamon de Valera, Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger 
delivered his illustrious lecture titled What is Life? Taking principles of his own scientific field 
and placing them onto the study of cell biology, he proposed the idea of a ‘code-script’ with 
all living things holding the “entire pattern of the individual's future development and of its 
functioning in the mature state.”32 Within a decade Watson and Cricks confirmed his 
hypothesis, describing the double-helix structure of DNA – the hereditary mechanism of all 
biological life and the foundations of the science of genetics. In honour of Schrödinger’s 
contribution, in 2012, Trinity College Dublin hosted another packed audience, including 
standing Taoiseach Enda Kenny for a follow-up lecture, again titled What is Life? The 
appetite for answers was clearly undiminished. Its speaker, American geneticist, J. Craig 
Venter, offered his definition. 
 “All living cells that we know of on this planet are DNA software driven 
biological machines comprised of hundreds of thousands of protein robots, 
coded for by the DNA, that carry out precise functions.” 33 (Venter, 2012) 
In May 2010 researchers at the J. Craig Venter Institute had sensationally announced to the 
world they had successfully constructed the “First Self- Replicating Synthetic Bacterial Cell.” 
By substituting the genome of a host bacteria with a fully synthesised genome they had, in 
effect, created the first synthetic life form. To distinguish their computer programmed DNA 
from the original genome it was copied from, they encoded the names of the authors of the 
research, a website address, and for good measure, three quotes touching upon the 
significance of their endeavour. “To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life” 
was chosen from James Joyce’s, A Portrait of the Artist of a Young Man34 and from American 
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Prometheus, the biography of Robert Oppenheimer, "See things not as they are, but as they 
might be"35. 
The third and final encoded statement “What I cannot build, I cannot understand”36, attributed 
to physicist Richard Feynman, transpired to be a misquote of “What I cannot create, I do not 
understand.” Regardless of this minor but somewhat embarrassing error, the quote touches 
on the underlying reason for perhaps humanity’s greatest technological and philosophical 
project. Motivated by questions, both metaphysical and scientific, on the origins of life and 
consciousness – with ever greater resolution – man has mimicked the forms and behaviours 
of life to better understand them. 
Venter’s view of life is unapologetically mechanistic. His code instructions programme protein 
automaton, just as a roboticist may engineer a servomotor mechanism. His work, and that of 
his team, is the latest step in a long and extraordinary history of machine making. Of artistic 
and scientific enquiry that with every step has further dissolved distinctions between natural 
and artificial, animate and inanimate, animal and automata. 
Today’s notion of a machine, and terms, such as autonomy and emergence have developed 
in unison with technologies that shed increasing light on life itself. As theoretical physicist 
Werner Heisenberg recognised "What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to 
our method of questioning"37. Conflicts naturally arose between the human tendency towards 
Vitalism and modern science’s tendency towards reductive mechanism. Neither have 
provided entirely satisfying answers to the question of What is Life? However, the friction 
between the two has inspired great inventions, art, technology and thought, that continue to 
inspire discourse. 
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2.2 Machine Life 
 
Figure 7. Heron's ‘Hercules and the Dragon’, illustrated by Giovanni Battista Aleoti (1589) 
 
Automatic Life 
From the legendary mythological automaton makers Daedalus and Pygmalion, to the early 
inventors Ctesibius (285–222 BC) and Heron (10 - 70AD), and the illustrious Ismail al-Jazari 
(1136–1206AD), there is a fascinating, and fragmented record of the ancient history of the 
human project to make life through imitation. The translation and dissemination of ancient 
texts in the renaissance, such as architect and stage designer Giovannie Battista Aleotti’s 
reinterpretation of Heron’s Pneumatics in 1589, have been instrumental in renewing interest 
in theatrical automaton38. Similarly translated in the 16th century, Marcus Vitruvius Pollio’s de 
Architectura – the only treatise on architecture to survive from antiquity – featured a tenth 
book dedicated to mechanical devices including hoists, cranes, catapults, sundials, water 
clocks, and the first recorded steam engines. It also included descriptions of mechanical 
figures that drank and moved, alongside water organs and “other things that are found to be 
pleasing to the eye and the ear”39. Architecture and the art of machine-making have a 
relationship reaching back to the foundations of architectural theory, in which the aesthetic 
potential of animated space is acknowledged. In 1598, Florentine architect Tommaso 
Francini, accompanied by his brother Alessandro, arrived at the gardens of the royal chateau 
of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, to begin building what are considered the high point of 
Renaissance automata40. 
Hydraulic statues enacted mythological tales, danced, played music and even spoke in what 
must have been for visitors of the time, an extraordinary, perhaps even supernatural, 
experience. In 1614, a young man recovering from the first of several breakdowns hid himself 
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away in Saint-Germain for two years. So fascinated by automata, records suggest he built 
his own41. However, it was not so much what he made, but how these animated machines 
shaped his way of thinking that was to cause perhaps the greatest epistemological shift in 
the Western world, towards a way of looking at the world that exorcised science of its animist 
tendencies. 
“Revolutions in thought are usually steady maturations suddenly 
completed. In emotional moments the gathered ideas of one mind 
decisively collect into a single vivid intuition. In such a moment of the year 
1619 the Angel of Truth announced to the dreaming Descartes that the 
material world was geometrical. In that moment of insight Descartes  
beheld a physical world of extended things with figures and motions.  
The vision perpetuated a permanent conviction that the material world  
was a vast assemblage of figured bits of extension in motion, or with 
relative rest... Versions of physical nature provided by the animate  
model, by the analogy of the living thing, gradually waned, and then 
dramatically succumbed, before the mechanical philosophy of the 
geometric ideal.” 42 (Gregory, 1927) 
Life was motion itself, and its truths could be found in an idealised mechanical model of the 
world. The influence of Descartes’ division of the material and mechanical human body on 
one side, from thinking mind and soul on the other, presented God as the architect of a 
marvellous automaton. Minsoo Kang notes in Sublime Dreams of Living Machines43 that 
Descartes, in effect, appropriated automata “conceptually wrenching them out of their 
original context of magical enchantment”44 into a new age where the physical world was 
rationalised so that living things and their behaviour, with study, could be mechanically 
explained and replicated. 
The dawn of the enlightenment saw automata flourish, epitomised by the artistic and 
scientific invention of Jacques Vaucanson, a trainee monk, born in 1709 in Grenoble, 
France. Vaucanson developed an interest in mechanics by making flying automaton angels. 
Finding his Jesuit superiors disapproving of his hobby – so much so that they destroyed his 
workshop – Vaucanson left the church and began a career that earned him the reputation, as 
Historian Silvio Bedini described it of “Unquestionably the most important inventor in the 
history of automata, as well as one of the most important figures in the history of machine 
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technology”45. Vaucanson first made his name with a series of life size flute playing androids, 
but it was the infamous Canard Digérateur, or Digesting Duck (1739), that secured his name 
in the history of performing machines. 
The life size automaton would eat, drink, stamp its webbed feet in water and, most 
momentously, digest food and excrete much like a living duck might do. It was a 
phenomenon, touring internationally, performing to enchanted crowds and bringing 
Vaucanson wealth and notoriety. His interest in replicating digestion had, however, begun 
before his musical automata. A student of anatomy, with an interest in medicine, he had 
earlier tried unsuccessfully to build a working imitation of a functioning human body. His 
failure to have achieved this overly ambitious goal would, it seems, to have provided the 
necessary lessons to allow him to accomplish his comparatively simpler, but nonetheless 
critically acclaimed automaton. 
“All the movements and attitudes of this automaton faithfully reproduce 
nature, copying it to the life even down to the tiniest detail, so much so that 
for a moment we are tempted to believe that there is a real duck before 
us… we have no doubt that the discoveries of this master mind will make 
his name immortal.” 46 (Chapuis et al, 1958) 
Great automata makers including Leonardo da Vinci, Wolfgang von Kempelen, James Cox, 
Pierre Jaquet-Droz and his son Henri-Louis, dazzled the world with performative machines, 
driven by ambitions to imitate life. Their automata played a theatrical role in the exorcism of 
Vitalist science, embodying the mechanical logic of astronomy, mathematics and physics, of 
Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes and Newton. Too often though, historical 
accounts of their machines portray them as merely playful curiosities. Vaucanson, for 
example, made improvements to machine tools decades ahead of their time, and while trying 
to replicate vocal cords discovered a way of making flexible tubing from Indian rubber that 
found countless applications in industry and medicine. Undoubtedly, it is for his invention and 
refinement of an automatic weaving machine erroneously attributed to Jacquard, that he 
deserves greatest recognition. For it was the genesis of programmable machines and the 
foundations of modern computing. 
 
39 
Cybernetic Life 
When in 1780, Italian physician Luigi Aloisio Galvani discovered the muscles of dead frogs' 
legs jumped when stimulated by an electric charge, he was the first to identify the animating 
power of electricity that famously inspired Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein47. Galvani’s 
experiments saw a wide variety of other theories of animation loose favour, including 
deflating the ideas of the Balloonists, who believed muscle contraction involved fluids or 
gases – not a surprising theory, in the age of steam engines. By the 20th century, the making 
of lifelike machines would shift from pneumatic and hydraulic mechanisms towards 
electromechanical brains and servomechanisms, in the perennial search for ever-more 
lifelike forms of behaviour, and it was the new science of cybernetics that would focus most 
intensively on the relationships between living and lifelike machine behaviour. 
 “Our terrestrial world is grossly bimodal in its forms: either the forms in it 
are extremely simple, like the run-down clock, so that we dismiss them 
contemptuously, Or they are extremely complex, so that we think of them 
as being quite different, and say they have life.” 48 (Ashby, 1960) 
In the 1930s, psychiatrist W. Ross Ashby’s studies of the underlying organisation of the 
nervous system led him to develop a general theory of complex regulating systems, 
hypothesising that a system of unorganised interacting elements, each with their own 
adaptive mechanisms, through circularities of stimulus exchange, could find dynamic 
equilibrium. His proto-cybernetic theory accounted not only for the effects of stimulus within a 
system, but also for the added complexity of unpredictable external environmental stimuli. He 
called this ‘ultrastability’, and in 1946 he began building a machine to test and embody his 
theory that he called the Homeostat. In Ashby’s essay Adaptiveness and Equilibrium 49 he 
had earlier recognised that regulatory mechanisms are not solely a feature of biology. 
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Figure 8. Ross Ashby's Homeostat cybernetic machine (1948) 
Throughout the 19th century, the automation industry had harnessed steam power with 
James Watt’s invention of the Governor. There was, however, a fundamental difference 
between the use of regulatory systems in biology and in machines of the time. An entire 
steam engine could operate on a single governor. A factory may use more, but nonetheless 
economically. Conversely the natural world, Ashby explained, was made up of systems far 
more “complex and composed of almost unaccountably many parts”50. To test his theory of 
complex regulating systems, he was to build a machine quite unlike any machine before it – 
an apparatus that contradicted the pre-programmed, automatic and, consequently, 
predictable behaviour of early machine paradigms. In the December 1948 issue of the 
journal Electronic Engineering under the conspicuous title Design for a Brain 51, Ashby 
presented Homeostat consisting of four sub-system units each networked together with input 
and output connections, through which they exchanged electrical stimuli. 
“Ashby understood these currents as the homeostat’s essential variables, 
electrical analogues of blood temperature or acidity or whatever, which it 
sought to keep within bounds—hence its name”. 52 (Pickering, 2010) 
Each Homeostat unit could be in one of 25 internal states – each state, an electrical 
configuration would change to another state if input stimulus thresholds were triggered. 
Regardless of having 2 x 25 x25 x 25 x 25 (781,250) combinatorial states within the 
Homeostat, it was successfully able to self-organise into a stable system, without any 
overarching control mechanism. 
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Figure 9. Circuit diagram of a single one of Ross Ashby's Homeostat devices 
Regulation was distributed and proved robust enough to also handle external perturbations 
Ashby electrically introduced into the system. Norbert Wiener, the father of cybernetics, 
heaped praise on this radical reformulation of the machine’s behaviour describing it as “one 
of the great philosophical contributions of the present day”53. Time magazine described it as 
the “closest thing to a synthetic brain man had made so far”54. Ashby, as a psychiatrist had 
built a machine to better understand how we organise thought. However, he had not only 
built a microcosm of a brain, but also of the living world. He argued provocatively in his later 
book, also titled Design for a Brain (2013), that if such organisation could come out of chaos, 
“the development of life on earth must thus not be seen as something remarkable. On the 
contrary, it was inevitable” 55. Such ideas of emergent life from self-organisation were 
decades ahead of the later work of complexity theorists, such as Stuart Kauffmann, Stephen 
Wolfram and Fritjof Capra. 
Similarly to Ashby, the neuroscientist Grey Walter came to develop an interest in 
cybernetics, recognising that negative feedback control processes in machines were 
analogous to those found in biological nervous systems. The dynamic stability of sensory-
motor systems was, as Grey Walter pointed out, something that physiologists had a head 
start on studying before engineers began formulating their own principles of control. 
Machines provided a necessary means of physically modelling sensory-motor behaviour, 
that Walter hoped might uncover some of the many mysteries of the human brain. He built a 
series of electro-mechanical animals called Machina Speculatrix. Due to their domed shell 
body and slow pace they were often affectionately called ‘tortoises’ and among some of the 
earliest autonomous robots built. 
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Figure 10. William Grey Walter's, cybernetic tortoise, (1950)56 
 
Each tortoise consisted of a pair of electrical circuits, built to simulate nerve cell functions 
coupled to motor functions. A photo-electric receptor enabled the tortoises to sense and 
steer motion towards light. The second receptor, an electrical contact switch, sensed 
collision with obstacles altering direction of travel. The robots would continuously explore 
their environment, attracted to light sources until a threshold of light exposure would be met, 
at which point they would turn away and the process would begin over again. A recharging 
hutch with a light above it assisted the tortoises in finding their way to a source of energy, 
giving them the ability to sustain continuous activity, with some autonomy. These robots, 
even by the engineering standards of the day, were electro-mechanically primitive. The 
“extreme economy” of design as Grey Walter described it, did not however lead to an 
economy of behaviours, with his primitive robots performing a variety of complex patterns of 
movement. Most compellingly, these behaviours were “remarkably unpredictable” with a 
“strange richness … [found in] animal behaviour– and human psychology”. A quality of 
“uncertainty, randomness, free will or independence” Grey Walter remarked, “so strikingly 
absent in most well-designed machines.”57 
These were the successors to life imitating automatons, representing a radical shift in 
approach. Whereas Pierre Jaquet-Droz’s The Writer (1772), consisted of 6000 exquisitely 
crafted mechanical parts, Walter had built his from only a handful of electro-mechanical 
components. Whereas programmable automatons were completely predictable and 
repetitive, ‘tortoises’ Elmer and Elsie would never repeat the same exact behaviours twice. 
Neither entirely consistent nor random in motion, they seemed to operate on the threshold 
 
43 
between order and chaos, performing qualitatively differently to anything built to imitate life 
before them. 
The sensorimotor nervous system of the animal brain now had an electro-mechanical 
simulacrum in machines. Unlike the animal brain however, it consisted of only 2 analogous 
cells rather than the billions of cells of a human brain. Nonetheless, to observers, the 
volitional behaviour of these tortoises was compellingly intelligent. They also had a particular 
liveness from their explorative behaviour, unlike Ashby’s earlier Homeostat which was 
immobile, and virtually silent once in a stable configuration. Walter later dubbed Ashby’s 
electro- mechanical device, Machina Sopora likening it to a "fireside cat or dog which only 
stirs when disturbed, and then methodically finds a comfortable position and goes to sleep 
again"58. While Ashby’s Homeostat attempted to find stability within itself, Walter’s tortoises 
attempted to find stability through their interaction with their surrounding environment. By 
modifying the environment, such as the location of sources of light or obstacles, a surprising 
variety of patterns of behaviours would emerge. 
 
 
Figure 11. Elsie the robotic tortoise distracted by the reflection of its own candle in a mirrored screen before 
eventually finding a candle light source behind it 
One of the most interesting examples given by Walter, was noted when a tortoise passed in 
front of mirror. An on-board indicator light – intended only for Grey Walter to observe the 
machine’s internal state – was detected by the tortoise’s own photocell, causing an 
unexpected flickering behaviour. The light sensed by the photocell activated a change in 
state in the robot which in turn switched off the light. This in turn changed the state of the 
robot back to its original light on state, which in turn switched the light off again, leading to an 
oscillating motion and corresponding flickering light. Walter quipped, such a behaviour could 
even be (mis)interpreted as form a self-recognition. When Elmer and Elsie were observed 
close to one another, a similar but distinctive pattern of behaviour would occur. 
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Each attracted by the light of the each other, would enter into a reciprocally oscillating 
motion. Author of The Cybernetic Brain, Andrew Pickering, likened it to a “tragic mating 
dance”59, a lively and seemingly creative higher-order behaviour emerging from the 
interaction of a pair of robots, each endowed with only a couple electro-mechanical nerve 
cells. Of course, such interpretations were not beyond dispute, raising questions of where 
indeed the intelligence and novelty lay in the behaviour of these machines. 
The tight-coupling between the features of the environment and the tortoise’s behaviour 
presented Walter with the opportunity to study his Machina Speculatrix, by modifying the 
environment they inhabited, rather than tampering with their internal electro-mechanical 
composition. This approach was strikingly similar to the deductive study of animal behaviour 
exemplified by Pavlov60, Thorndike61 and Skinner62, where the inner workings of the brain are 
inaccessible, so environmental stimuli are modified and resulting behaviour observed. 
Alongside Ashby and Walter, early cyberneticians including Norbert Wiener and Claude 
Shannon, built electro-mechanical models to study self-organising behaviour. Though the 
singular Watts Governor may have symbolised the cybernetic principle of circular feedback 
control, it was multiplicities of interacting feedback mechanisms, and their emergent self-
organising behaviour, that captured the pioneers’ imagination. 
Emergence and self-organisation are interchangeable terms in cybernetics. While Self-
organisation sees less use beyond the field, Emergence has a wider, although somewhat 
notorious, philosophical position within the arts and sciences. From the Latin verb ‘emergo’ 
to arise, to rise up, to come up or to come forth – discourse on emergence developed within 
a fractious debate on the nature of life in the 19th century. The rise of a mechanical worldview 
– established by the achievements of Copernicus, Galileo. Bacon, Descartes, and Newton – 
advocated a view of life as reducible to physical processes. In opposition, the Vitalists 
argued that such reductivism failed to explain the phenomenal qualities of life and 
consciousness, favouring the proposal of a metaphysical substance – a soul, or Aristotle’s 
and Hans Driesch’s entelechy – that differentiated the inanimate from the animate. “May God 
us keep, From single vision and Newton’s sleep”63 lamented romantic artist and mystic, 
William Blake. 
Avoiding the vitalist disposition towards the spiritual, while maintaining the need to recognise 
a property greater than the material parts, a third way was proposed by the British 
Emergentists, including philosopher Samuel Alexander who encapsulates their perspective 
in his 1920 book Space, Time, and Deity. 
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 “Physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity have the quality 
of life… The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and 
has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to 
that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with 
its special laws of behaviour. The existence of emergent qualities thus 
described is something to be noted, as some would say, under the 
compulsion of brute empirical fact.” 64 (Alexander, 1920) 
The recognition of the limitations of reductive methods, and the embrace of unpredictable 
and emergent phenomena, became central interest for pioneering cybernetic practices. The 
electro-mechanical machines of Ashby’s Homeostat and Walter’s tortoises representing the 
first electro-mechanical embodiments of emergent artificial life. Whereas the prior age of 
industrial automation had seen machines limited to repetitive and predictable motion, the 
cybernetic revolution unlocked the potential for unpredictable, yet purposeful, emergent 
behaviour. Machines with an aesthetic potential that captured the public’s imagination, would 
have likely entertained William Blake with their ability to bring out the vitalist tendencies of 
their spectators. The environmental stimuli of mirrors, light sources and obstacles, that 
Walter’s tortoises encountered, shaped their animate emergent behaviour without the need 
for sophisticated electronics or computing power. Through Walter and Ashby’s machines, we 
see from its foundations, that cybernetics recognised behaviour of a physical agent-system 
being inseparably coupled to its environment. Whether it is in the study of the brain, or social 
or economic systems, behaviour does not occur within a vacuum, but rather is a continuous 
embodied exchange with an environment. Though environment as a term is often used 
loosely to describe a subject’s general surroundings, in cybernetic it should be understood as 
specific to “all objects a change in whose attributes affect the system and also those objects 
whose attributes are changed by the behavior of the system"65. 
“There can’t be a proper theory of the brain until there is a proper theory of 
the environment as well… the subject has been hampered by our not 
paying sufficiently serious attention to the environmental half of the 
process… the “psychology” of the environment will have to be given almost 
as much thought as the psychology of the nerve network itself.” 66 (Ashby, 
1953) 
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This is one of early cybernetics’ key contributions to understanding the source of emergent 
life and intelligence. It encourages us to rebalance our attention to design problems between 
agent and environment, whether one is engaged in designing the behaviour of common 
robotic typologies or exploring non-standard applications in architecture, arts and 
performance. In my own practice, working between robotics and architecture, and making 
semi-autonomous machines to behave in spaces, it has become apparent to me that this is 
essential. I have found the ‘environmental half’ – which I believe has been understudied – 
remains in much need of deep consideration. 
Defining an environment, particularly one that is highly dynamic creates considerable 
challenges for designers. The Smart Geometry: Constructing for Uncertainty conference 
which I chaired at the Bartlett in 2013 addressed these issues at a variety of scales. When 
trying to understand the environment in which an agent-system is intended or observed to 
exist within, two observers may well have different ideas about what constitutes a given 
agent-system’s environment. Heinz von Foerster puts its plainly, stating that “the 
environment as we perceive it is our invention.” Further Ashby’s notion of the ‘Black Box’, 
warns us that there may be things that are ‘out of view’, and these may be of greater 
importance than we fully anticipate or appreciate. 
Neo-Cybernetic Life 
Heinz von Foerster, the secretary of the early Macy Conference proceedings, which brought 
together the founders of cybernetics, had presided over developments in the field that, in the 
following decades, saw ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ camps emerge. On one side the mathematical and 
engineering concerns towards computing, communication technologies, robotics and artificial 
intelligence developed the foundations of today’s ubiquitous digital infrastructure. On the 
other, the ‘softer’ philosophical concerns of social systems, psychotherapy, cognition and 
ecology were developed. As Bruce Clarke explains “Few persons besides von Foerster could 
be said to have had a foot in both camps”67, allowing him to explore a complete vision for 
cybernetics that might consolidate some of the field before it otherwise separated entirely 
into independent specialisms. 
Primed by Ashby’s understanding of the ‘Black Box’, alongside contemporaneous work in 
fields of mathematics of George Spencer Brown’s The Laws of Form68 that examined the act 
of making distinctions, von Foerster harnessed the language of control feedback (of first-
order cybernetics) to examine a second-order of circularity for the field. This was a 
conceptual leap in which the observer not only stipulates the purpose of the system, but also, 
as Heinz von Foerster explains, enters that system by stipulating his or her own purpose69. 
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This has been described as the cybernetics of cybernetics, second-order cybernetics or 
more recently neo-cybernetics. This ‘meta’ cybernetic framework is an epistemological shift 
away from scientific traditions of objectivity and reductive rationality, towards radical forms of 
constructivist and ecological thinking. Ranulph Glanville describes “Von Foerster’s 
significance/role in second-order Cybernetics is without equal”70. 
“The relationship of first order Cybernetics to second order Cybernetics is 
like the relationship between the Newtonian view of the universe, and the 
Einsteinian. Just as Newton’s description remains totally appropriate and 
usable in many instances (including flights to the moon), so first order 
Cybernetics also retains its value and frequently provides us with all we 
need (for instance, in many control arrangements). And just as the 
Newtonian view is now understood to be a special, simplified, restricted 
(and slow) version of Einstein’s view, so first order Cybernetics is a special, 
simplified, restricted (and linear) version of second order Cybernetics.” 71 
(Glanville, 2002) 
This critical maturing step in cybernetic thinking acknowledged the observer was an essential 
part of all systems. Von Foerster’s papers Notes on an Epistemology for Living Things72, On 
Constructing a Reality73 and Cybernetics of Epistemology74 and Objects: Tokens for (Eigen-) 
Behaviour75 made the case that to live within an environment is to be an epistemologist, 
presenting with persuasive style, the circular feedback mechanisms that enable cognitive 
systems to construct stable realities (continuously re-distinguishing the distinction). His 
argument is based on an understanding that knowledge of an environment is dependent on 
the system that observes it, that “form and content interrelate, in much the way Gregory 
Bateson talked of the unity of the mind and body”76, and that a systemic reality of an 
environment is both the precondition and product of an observing system. 
Where early first order cybernetics provided a means to understand regulatory processes, 
such as homeostasis, habituation and adaptation, the second-order provided a framework to 
tackle processes of cognition, bound between living things and their environments in 
continuous interaction. As von Foerster concludes in his 1973 paper, On Constructing a 
Reality, “If you desire to see, learn how to act.”77 
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Figure 12. Trivial machine with truth table (left) and non-trivial machine (right) 
 
Heinz von Foerster unlike other cybernetic pioneers such as Wiener, Walter, and Ashby, was 
not a machine maker. He instead would use the word ‘machine’ in terms of conceptual 
mechanisms for discussing input and output relationships in systems. He distinguished two 
fundamentally different types of machine, trivial and non-trivial. The trivial machine is a 
simple, limited and predictable system, best described by von Foerster himself. 
A trivial machine is characterized by a one-to-one relationship between its 
“input” (stimulus, cause) and its “output” (response, effect). This invariable 
relationship is “the machine.” Since this relationship is determined once 
and for all, this is a deterministic system; and since an output once 
observed for a given input will be the same for the same input given later, 
this is also a predictable system. (Von Foerster, 1972)78 
Importantly the trivial machine is a personal construct of the observer, not a first- order 
cybernetic system diagram. With observation of input stimuli and output behaviour, clear 
causal relationships can be constructed and a “truth table” drawn up to refer to. A trivial 
machine will repeat behaviours predictably to repeated stimuli input without change. By 
contrast, non-trivial machines will not exhibit completely predictable behaviour because its 
internal mechanism, are subject to change due to its history of previous inputs. 
Ashby’s Homeostats, are clear examples of non-trivial machines with their internal 
transformations in signal processing that lead to adaptive behaviour. In networks of other 
machines the interaction of multiple machines lead to non-linear self- organising behaviour 
that are complex but capable of dynamic stability. While Trivial machines represented a 
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primitive reactive model of behaviour, non-trivial opened up the possibilities for behaviour 
adaptive to changing conditions over time. Though most technology we encounter is 
designed to act as a trivial machine and operate predictably, cybernetics was far more 
interested in non-trivial mechanisms as they seemed to hold the key to understanding the 
recursive and continuous performance of complex living systems. 
Knowledge, far from being passively received, is actively and continuously constructed by a 
cogniscant observer, and the function of cognition is adaptive to its environment, serving an 
observer’s experiential world, not the discovery of an ontological reality. The cybernetics of 
cybernetics took what Ernst von Glasersfeld coined as a radical constructivist position 
arguing that, “Those who ... do not explicitly give up the notion that our conceptual 
constructions can or should in some way represent an independent, ‘objective’ reality, are 
still caught up in the traditional theory of knowledge” 79. The use of ‘radical’ was in order to 
emphasise that this epistemological perspective had to be total in its rejection of a “correct” 
observable world, ensuring that no lapse back into the fantasy of realism should ever occur. 
Radical constructivism did not however deny an objective reality exists, only that we have no 
way of knowing what that reality is. 
“Radical constructivism itself must not be interpreted as a picture or 
description of any absolute reality but as a possible model of knowing and 
the acquisition of knowledge in cognitive organisms that are capable of 
constructing for themselves, on the basis of their own experience, a more 
or less reliable world.” 80 (Watzlawick, 1984) 
Though epistemological concerns were often directed to issues of human cognition, the 
foundations of these understandings had emerged from general studies of simpler 
behaviours and the organisation of primitive nervous systems. In the foundational years of 
cybernetic research, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’ neurophysiological studies led to 
the development of the first mathematical model of neural networks 81 that continue, today, to 
be the principle reference for the computation of artificial neural networks. McCulloch and 
Pitts joined MIT, under the invitation of Norbert Wiener, where they worked with Jerome 
Lettvin and Humberto Maturana on the publication of What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s 
Brain82, the paradigmatic study on visual perception that demonstrated that retina was not 
merely a light receptor that sent signals to the brain for interpretation, but that it also 
performed ‘feature-detection’, with neurons responsive to specific features of a visual 
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stimulus, such as edges, changes in light levels and movement. Famously, they identified a 
feature detector that they called the ‘bug detector’ - specialised cells in a frog’s eye that 
responded when small, dark objects enter the visual field, stop, and then move intermittently. 
“The eye speaks to the brain in a language already highly organized and 
interpreted, instead of transmitting some more or less accurate copy of the 
distribution of light on the receptors” 83 (Myhrvold 2013) 
So radical an idea was it that Lettvin tells the story of when they tried to present the study to 
the American Physiology Society, were laughed off the stage and had their research funding 
threatened. The paper has since gone on to be one of the most highly cited papers in 
perceptual and cognitive science. The paper characterises the eye far from being a passive 
camera receptor of an external reality, but rather an active and specialised interface for the 
frog’s own purposes within its world – one that is highly attuned to its own survival with 
reflexes for social perception and responsive behaviour. 
“A frog hunts on land by vision... The frog does not seem to see or, at  any 
rate, is not concerned with the detail of stationary parts of the world around 
him. He will starve to death surrounded by food if it is not moving. His 
choice of food is determined only by size and movement. He will leap to 
capture any object the size of an insect or worm, provided it moves like 
one. He can be fooled easily not only by a bit of dangled meat but by any 
moving small object.” 84 (Lettvin et al, 1959) 
While the frog is easily fooled into false detection, it has evolved and thrived with these 
relatively simple object motion-detection capabilities. The eyes of other more advanced 
predators have far sharper and longer-range vision, capable of detecting the animate motion 
of potential prey from great distances. The visual-cortex of social animals including human 
beings are also understood to be highly attuned to detect not only life, but also gender, and 
emotional cues from even limited visual motion information85. Jerome Lettivin, and his 
colleagues at MIT, demonstrated in compelling fashion that the optic nerve was less like a 
transmission cable and much more like a neural computer, processing information and 
parsing features from the retina into meaningful information, and triggering responsive 
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behaviour. The Frog’s eye not only detected bugs but it automatically triggered a jumping 
reaction. Far from the eye being an ‘input’ sensor, it is understood to be tightly coupled to 
behavioural response. Such automatic responses are found throughout the animal kingdom 
and, in the following chapter, I will examine how this understanding has been extended to 
studies on how the human eye automatically constructs not only spatial, colour and motion 
information, but also the causal and the social structure of its environment. I will also 
describe how, today, some of the most sophisticated research into deep neural networks is 
discovering the power of binding perceptual and motor control together, to solve the most 
challenging of problems in robotic behaviour. 
The collaboration of Jerome Lettvin, Humberto Maturana, Warren McCulloch and Walter 
Pitts was a moment of convergence in the careers of four eminent scientists, working with 
the characteristic disregard for disciplinary boundaries that cybernetic practice embodied. 
First-order cybernetic concerns of purposeful (goal- directed) behaviour were deepened by 
second-order study of the purpose of purpose, and the regulation of regulation, implicitly 
raising ‘big questions’ about the self-organising systems that lead to cognition, and life itself. 
Seeking to understand “the characteristic organization of living systems”, Maturana’s early 
work on the Biology of Cognition was further developed with his student Francisco Varela, 
into their theory of Autopoiesis 86 - auto meaning "self” (i.e. autonomy of self-organising 
systems) and poiesis, meaning making, formation or creation. 
"An autopoietic machine is a machine organised (defined as a unity) as a 
network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components that produces the components which: (i) through their 
interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realise the 
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it 
(the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realisation as 
such a network." 87 (Maturana and Varela, 1980) 
A system was autopoietic if the structure of parts interacts in such a way as to self- organise 
the production of further parts and interactions that maintain its self- organisation. Maturana 
and Varela’s neo-cybernetic theory was developed as an abstract model of cell metabolism - 
not defined by the presence of a particular material substance, but rather a set of dynamic 
relations. Central to their theory is the concept of autonomy, but not in the naïve sense of 
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absolute self-sufficiency. Rather, it acknowledges that the organism or agent-system is 
organisationally closed, while paradoxically bound to its environment. 
"The result of structural coupling is an autonomous and strictly bounded 
system, that has nevertheless been shaped extensively by its interactions 
with its environment over time, just as the environment has been shaped 
by its interactions with the system." 88 (Quick, 2003) 
Autopoietic theory comprises two key reciprocal features - the maintenance of organisation 
(dynamic interactions), and regeneration of structure (network of parts) to remain 
autonomous. The complexity of an environment can ‘perturb’ the autopoietic system and 
stimuli can even trigger it to restructure itself, however, the system’s boundaries are 
organisationally closed. 
"The self-transcending movement of life is none other than metabolism, 
and metabolism is none other than the biochemical instantiation of the 
autopoietic organization. That organization must remain invariant – 
otherwise the organism dies – but the only way autopoiesis can stay in 
place is through the incessant material flux of metabolism. In other words, 
the operational closure of autopoiesis demands, that the organism be an 
open system." 89 (Thompson, 2009) 
For an autopoietic system to perpetuate itself within an environment, it must be responsive to 
that environment, with an organisation that seeks to increase its potential to survive and 
thrive. Evolutionary biologists and psychologists examine how the behavioural organisation 
of living organisms are shaped over generations – from their ability to sense external stimuli, 
to their articulation of a response – and that, significantly, this occurs in the context of their 
environment. Over generations, perceptual capabilities to detect salient stimuli, while 
ignoring aspects of their environment that are irrelevant, develop. Evolutionary ‘knowledge’ is 
embodied in these perceptual systems (detecting predators, for example), and suitable 
response mechanisms have also developed. 
In Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology, Evan Thompson describes the 
autopoietic (and neo-cybernetic) understanding of cognition as simply “the minimal sense of 
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viable sensorimotor conduct”90 found in the most primitive of living organisms. The 
autopoietic view of life is one where life and stimulus exchange with an environment are 
necessarily bound to one another, as Maturana's is often quoted, "to live is to cognize", a 
shortening of his earlier statement "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a 
process, is a process of cognition"91. The life of a species, in its structure and organisation, 
holds a deep evolutionary knowledge, where each instantiation of that species embodies that 
perceptual knowledge, which, in interaction with an individual’s lifetime of experiences, 
shapes an individual’s reality. 
Whether we are discussing a human being, a frog, or a single cell, homeostasis is not simply 
the maintenance of biological operation. Understood through the cybernetic entrainment of 
mind, body and environment, autopoietic systems are continually in a process of constructing 
their own stable reality or “cognitive homeostasis”, as von Forester put it. And so, as Varela 
asserts, our deep knowledge of our constructed world, and how we interact with it, is not "as 
a representation of the world ‘out there’, but rather as an ongoing bringing forth of a world 
through the process of living itself"92. 
“Autopoiesis entails emergence of a self. A physical autopoietic system, by 
virtue of its operational closure, gives rise to an individual or self in the form 
of a living body, an organism. Emergence of a self entails emergence of a 
world.” 93 (Thompson, 2009) 
Autopoiesis, as an abstracted description of autonomous living systems, attracted the 
attention of the social sciences as well as organisation and information system theorists. 
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s use of the metaphor of autopoiesis to describe whole 
social systems immaterially mediated by communication, is the most prominent example of 
the transferability of cybernetic models to other domains. Luhmann argued that all higher 
forms of life, consciousness and social communication behavior were necessarily non-trivial 
machines.94  He explained that Social systems were – like living organisms – self-referential. 
"The system continuously refers to itself by distinguishing itself from the environment"95. The 
self-referentiality allows the social system to distinguish itself as a system from its 
environment, without the material boundaries we can more easily distinguish in biological 
cells, for example. 
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"A social system comes into being whenever an autopoietic connection of 
communications occurs and distinguishes itself against an environment by 
restricting the appropriate communications. Accordingly, social systems 
are not comprised of persons and actions but of communications." 96 
(Luhmann, 1989) 
Zeleny points out that, in fact, one can also see "(...) all biological (autopoietic) systems are 
social systems. They consist of production, linkage, and disintegration of related components 
and component-producing processes. An organism or a cell is, therefore, a social system"97. 
He also points out that while there have been many successful examples of defining all 
biological systems as autopoietic, there has been less success at demonstrating all 
autopoietic systems are living ones. 
The epistemological focus of neo-cybernetics that enabled an autopoietic view of life and 
cognition is not without critique. Ontologist Andrew Pickering warns the “endless agonizing 
about the observer’s personal responsibility for his or her knowledge claims”98 detracts from 
the “performative materiality” of the field. He views cybernetics, embodied in the performance 
of the machines of Ashby, Grey Walter and (later) Pask, amongst others, as providing a 
lasting contribution, by grounding a nonmodern ontology through performativity. He 
maintains behaviour does not require an observer – although it might have one – rather, 
“behaviour is that part of the functioning of an organism which is engaged in acting upon or 
having commerce with the outside world”99. I find both the performative nonmodern ontology 
of Pickering, and the epistemological emphasise of Glanville, von Foerster, and Pask to be, 
in practice, very similarly useful. They both share the metaphor of a dance of agency which 
implies a continuity of adaptive exchange, and embodied interaction. 
The complexity of emergent interactions in social systems, the emphasis on the irreducibility 
of those system-observer exchanges, and the inherent subjectivity of modelling, led neo-
cybernetic research to dispense with formal mathematical modelling, in favour of 
philosophical discourse. This, it has been argued may have insulated its impact from 
concurrent mathematical and computational discourse on the design of artificial ‘intelligent’ 
systems. For those in fields of applied sciences, the second-order passion for the self-
referential and philosophical detached cybernetics from concrete phenomena. Yet, as Bruce 
Clarke and Mark Hansen make the case in Emergence and Embodiment, New Essays on 
Second-Order Systems Theory, “Some of the most important theoretical and critical 
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conversations going on today in cognitive sciences, chaos and complexity studies, and social 
systems theory stem from neo-cybernetic notions of self-organisation, emergence and 
autopoiesis” 100. I would add to that statement, that cybernetic machines – particularly early 
analogue homeostatic contraptions – are commonly left unrecognised for their foundational 
role in the development of those theories, though their embodiment performance of these 
ideas. 
 
Digital Life 
The dawn of digital computing granulated the previously continuous interface between 
machines and their environments. And, with the digital turn, the discrete computational 
biology of von Neumann came to dominate approaches to replicating life-like behaviour in 
machines. In 1970, when John Conway published his binary state cellular automata, 
famously titled the Game of Life101, it became the defining example of the enormous 
emergent potential of even the simplest of rule bases. Further studies revealed it capable of 
building of a universal Turing machine, offering a way to build a mathematical universe from 
the ground up. William Gosper, a leading programmer at MIT’s AI Lab described it as giving 
"the ability to do everything from animal husbandry to recursive function theory"102, and 
Conway himself believed the Game of Life might support the emergence of any known 
animal, as well as unlimited novel new creatures. 
If the grid was large enough to compute the enormous number of infinitesimally small 
interactions, something may emerge capable of “Evolving, reproducing, squabbling over 
territory. Getting cleverer and cleverer. Writing learned Ph.D. theses. On a large enough 
board, there's no doubt in my mind this sort of thing would happen”103. For this scale of 
computation to emerge in a cellular automaton, the computer scientists predicted it to need 
unfathomably large grids, possibly the size of a universe itself, and it was this sort of 
equivalency that inspired groups like the Information Mechanics Group at MIT, to explore the 
possibility of our universe as an enormous automaton – and by implication something fully 
knowable and simulatable. For the group’s founder Edward Fredkin "the basis of life is 
clearly digital… nothing is done by nature that can't be done by a computer. If a computer 
can't do it, nature can't" 104. He wasn’t alone in this proposition. Models of the universe as a 
giant computer had first been explored by Konrad Zuse (1969), and then later by Stephen 
Wolfram (2002). 
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“It’s interesting what the principle of computational equivalence ends up 
saying. it kind of encapsulates both the great strength and the great 
weakness of science. because on the one hand it says that all the wonders 
of the universe can be captured by simple rules. yet it also says that there’s 
ultimately no way to know the consequences of these rules— except in 
effect just to watch and see how they unfold.” 105 (Wolfram, 2005) 
In Wolfram’s and Conway’s automata, there is little means available to calculate in advance 
how they will behave. One simply has to ‘let them run’, stepping through discrete units of 
time, updating their state variables in accordance to the given rules, to see what emerges. 
Though many rules bases of cellular automaton predictably generated instances of 
unresponsive and periodic patterns, it was the instances of unpredictable chaotic and semi-
chaotic patterns that attracted the most interest. Studying cellular automata, Christopher 
Langton examined how CA rules – approaching a phase transition between ordered and 
disordered patterns – were capable of universal (Turing) computation. He identified that 
between predictable order and chaotic noise, a zone of emergent complexity existed. 
Langton and other complexity researchers became interested in how certain patterns could 
remain semi-ordered, yet interact with dynamics of their noisy environment. Mathematician 
Doyne Farmer coined this the ‘Edge of Chaos’, an emergent computational space that had 
properties of living systems interacting with the dynamics of an entropic world. 
 
Figure 13. Chrisopher Langton's Life at the Edge of Chaos illustrated using Wolfram's cellular automata 
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Langton's egg diagram, mapping the mathematical space of his cellular automata, indicates 
the relative location of periodic, chaotic, and complex transition spaces. To the left, 
information is frozen entirely, followed by a ‘regime’ where ‘periodic cycles’ might be 
considered like crystal growth. Patterns emerge, yet they are too limited to support life. To 
the right, information is unstructured, or cannot maintain structure for long. Only within a 
relatively small ‘sweet spot’ do we find information with stability, but enough dynamic 
interaction with its surrounding environment to appear to have life-like behaviour. The 
responsive emergent patterns of CAs suggested types of phase-transitions of a pre-biotic 
world, with information processing capabilities that may have formed with other complex 
structures to become the ‘primordial soup’ of life. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the emergent 
qualities of complex animated computer animations encouraged a quiet vitalism to appear in 
discourse. Leader in parallel supercomputing, Danny Hillis went as far as to describe the 
soul as being found in emergence. 
"The soul is the result of taking simple things that you understand the rules 
of, and applying this emergent behavior that is both a consequence of the 
rules and also not obviously connected to it. That's to me where the soul is. 
That's a much more interesting, robust place for the soul to be than off in 
some little comer of science which we just haven't figured out yet.” 106 (Hillis 
in Levy, 1993) 
The artificial life community that emerged in the late 1980s, embracing a bottom-up approach 
to intelligent machine behaviour, were faced with the immediate problem of definition. The 
first ALife conference, chaired by Christopher Langton, had promoted itself as “the study of 
artificial systems that exhibit behaviour characteristic of natural living systems”, rather than 
dare suggest any promises of “real” life in silico. Yet, the diverse crowd of over a hundred 
scientists and technicians who attended the first gathering in Los Alamos, coming from a 
diverse array of fields, all had very different ideas about the problem definition for the 
community. Steven Levy’s account of the first meeting describes the “perpetually haunting 
question: What is life?” that left the community wondering, “How can you create life when no 
one agrees what that means? How would you know you had done it?”107 
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A similar problem had been faced for decades in the field of artificial intelligence. The 
solution proposed by Alan Turing, which would come to be known as the Turing test, was an 
experiment that, in short, asked a human subject to have a text based conversation with 
another hidden agent, who may be human or machine. The subject would ask questions and 
receive answers eventually making a judgement call about whether the hidden agent was 
human or not. In other words, if the subject could no longer determine which respondent was 
human or machine, the Turing test would be passed and we could attribute intelligence to 
machine. The delegates at the first ALife conference discussed what an equivalent test might 
be for a field less interested in imitating human reasoning and, rather, the essential 
characteristics that we all appear to irresistibly identify as life-like. 
“In a coincidental nod to de Vaucanson, some people at the a-life 
conference began talking about a duck test: if it looks like a duck and 
quacks like a duck, it belongs in the class labelled ducks. this Vaucanson 
test was admittedly subjective but ultimately no more so than the Turing 
test.” 108 (Levy, 1992) 
With such a variety of software, hardware and wetware approaches to animate behaviours, 
within the burgeoning community, a general agreement formed that creators should simply 
aim to satisfy their own criteria for aliveness. This allowed deeper inspection of a multiplicity 
of types of behaviour, rather than immediately seeking a universal principle, although that 
remained an ambition. Langton’s favourite example of tackling a particular behaviour was 
Craig Reynolds's 1986 ‘Boids’ program109. Boids, short for ‘birdoid’, referring to something 
bird-like, demonstrated compelling impressions of flocking behaviour directed by a simple set 
of three rules of separation, alignment and cohesion, driven by attraction, detraction and 
velocity parameters. 
"The motion of a flock of birds is ... simple in concept yet is so visually 
complex it seems randomly arrayed and yet is magnificently synchronous. 
Perhaps most puzzling is the strong impression of intentional centralized 
control. Yet all evidence indicates that flock motion must be merely the 
aggregate result of the actions of individual animals, each acting solely on 
the basis of its local perception of the world." 110 (Reynolds, 1986) 
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From a primitive set of ‘perceptual’ rules, a global flocking behaviour spontaneously emerged 
from local interactions, in a similar manner to cellular automata. So convincing was the 
performance of the boids, that ornithologists began contacting Reynolds intuiting that real 
living birds might be using the same perceptual heuristics 111. Iztok Lebar Bajec and Frank 
Heppner have described the study of organised flight of birds as “one of the most easily 
observed, yet challenging to study, phenomena in biology” 112,with computational simulations 
generating a great variety of striking representation of behaviour and hypothesises about the 
underlying mechanism. So rapidly that “the ability to test these hypotheses lags behind the 
capacity to generate them”.113  
The work also attracted the interest of the computer animation industry who would come to 
be a key financial backer of the ALife movement, deploying the techniques in 1992 for the 
first time in a feature film to simulate flocking bats in Tim Burton’s Batman Returns114. In this 
context, the success of these simulated agents is measured by their verisimilitude to an 
audience’s expectations of bat behaviour. This would be at the softer end of the ALife 
research field. At the other end of the spectrum there were those hard ALifers who 
maintained that if an organism (usually digital in their research) was self-organising and self-
replicating in its (usually digital) environment, they could be considered seriously as alive in 
every sense. 
Langton, a computer scientist argued for a reconceptualisation of life. "The leap you have to 
make is to think about machineness as being the logic of organization. It is not the 
material…if you can capture its logical organization in some other medium you can have the 
same “machine” because it’s the organization that constitutes the machine, not the stuff it’s 
made of. That's the leap you have to make. It's a small one" 115. ‘Machineness’ is here an 
expanded notion, beyond mechanical forces, into the realm of systems thinking, with 
information flow and interaction, representing the fundamental layer. Life, in Langton’s view, 
is not therefore located in the material itself but rather in an ongoing set of relations. “To 
animate machines… is not to bring life to a machine; rather it is to organize a population of 
machines in such a way that their interactive dynamics is alive” 116. 
Langton’s confidence that he could create life, was not universally shared by researchers in 
the field. While those in the hard ALife camp believe – as von Neumann did – that life was a 
process that could be abstracted away from any particular medium, soft ALife sees the 
product of the field as a performative animacy, of life-like rather than living behaviour. 
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“The question "What is life?" is not often asked in biology, precisely 
because the machine metaphor already answers it: "Life is a machine." 
Indeed, to suggest otherwise is regarded as unscientific and viewed with 
the greatest hostility as an attempt to take biology back to metaphysics.” 
117 (Rosen, 1991) 
Robert Rosen’s Life Itself 118 delivers a surgical dissection of the shortfalls of modern 
science’s mechanistic conception of life, rejecting them ultimately for their inability to explain 
the qualities of life. He suggests that to reveal the answers to the mystery of life one must 
look to the ‘oracle’ of Systems Theory - shifting the question from what is special about life in 
terms of material, to what is special about life in terms of organisational behaviour. 
Sympathetic theories can be found in Deep Ecology 119, and intrinsically within cybernetics. 
Fritjof Capra and Pier Luigi Luisi, in their Systems View of Life120, further the argument for a 
holistic network view emphasising pattern and organisation. What is so tantalising for me, 
personally, about this counter argument with modern Cartesians, is its quiet vitalism. Rosen 
acknowledges the aversion this causes to many in the scientific community. 
Philosopher Mark Bedau argues that this “should be considered one of the fundamental 
concepts of philosophy, but philosophers haven't thought of it much. Nor have biologists. 
They typically throw up their hands. It is not a natural property like water – you can 
investigate water and say, 'there's H20, that's its essence.' But life isn’t material, it's 
ephemeral". Elliott Sober contends that, ultimately, the question is not important. "If a 
machine can extract energy from its environment, grow, repair damage to its body, and 
reproduce," he asks, "what remains of the issue whether it’s ‘really’ alive?" 121 Physicist 
Gerald Feinberg and biologist Robert Shapiro have coined a term for those who "believe that 
all life must be based on the chemistry of carbon compounds and must operate in an 
aqueous (water) medium" - "carbaquists" 122. Yet, no one has effectively argued that life 
could never exist in other forms. 
2.3 Models of Intelligence 
Cartesian Cognition 
In the age of mechanical clocks, Decartes described the world in terms of cogs and levers, 
and all life as a divinely designed automaton. In an age of digital automaton, computer 
scientists, in the same manner, theorised of our universe in binary automaton. This modern 
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Cartesianism, proposing a digital physics or pancomputationalism, met with strong critique 
for its inability to account for natural emergent phenomena, such as human 
consciousness123, nor for free will and various examples of indeterministic randomness124. 
Whereas cybernetic conceptions of cognition were understood as continuous, embodied 
exchange between autopoietic-systems and their complex environments, artificial 
intelligence research that emerged out of the establishing of computer science departments, 
built on the binary logic of digital computing. 
What is often called ‘Classical’, ‘Computational’ or ‘Cognitivist’ AI, prescribed to a view of 
intelligence as a problem of computer software, and the internal manipulation of symbolic 
representations of an outside world. Software became the focus of AI, relegating hardware to 
the supporting role of input-output devices and information processors. This Cartesian split 
came from perceived limitations of analogue computing compared to the discrete logic of 
binary computing. Marvin Minsky, a leading figure in AI research, argued the limitations of 
the computer as an intelligence-amplifying machine rested in the capabilities of the 
programmer alone125, and a great deal of promise was made in early artificial intelligence 
research, based on a premise that the brain and the computer were much the same thing. 
This approach reinforced the view that intelligence was an entirely rational processing of 
logical and discrete representations, as opposed to an embodied, complex and continuous 
exchange with the physical world. To today, the cultural power of computing has had lasting 
effects on broad cultural conceptions of intelligence, and has reinforced Cartesian 
conceptions of cognition that continue to relegate bodies and their embodied knowledge to 
the supporting role of input- output devices and information processors. 
After a disappointing start to the new field, Minsky and others recognised what they called 
the ‘common-sense problem’, which emerged from designing intelligence from the top -
down. The scientists had not fully appreciated that human intelligence was structured upon 
vast amounts of implicit knowledge, shared between us through experience, but rarely 
explicated in any logical representation. 
“An old philosophical dream was at the heart of the problem. AI is based on 
an idea which has been around in philosophy since Descartes, that all 
understanding consists in forming and using appropriate symbolic 
representations. For Descartes these were complex descriptions built up 
out of primitive ideas or elements. Kant added the important idea that all 
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concepts were rules. Frege showed that rules could be formalized so that 
they could be manipulated without intuition or interpretation. Given the 
nature of computers, AI took up the search for such formal rules and 
representations. Common-sense-intuition had to be understood as some 
vast collection of rules and facts.” 126 (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986) 
This approach became embroiled in issues about the structure of knowledge representation, 
for example, how could encyclopaedic databases, such as dictionaries and image banks be 
organised to enable human machine interaction or autonomous robot navigation of 
environments? Others explored whether environment could be formulated into hierarchical 
‘if-else’ logics. Without a machine capable of learning common sense facts, scientists 
resorted to manual input of millions of general knowledge rules, most of which the average 
human being would take for granted. The largest of these is the CYC Project founded by 
Douglas Lenat in 1984, with over a million hand-entered facts127. 
Hubert Dreyfus phenomenological critique What Computers Canʼt Do128 published in 1972, 
and the brilliantly biting 1992 follow-up What Computers Still Can't Do129, argued that there 
was a fundamentally flawed assumption in AI that the brain is analogous to computers and 
the mind to software. As a scholar of French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, he argued that there was an inherent inability for 
disembodied machines to achieve any of the AI aims their authors set out to achieve. A 
second assumption he railed against was that there could be no objective set of facts outside 
of an individual’s mind that are continually re-constructed through interaction with the world, 
and through cultural filters. Classical AI, he argued, would always come up against the 
common-sense knowledge problem, regardless of attempts at look up tables. “Current claims 
and hopes for progress in models for making computers intelligent are like the belief that 
someone climbing a tree is making progress toward reaching the moon,” he argued in Mind 
Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer130. 
Regardless of the significant limitations with negotiating complex physical environments, it 
should be recognised that computational approaches to AI have lead to many important 
applications in digital environments, such as the internet, where statistical and machine 
learning techniques have been essential in processing large amounts of text, images and 
other data. But the Promethean project of making animate machines is one of embodied life, 
not of informatics and as Rolf Pfeifer and Fumiya Iida argue, “the classical approach has not 
contributed significantly to our understanding of, for example, perception, locomotion, 
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manipulation, everyday speech and conversation, social interaction in general, common 
sense, emotion, and so on” 131. 
The critique of Classical, Computational or Cognitivistic approaches to AI, that became 
known as good old-fashioned AI or GOFAI, was characterised by Stevan Harnad in 1990, as 
the “Symbol Grounding Problem”132, where engineers had made great progress in highly 
structured symbolic environments, such as chess games, but struggled to build computer-
controlled robots able to achieve even the simplest of navigational tasks in common day 
physical environments. 
Consequently, examples of where classical approaches to AI in the physical world have 
been used, have been limited to highly structured physical environments, such as factory 
assembly lines, where all objects are known, modelled and manipulated in controlled spaces, 
engineered to segregate human and machine contact until maintenance is required. 
Industrial robots are mass-produced, general purpose positional machines, typically arms, 
augmented by custom end- effectors to repetitively automate a single task. Though they are 
electrically sophisticated and reprogrammable, they are, once running, operationally closed 
and little different to the classical automaton of pre-electronic mechanical age. Not only do 
they share the repetitive motion, but built from rigid metal bodies, the mathematics of their 
kinematic models are fundamentally Newtonian. It would take a paradigm shift to overcome 
the limitations of GOFAI. And it would be a neo- cybernetic revival that returned to 
fundamental understandings about animate behaviour that would bring robots out of the lab 
and into complex environments forging new relationships with emerging theories of cognition 
that rejected Cartesian dualism. 
Embodied Cognition 
 “Embodiment is the method by which situatedness is achieved. It proves 
the actual functioning of the system in ways that simulation cannot. It is 
ruthlessly efficient at exposing wishful thinking.”133 (Kruegar 1996) 
Roboticist Rodney Brooks, who had spent the late 1970s working with Hans Moravec on 
symbolic approaches to AI for mobile robotics, was to have a pivotal role in a revival of the 
nonrepresentational, embodied approaches to intelligence characteristic of early cybernetic 
devices. His 1986 internal memo 134 to MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory was one of a 
growing number of scathing critiques of GOFAI, where Brooks lamented at the inability of 
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multi-million dollar, state of the art robots to navigate environments with the ease that Grey 
Walter’s tortoises had demonstrated with primitive and affordable sensorimotor systems. The 
more technologically sophisticated work at MIT involved machines building abstract models 
of environments, and exploring solutions within the internal abstract model of the 
environment before executing motion in the environment. Knowledge representation, 
planning, hierarchical analysis, reasoning, path planning, were all areas of research, 
reflecting a linear and modular conception of human thinking. 
Brooks famously argued “the world is its own best model”135 and proposed that AI research 
spend less time trying to engineer simulacra of higher-order human functions, before 
addressing lower order characteristics of living organisms. 
 “Insects are not usually thought of as intelligent. However, they operate in 
a dynamic world, carrying out a number of complex tasks, including 
hunting, eating, mating, nest building, and rearing of young. There may be 
rain, strong winds, predators, and variable food supplies all of which impair 
the insects' abilities to achieve its goals. Statistically, however, insects 
succeed. No human-built systems are remotely as reliable.” 136 
 (Brooks, 1991) 
Embodying a bottom-up approach, which the field called ‘behavioural robotics’, Brooks built 
‘robotics insects’, such as Genghis (1989), demonstrating, just as Grey Walter had done 
almost half a century earlier, that the qualities of life-like and intelligent behaviour can be 
abundantly found without resorting to computationally heavy processes. After all, nature was 
full of intelligent forms of behaviour by animals with minimal neural capabilities. As social 
scientist Herbert Simon pointed out in The Sciences of the Artificial 137, “An ant, viewed as a 
behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent complexity of its behaviour over time is 
largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which it finds itself”. He goes on a 
page later, to argue that human behaviour is also ‘largely’ explained by the same principle. 
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Figure 14. Genghis, an insect-like six-legged robot built by Rodney Brooks at MIT. Complex behaviours, such as 
‘crawling’ emerged from a network of reactive decentralized controllers. 
Brooks suggested that many fast and cheap robots could be more effective and far more 
resilient a strategy, for robotics in hostile environments, than the expensive GOFAI 
approaches of the time 138. So frustrated was the research field by technical limitation of the 
symbolic approach that a substantial segment of the community revisited the sensorimotor 
cybernetic models of W. Grey Walter. 
Bottom-up became the pervasive phrase in the new field of behavioural robotics and artificial 
life research and nowhere more clearly and concisely is this approach expressed than in 
Valentino Braitenberg's 1984 book, "Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology"139. In a 
series of thought experiments, beginning with the simplest of stimulus response 
mechanisms, Braitenberg, over the course of short but captivating chapters, takes 
developmental steps in the complexity of his Vehicles. 
Beginning with a single sensorimotor model, Vehicle 1 has one stimulus input and drives a 
single motor with a linear response. Braitenberg explains, “the more of the quality that the 
sensor is tuned to, the faster the motor goes”. 
 “As the vehicle pushes forward against frictional forces, it will deviate from 
its course. In the long run it will be seen to move in a complicated 
trajectory, curving one way or the other without apparent good reason… 
Imagine, now, what you would think if you saw such a vehicle swimming 
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around in a pond. It is restless, you would say, and does not like warm 
water. But it is quite stupid, since it is not able to turn back to the nice cold 
spot it overshot in its restlessness. Anyway, you would say, it is ALIVE, 
since you have never seen a particle of dead matter move around quite like 
that.” 140 (Braitenberg, 1986) 
With a second sensorimotor mechanism introduced, Vehicle 2 is able to steer towards or 
away from a stimulus. Its behaviour is controlled by both the physical (morphological) 
arrangement of the sensors and motors, and the location of stimuli in the environment. With 
a primitive pair of sensorimotor mechanisms, Braitenberg demonstrates the cybernetic 
principle of goal-directed behaviour, in a similar manner to Grey Walter’s tortoises. He also 
similarly gives accounts of his purposeful machines appearing emotively motivated - driven 
by fear, love, and other emotions that readers might associate with higher-order cognitive 
functioning. 
 
 
Figure 15. Braitenberg's Vehicles, 1, 2a, and 2b 
 
Increasing again in complexity, Vehicle 3 features a variety of sensors tuned to different 
environmental stimuli making behaviour far less predictable. Braitenberg attributes the 
Vehicle as having ‘knowledge’, or ‘knowing’ what is best for it - again traits that readers might 
associate with higher-order cognitive functioning, but that he presents as embodied 
knowledge held in their morphology.  
“You will have no difficulty giving names to this sort of behavior. These 
vehicles LIKE the source, you will say, but in different ways. Vehicle 3a 
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LOVES it in a permanent way, staying close by in quiet admiration from the 
time it spots the source to all future time. Vehicle 3b, on the other hand, is 
an EXPLORER. It likes the nearby source all right, but keeps an eye open 
for other, perhaps stronger sources, which it will sail to, given a chance, in 
order to find a more permanent and gratifying appeasement.”141 
(Braitenberg, 1986) 
Vehicle 4 introduces non-linear relationships between stimulus and response that suggest 
decision-making and, by Vehicle 5, Braitenberg establishes the idea of inhibitors as the 
foundations for the logic of a neural networked brain. By Vehicle 6 he discusses chance and 
its contribution to natural selection, "a source of intelligence that is much more powerful than 
any engineering mind"142. He then goes on to build a primitive eye, for the vehicles to have a 
picture of their environment, and further features including memory. By his 14th Vehicle, he 
has described explorer, social and even philosopher Vehicles, suggesting they display free 
will. A provocation to the reader to consider behaviour and free will not within the machine, 
but instead in the eye of the observer. 
To understand Braitenberg’s motivation for this step-by-step assembly to human- like 
intelligence, we must return to his introduction entitled Let the Problem of the Mind Dissolve 
in Your Mind. After a career in neuro-anatomy, he had come to the view that the problems of 
intelligent life were not so problematic at all. “While I was counting fibers in the visual ganglia 
of the fly or synapses in the cerebral cortext of the mouse, I felt knots untie, distinctions, 
difficulties disappear, difficulties I had experienced much earlier when I still held my first 
naive philosophical approach to the problem of mind”143. 
For Braitenberg, his Vehicles are intended to carry his readers through a series of insights he 
had made himself in understanding the building blocks of animate behaviour. A series of 
thought experiments that start to recognise the role of environment, the knowledge embodied 
in physical organisation, the intelligence of evolution and, critically, the role of the observer. 
Braitenberg recognises the difficult distinction between a systemic description and observed 
behaviour as the "law of uphill analysis and downhill invention" - where we might understand 
the internal components of an agent, yet not be able to confidently lay claim to why particular 
behaviours emerge. 
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"It is pleasurable and easy to create little machines that do certain tricks. It 
is also quite easy to observe the full repertoire of behavior of these 
machines -- even if it goes beyond what we had originally planned, as it 
often does. But it is much more difficult to start from the outside and try to 
guess internal structure just form the observation of the data. [...] Analysis 
is more difficult than invention in the sense in which, generally, induction 
takes more time to perform than deduction: in induction one has to search 
for the way, whereas in deduction one follows a straightforward path. A 
psychological consequence of this is the following: when we analyze a 
mechanisms, we tend to overestimate its complexity." 144  
(Braitenberg, 1986) 
Acknowledging Norbert Wiener in his introductory chapter, Valentino Braitenberg’s bottom up 
approach is knowingly cybernetic. Though he makes no mention of Grey Walter, the 
influence of his tortoises playful disposition to attributing elaborate motivations to his 
machines is discernible. Brooks and Braitenberg were highly influential in inspiring a new 
generation of robot makers to animate machines from the bottom up. 
As I have mentioned, insects were an early source of study with Brooks arguing that it took 
evolution far longer to get from nothing to walking insects, than it did to get from walking 
insects to human intelligence145. The provocation to the community was that the hard 
problem was not human intelligence but getting the fundamental building blocks (technical 
and theoretical) right. A field of bio-robotics emerged in the 1980s building machines from 
the bottom up at a fraction of the cost of GOFAI approaches, enabling a proliferation of 
cheap reactive robots negotiating complex environments that forged new interdisciplinary 
research. 
Taking some of the findings, Brooks’ offshoot company Roomba developed a tortoise like 
robot vacuum cleaner that went gone on to sell more than 14 million units worldwide146. But 
Brooks was indeed right that the building blocks of a bottom-up approach would take time. 
Brooks somewhat impatient for human level interactions, shifted to a humanoid robot called 
Cog147. Continuing to follow principles of bottom-up emergent behaviour, hybridised with 
some higher-order reasoning capabilities, the childlike robot modelled aspects of infant or 
primate psychological development through interaction with the physical world, and social 
exchanges with human beings. 
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As roboticists Rolf Pfeifer and Fumiya Iida explain, “This was, of course, a happy turn for 
those who might have been slightly sad or disappointed by the direction the field took – 
insects simply are not as sexy as humans!”148 Cog and the development of the field of social 
robotics is discussed in a later chapter. Here, I just wish to point out that in robotics’ bottom-
up approaches have somewhat diverged between quintessentially cybernetic interests in 
multi-agent interactions, reframed as the field of embodied artificial life, and humanoid 
robotics typically focused on one to one interactions, reflecting a predisposition of classical 
AI to recreate human-like intelligence. 
Embodied artificial Life’s multi-agent ecological framework, made up of a diverse 
interdisciplinary community, encouraged holistic approaches that led to a more diverse 
investigation of behaviour between morphology, materials, control and interaction with the 
environment. ALife robots were also characteristically primitive in their sensory, motor and 
(neural) control systems, in the manner of Braitenberg’s Vehicles, resisting, for example, the 
use of high-resolution cameras or complex assemblages of moving parts before attempting 
to find more computationally and materially economic solutions. Animals, after all, don’t have 
cameras but retinas that perform morphological computations through a non- homogeneous 
assemblage of the light-sensitive cells. 
Sharing the task of designing intelligent behaviour across morphology, materials, control and 
interaction with the environment, ecologically balanced149 approaches to robotics provided an 
essential critical contrast to prevailing Cartesian methodologies. Developments in 
morphological simulation and digital fabrication have opened up new design practices of 
programming material behaviour, steered by minimal control systems. A compelling example 
is the design of passive dynamic walkers150 that demonstrate the embodied intelligence of 
bipedal mechanical systems found in nature. 
Without the need for powered motors or sophisticated control systems, these mechanical 
walkers, driven by the potential energy of a shallow slope and the swinging pendulum motion 
of the legs, move with a balance and grace not found often in robots driven by classical 
motor control approaches. These machines elegantly illustrate the understanding that 
intelligent behaviour is not shaped solely by a brain but instead distributed from our heads 
down to the soles of our feet. 
Philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark develops the argument that our minds are 
inextricably interwoven with body, world and action – an assertation that he acknowledges 
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has its foundations in Martin Heidegger's Being and Time151, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 
Structure of Behavior152, and Maturana and Varela’s Autopoiesis153 – by constructing an 
integrative theoretical framework between robotics, philosophy, and cognitive science. In his 
1997 book Being There: Putting Mind, World, and Body Back Together154, he points to the 
work of behavioural robotics and embodied artificial life research, to support his assertion 
that we should consider minds not as thinking, but rather as doing, in the world. His 
‘Extended Mind’ hypothesis is characteristically cybernetic, describing mind as not restricted 
to an agent, but rather bound to its environment through continuous circular interaction. Here 
interaction is not merely instrumental, but rather it constitutes cognition and life itself. 
One might argue that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Phenomenological’ cognition is also 
characteristically cybernetic in its search for stability - a continuous active process in which 
“our body is not an object for an ‘I think’…” but instead, as Merleau-Ponty explains, “…a 
grouping of live-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium”. His notion of 
perception is a performative act of bodily- mediated perception coupled to motor-action, "the 
'perceptual side' and the 'motor side' of behaviour are in communication with each other"; 
"every perceptual habit is still a motor habit".155 
Habits, to Merleau-Ponty, are behaviours that through repeated action construct stability in 
perception. This performative relationship between the behaving body and the world it 
constructs he explains as "the relations between consciousness and nature, between 
interiority and exteriority"156. A central discussion in his Phenomenology of Perception, is that 
these relations may not be linear in causation, enabling our embodied experience of our own 
behaviour to translate into other perceptions of other bodies performing. "Perception does 
not present itself in the first place as an event in the world to which the category of causality, 
for example, can be applied, but as a re-creation or re-construction of the world at every 
moment"157. Perceptions of animate behaviour, from a phenomenological perspective, are 
not reduced to "a certain indescribable state or quale", but rather a means to access the 
world. Our perception of animate behaviour in our environment is bound to our own 
embodied animate behaviour. Varela proposes the term ‘Embodied Mind’, drawing upon the 
work of cybernetician Gregory Bateson’s Ecology of Mind, Heinz von Foerster’s Constructed 
Realities, and his work with Humburto Maturana on Autopoesis. By replacing the word 
cognition for mind, he attempts to separate from computational cognitivist tendencies, and to 
ground mind within an embodied dynamical process that he terms “enaction”158. This binding 
together, arguing for organic living structure and the mechanism of cognition are two facets 
of the same phenomenon of life. 
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"Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, 
which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive 
systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in 
transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a 
world.” 159 (Di Paolo et al, 2010) 
This idea resonates with George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez in their provocative book Where 
Mathematics Comes From160, where they argue that even highly abstract concepts, such as 
‘numbers’, or ‘limits’ are concepts that are ultimately a construct that reflects our embodiment 
and interaction with our world. 
Mathematical concepts are based on metaphors, such a point ‘moving’ towards infinity. Our 
movement - the interaction and transformation of physical objects - ground these metaphors 
in embodied cognition. Therefore, they argue, spatial, social cognition and rational problem 
solving, natural language and other forms of reasoning are also ultimately grounded in 
embodied cognition. 
Evidence of a cognitive architecture for this coupling of perception-action, sensorimotor 
processes in the context of social interaction has been identified in neurological research by 
Rizzolatti and Luppino. They describe it as the “execution/observation matching system”, 
popularly termed ‘Mirror Neuron System’, which is involved in both perceptual and motor 
behaviour. Vittorio Gallese suggests that this region, involved in controlling our own body 
movement through space, may also shape our understanding of the agency161 of other 
animate bodies. By being not only able to guide our embodied motor action, but also our 
embodied simulation of action, he suggests that Mirror Neurons may provide a neurological 
explanation for how we emotionally empathise with the performance of other bodies. Gallese 
and Freedberg argue that processes of embodied empathy have aesthetic qualities162 that 
are universal and essential in appreciating static imagery, sculpture or dance. 
Antonio Damasio argues forcefully for the importance of embodied thinking in Descartes' 
Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain44, examining how, alongside the perceptual 
cues that are acknowledged to shape cognition, the body murmurs with emotional 
information, that are essential parts of cognition but remain under examined, in part because 
of their appearance of irrationality. Damasio’s critique is that cognitive science which, like AI 
research, tends towards rational and computation approaches to mind, have been reluctant 
to acknowledge that feelings exist and are important. His critique in particular takes aim at 
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cognitive science’s reductive approach to discussing human experience, namely rationality of 
Cartesian ‘Theories of Mind’. 
2.4 Cybernetic Performativity 
 “The entire task of cybernetics was to figure out how to get along in a 
world that was not enframable, that could not be subjugated to human 
designs—how to build machines and construct systems that could adapt 
performatively to whatever happened to come their way.” 163 (Pickering, 
2010) 
Coming to understand the emergence of meaning through a temporal process of embodied 
interaction with things and other agents in our environment, is to engage in what Andy 
Pickering has called a ‘Performative Ontology’. Pickering’s notion of performative behaviour 
is embodied and adaptive, emerging from circularities of interactions between agent-systems 
and environments - a situated sensorimotor action in which the brain is a “performative organ 
rather than a cognitive one”164. This is an understanding rooted in the central discourse of 
cybernetics that, as I have discussed in chapter one, was shaped by the embodiment of 
theories of life and cognition within animated machines. 
 “To some, the critical test of whether a machine is or is not a ‘brain’ would 
be whether it can or cannot ‘think.’ But to the biologist the brain is not a 
thinking machine, it is an acting machine; it gets information and then it 
does something about it.” 165 (Ashby, 1948) 
In opposition to Cartesian modes of dualist thinking, the emergent performance of embodied 
machines resisted the reductive and symbolic, instead steering their paths through the 
complex and continuous. As I have emphasised this is a fundamentally cybernetic approach, 
but to portray the discipline as being entirely antirepresentational would be a 
mischaracterisation. Cybernetic textbooks filled with mathematical equations, and logic 
diagrams, pursued a common language. Yet, we see the practices of the founders of the 
field showed an intense suspicion of making representations of the world, instead 
approaching problems through embodied behavioural artefacts. Besides the aforementioned 
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work with analogue electronics, the Chemical experiments of Gordon Pask and the extensive 
work of the Biological Computing Lab founded by Heinz von Foerster, demonstrate a 
resistance to symbolic reductivism, even though it remained useful within the axioms of 
established scientific practice. Even Ashby’s ‘Black Box’, which describes the construction of 
conceptual apparatus to interact with the world, is a performative representational construct, 
rather than a symbolic representational one, as a ‘Black Box’ is a responsive acting thing, 
that one acts upon, and the ‘Black Box’ acts back - entering into an adaptive exchange that 
Pickering has called a “dance of agency”166. 
 “As ontological theater, then, a multihomeostat setup stages for us a vision 
of the world in which fluid and dynamic entities evolve together in a 
decentered fashion, exploring each other's properties in a performative 
back-and-forth dance of agency.” 167 (Pickering, 2010) 
This metaphor of a dance is one of negotiating adaptive embodied actions in search of 
stability, as Ashby’s Homeostat had first demonstrated. Pickering’s choice of the metaphor of 
a dance also alludes to the latent theatricality of observing the indeterminate unfolding of 
interactions. Rather than predictable or pre-choreographed, cybernetic machines displayed a 
‘life of their own’. It is my opinion, that the animate behaviour found in cybernetic Machines 
encouraged their designers, to view their machines as life-like agents, and that this inspired 
circulatory and participatory models of interaction that were creatively surprising, and 
aesthetically richer than models based on reductive and linear control. 
Gordon Pask’s Musicolour 
Gordon Pask was the first cybernetician to recognise and explicitly harness the theatricality 
of these Lively Artefacts in a series of staged performances. As a Cambridge undergraduate 
Pask, and his friend and long time collaborator Robin McKinnon-Wood, took an interest in 
building novel machines, by repurposing bits of bombsight computers and musical 
instruments168, fashioning together various curiosities including a musical typewriter and a 
self-adapting metronome. Inspired “by the concept of synaesthesia and the general 
proposition that the aesthetic value of a work can be enhanced if the work is simultaneously 
presented in more than one sensory modality”169, Pask presented for the first time, in 1953, 
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his Musicolour live performance machine. 
 
Figure 16. Gordon Pask's Musicolour (1953-57), Left: Experimental electrical control rig, Right: Servomechanism 
driven projection wheel170 
A touring rig of coloured lights that responded to audio input from human musicians, it 
travelled with Pask around England performing at many cabaret and night clubs, while 
modifications were made to its design. Pask’s account of this period of experimentation, 
described in A Comment, a Case History and a Plan171, tells how, as these performances 
developed, his interest turned away from synaesthesia and towards adaptive learning 
behaviours. Unlike modern disco lighting systems that are typically pre-programmed and 
predictable in their behaviour, Pask was interested in the possibility of Musicolour as a 
performer itself, in co-operation with musician performers. His approach was to make its 
responses less predictable by giving it the capacity to get bored, dimming its lights and 
becoming less responsive, if its musical partners played a rhythm that was too static or the 
frequency range was too consistent. This would, in turn, encourage the musicians to 
continually perform something novel. 
“The result (at least when the performer cooperated) was a continuous flow 
of improvisation; a “conversation” where the performer and apparatus 
flowed into the other with action and response...At another level it is 
dialogue without a set script; an unfolding of events delimited by the range 
of the performer.” 172 (Pangaro ,1993) 
Musicolour was presented in a wide range of contexts to different audiences, some engaging 
in it more than others. It was through these valuable staged experiments that Pask was able 
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to observe its effects on both the audiences observing, and performers interacting with, it. 
This theatrical period in Pask’s development of a cybernetic practice sowed the seeds for his 
development of theories of human- machine interaction based on models of messy 
conversational exchange. An approach to machine behaviour starkly in contrast to the linear 
master-slave models of von Neumann’s models of computing, that have become doctrine for 
so called interaction design and user interface design today. As Paul Pangaro, a student of 
Pask and scholar on interaction design models argues, “Most modern interface designs… do 
not involve ‘interacting’ very much at all. They are more like command-line instructions 
dressed up in drag”173. Pask’s models of interaction explored multiple participants, human or 
machine, each with their own goals searching for stability (control) of their environment. By 
coupling the musicians’ purposeful actions and Musicolour’s purposeful responses, a 
dynamic stability was created that neither could predict or produce without the other. Both 
human and machine were adaptive to each other leading to a truly open-ended and 
emergent space of performative possibilities. 
With every different musician or different audience, the criteria of stability would change, and 
so too would the emerging music and light show. This had clear aesthetic advantages, but 
also created new challenges compared to the use of predictable pre-choreographed lighting 
systems. Pask described the feedback loop as leading to “an almost hypnotic effect upon the 
performer”174, though not always leading to as compelling and experience for its audiences. 
While musicians could construct an understanding of Musicolour’s behaviour through 
purposeful musical inputs into the system, and observe the resulting responses, audiences 
would require a sensitive enough ear to recognise those inputs and connect them to resulting 
outputs. It is likely that such a new genre of performance would have been particularly 
challenging for even the most avant-garde of audience to find legible, at least enough to 
construct their own understandings of the ongoing exchange. 
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Figure 17. Records from Musicolour presented at Boltons Theatre Club, South Kensington in 1954. 
Left: Stage with projection screen for Musicolour. Right: Event poster175. 
Musicolour satisfies Pickering’s notion of performative behaviour as embodied and adaptive, 
emerging from circularities of interactions, but there is another distinct notion of performative 
in the work. That, of staging a multi-sensory performance between human and machine, as 
an aesthetic act. I will hereon in describe the first notion as ‘Cybernetic Performativity’, and 
the later as ‘Staged Performativity’. 
Musicolour satisfies both of these descriptions, Ross Ashby’s Homeostat, would only meet 
the first. Grey Walter’s tortoises were perhaps built to engage in a study of Cybernetic 
Performativity but their compelling animacy led to multiple appearances on television and at 
many expos turning them into minor celebrities. In their staging to delight audiences, we can 
say that they also satisfy the later notion of performativity. 
Behaviourist Art 
From the 1960s, artists began to take an interest in these new aesthetic possibilities. British 
educator, artist and theoretician Roy Ascott was one of the earliest and most influential 
practitioners to build a theoretical framework for the production of what he called 
‘behaviourist art’176, which brought together elements of the avant-garde with the systemic 
“spirit of cybernetics”. Ascott argued that a cybernetic form of art would free itself “from the 
modernist ideal of the perfect object”. An ideal already under sustained critical attack from 
the participatory art of Fluxus Happenings, and the dynamic, unstable, ambiguous and 
polemic works of kinetic, optical, and conceptual art. Ascott explains, “The vision of art has 
shifted from the field of objects to the field of behaviour and its function has become less 
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descriptive and more purposive” 177. His choice here of the word purposive, points to the 
fundamental cybernetic principle of feedback control. He goes on to say, “The participational, 
inclusive form of art has as its basic principle "feedback," and it is this loop which makes of 
the triad artist/artwork/observer an integral whole” 178. 
Describing such feedback systems as a common feature of computer-based art today, artist 
and educator Golan Levin discusses how a “feedback loop can be established between the 
system and its user(s) — allowing a user or visitor to collaborate with the system’s author in 
exploring the possibility-space of an open work, and thereby to discover their own potential 
as actors”179. These systems produce aesthetic work, but unlike mere instruments of 
production, they are in themselves aesthetic works. Artists exploring these types of systems 
are often process orientated180, and less concerned with the aesthetic value of what’s 
produced than they are with the aesthetic experience for the performers and audiences of 
these open-ended exchanges. 
 
Figure 18. Myron W. Krueger's VideoPlace "An artwork that happened to be interactive, but to raise interactivity 
itself to the level of an art medium."181 
With video and audio processing available on increasingly affordable, and miniaturised 
computing devices, the past couple of decades have seen an explosion in installation art that 
uses camera and sound input to gather data about human behaviour in space. A field that 
pioneer Myron Krueger called “responsive environments”182 has emerged, not only leading to 
work for art galleries, but increasingly in public space and on commercial media displays 
from the scale of advertising signage, to architectural facades. Myron Krueger’s work 
between 1969 and early 1990s was decades ahead of its time and continues to be sadly 
under- acknowledged for its foresight, and technical sophistication. His VideoPlace 
installation is an example of a continuously iterative experimental practice in which he would 
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develop its behaviour, invite people to explore the responsive environment, observe its 
aesthetic successes and failures and develop further versions, finessing its behaviour over 
time. Feedback-response was in this sense the medium of the work, and his writings on his 
observations about the immediacy of feedback response remain important. 
“It is the composition of these relationships between action and response 
that is important. The beauty of the visual and aural response is 
secondary.” 183 (Krueger, 1977) 
Krueger and the participants who perform with his responsive environments share in “an 
aesthetic experience on the boundary between the aesthetics of production and the 
aesthetics of reception”184, and the possibility of meaning being constructed in unexpected 
ways through this exchange. This Staged Performativity transfers creative control to 
participant performer(s) away from the artist, and may also involve the transfer of control to 
participant machine performer(s), but does not satisfy the definition of Cybernetic 
Performativity. Pask’s Musicolour was the first such example of a machine that had a degree 
of control that was adaptive to an ongoing exchange, getting bored and less responsive if 
human performers were repetitive. Its adaptive behaviour was shaped by a history of 
interactions, distinct from Krueger’s work that, while unquestionably ground breaking, was 
not adaptive to input stimuli, limited to pre-configured responses. Musicolour was, by 
contrast, capable of novelty, beyond a catalogue of pre-choreographed routines, in the open-
ended exchange of performer and machines. Today, with an enormous variety of responsive 
environments being produced in artistic and commercial contexts, I would argue that 
contemporary work remains limited to reactive models of ‘Staged Performativity’ that, on 
aesthetic grounds, without ‘Cybernetic Performativity’ miss opportunities for novelty. 
To make the case for the potential pitfalls of reactive models, we can look to a commonly 
cited example of a responsive environment, David Rokeby’s installation Very Nervous 
System (1986-1990). Rokeby was an artist whose discontent with the limitations of computer 
interfaces, led him to develop an installation to “draw in as much of the universe's complexity 
into the computer as possible”185. For its time, it was a sophisticated computer vision system 
detecting accurate location and movement information, which was then interpreted, and 
mapped to a bank of sounds and instruments. 
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Figure 19. David Rokeby's Very Nervous System, computer vision sensing 
The system constructed by Rokeby comprised video cameras, image processors, 
computers, synthesisers and a sound system. He personally developed and mapped out the 
sounds through his own experimentation in front of the camera and, as a result, was able to 
achieve a considerable level of control, much like a musician using his own musical 
instrument, so that “that every 'pixel' of the space corresponds to a sound”186. In a 
metaphorical sense, he knew what keys to press. When Very Nervous System was first 
presented in Vancouver, Rokeby was surprised by how difficult other people found it to use. 
Over time, however, people began to play with the space, become aware that the system 
was reacting to even very subtle gestures, and started to build mental maps of the 
spatialised instrument. The complexity and surprising musical expressions that came out of 
this system were, however, not of the machine's doing, rather the result of the complexity of 
human movement within space. 
 
 
Figure 20. Illustration by David Rokeby of the reactive feedback loop.187 
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Scholar Luísa Ribas defines work in this genre as interactive performativity, and Rokeby 
himself describes the work as an interactive environment. However, I would argue the artist’s 
systemic description, could be better described as a reactive environment, or constructing a 
reactive performativity. Very Nervous System’s behaviours are not adaptive to an ongoing 
exchange but are rather fixed, so that a particular, sensed gesture will trigger the same 
audial response. Very Nervous System is an open-end space for exploration of sounds 
mapped into space, not dissimilar to the mapping of tones to keys on a keyboard. It is not, 
however, designed to act as a performer itself, but rather as an instrument to control. In an 
interview Rokeby described how he wished to create systems of “inexact control” and this is 
a common ambition of artists in the field, but the lack of criticality on what constitutes 
interaction, I believe, limits this work from achieving his intended goal. 
 “I think that the computer is the result of a fetishization of control and so I 
like, in my contrary way, to work against that dominant paradigm. Control is 
over-rated...or perhaps it is better to say that we need to learn to balance 
control which is very useful in surgery or driving, with other sorts of 
engagements with other things and otherness that are looser than control 
relationships where we allow ourselves to be open, engaged and willing to 
be surprised. Otherwise life is dead.” 188 (Rokeby, 1998) 
The desire to make artworks that not only surprised the audiences, but also the artists 
themselves, became a notable characteristic of mid to later 20th century time-based art 
practice. John Cage, a leading figure of the post-war avant-garde, experimented with 
computer music using randomisation or chance within parameters defined in the ancient 
Chinese book 'I Ching', as a generator for constructing musical scores for performances. The 
use of random, provided a degree of indeterminacy that was aesthetically appealing, though 
the possibility for novelty was limited to results within a range algorithmically defined by the 
artist, falling some distance short of generating the type of novelty that might be possible, for 
example, between two improvising dancers. 
2.5 Performative Ecologies 
With the metaphor of an improvisational dance in mind, Performative Ecologies is an 
investigation into the design of embodied interactive agents. Made up of four autonomous 
attention seeking robotic “dancers” which search out people and begin performing using their 
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illuminated “tails”. Each robotic agent autonomously manages its own performances which 
are generated from a computational gene pool of evolving short “dances” whose fitness are 
measured by how much attention they receive from the public. The on-board camera 
assesses attention levels based on orientation of the audience before and after each short 
performance. 
Over time successful manoeuvres are kept and recombined to produce new performances 
while less effective ones are discarded. The robots also are capable of sharing performances 
with each other so they have competitive and collaborative behaviours with their neighbours. 
They compete for the attention of human spectators, and share performance data when 
there are no spectators around. 
 
Figure 21. Performative Ecologies exhibited at Instituto Itaú Cultural, Sao Paulo (2008) 
The term ecology is used here in two ways. One is the idea of multiple classes of agency, 
with varying goals and behaviours in a shared environment. The robots perform with their 
‘tails’ to the human audiences. In return the human beings gesture interest with their gaze 
and proximity. Human spectators also perform to other human spectators in a variety of 
social forms. The robots also perform to each other when sharing performance data. So, this 
notion of ecology touches on the rich web of communicative exchanges that occur in 
complex interacting systems. The second important idea that is central to ecological theory is 
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adaptive behaviour. Ecosystems, and the agents within them are adaptive to changing 
circumstances. Ernst Haeckel coined the word ‘Oecologie’, referring to the study of the 
relationship of organisms to their surroundings. In his popular 1876 English edition History of 
Creation189, he noted that Darwin’s doctrine of adaptation provided the law-like nature to 
explain ecological relationships. 
Genetic Algorithm 
These ideas have become influential in design. Architect John Frazer’s early work in 
harnessing evolutionary processes, had the goal of not merely copying the work of nature in 
architectural form, but through adaptive behaviour, “relating architecture to the new holistic 
understanding of the structure of nature” 190. Frazer’s ecological approach was not to 
replicate “natural ecosystems, but the general principles of interaction”. This could be 
described as a soft artificial life strategy, Frazer himself exploring the behaviour of cellular 
automata with genetic algorithm (GA) evolved rule sets. Pask, in his foreword to Frazer’s 
book An Evolutionary Architecture, suggests that working with these life-like behavioural 
systems changes the role of the architect, “to not so much […] design a building or city as to 
catalyse them; to act that they may evolve” 191. This notion of emergent co-creation has 
precipitated an enormous field of computational design techniques. A critique of the current 
state of evolutionary inspired computational design I have is that, whilst generally highly 
adaptive and responsive in the digital design space, the realisation of this evolutionary 
architecture in the physical world is largely static and unresponsive, seemingly frozen in a 
form of cryogenic stasis. Performative Ecologies was an effort to explore what an ecological 
architecture could be, where ecological processes (like evolution) could go beyond the digital 
design phase and enter into the operation (even life) of built environments. 
“When man wanted to fly, he first turned to natural example--the bird-to 
develop his early notions of how to accomplish this difficult task. Notable 
failures by Daedalus and numerous bird-like contraptions (ornithopters) at 
first pointed in the wrong direction, but eventually, persistence and the 
abstraction of the appropriate knowledge) resulted in successful glider and 
powered flight. In contrast to this example, isn't it peculiar that when man 
has tried to build machines to think, learn, and adapt he has ignored and 
largely continues to ignore one of nature's most powerful examples of 
adaptation, genetics and natural selection?” 192 (Goldberg, 1986) 
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Genetic Algorithms is a method of search and optimisation, following evolutionary concepts 
and inspired by the chromosomal processes of genetics. A GA starts with gene pool of 
random solutions, typically stored in binary strings. In the case of Performative Ecologies, its 
genotype was 14bit string that can be broken down as follows. 
6 bit Colour  Colour Range of 64 RGB combinations, 2 bit per colour 
3 Bit Speed  8 Speeds (applied to lighting pattern and tail motion) 
3 bit Tail Swing 8 swing ranges from possible 
2 bit Lighting  4 lighting effects (pulse, flash, on, off) 
Each generation of phenotypes, which encoded a short dance would be performed and a 
facial recognition algorithm would measure attention and proximity. The ‘fittest’, highest 
ranked dances are retained as “parents” for the next generation of dances. The weaker die 
out. In pseudocode this can be understood as follows 
 
BEGIN 
INITIALISE Population (gene pool) with random phenotypes (dance) 
LOOP START 
IF(Face Detected) 
ACTIVATE phenotype (dance) 
EVALUATE fitness of solution IF(All Phenotypes Evaluated) 
SELECT fittest phenotypes as “parents” 
RECOMBINE pairs of phenotypes 
MUTATE the phenotype of offspring a percentage REPEAT FROM LOOP 
START 
 
A GA works in generations, using three operations: reproduction, crossover and mutation. In 
GA algorithms, there is typically a termination criteria to be satisfied. In the case of 
Performative Ecologies the machines continue to perform endlessly. GA’s are a widely 
utilised search and optimisation technique first developed by John Holland in 1965 and 
published in 1975 in Adaptation in Natural and Artificial System: An Introductory Analysis 
with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence 193. They have since become 
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hugely popular, primarily because of their simplicity, but also their capacity for parallel 
computing. Many phenotypes can be evaluated against fitness criteria, over many parallel 
processing units, allowing for thousands, or millions of combinatorial solutions to evaluated 
quickly. Another feature of GA is their ‘global perspective’, which means that a very wide net 
is cast with the random seeding of generation zero. Classical methods for search and 
optimisation often converge on local solutions and therefore struggle to have the breadth to 
solve complex problems efficiently. 
 
 
Figure 22. Each robot autonomously test out their own continually evolving performances. 
GA’s attraction was their capacity to arrive at novel solutions that were tricky to reverse 
engineer, making the results mysterious and, at times, pleasurably surprising. Karl Sim’s 
evolved virtual creatures are perhaps one of the best known and loved examples of their 
application to create artificial life within an arts context. However, the use of GA for the 
adaptive behaviour of physical objects has the challenge of testing solutions in a physical 
world, which takes time - a lot of time if there are many possible solutions. A dance, for 
example, took between five and 15 seconds. Holland and collaborator Goldberg commented 
that "genetic algorithms... have often been attacked on the grounds that natural evolution is 
simply too slow to accomplish anything useful in an artificial learning system; three billion 
years is longer than most people care to wait for a solution to a problem"194. To address this 
issue I took advantage of the parallelism of GA methods. Four autonomous robots were built, 
each evolving performances in parallel and exchanging data at intervals. Still, with a 
genotype of 214 (16384) combinatorial possibilities, the search space remained large enough 
to require thousands of performances over the course of a number of gallery exhibitions. 
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Figure 23. Exhibition of Performative Ecologies at the VIDA 11.0 Exhibition in Madrid (2009), robots perform while 
observing the success of their performance on the public. 
Installation 
At each exhibition, the robots were installed in different formations, and randomly seeded at 
the opening. This meant that in the first few days, performances were very unpredictable. 
Patterns were found to emerge only after weeks or months of performance. The waiting 
game was a curiously pleasing aspect of the project. During the 3month exhibition at Instituto 
Itaú Cultural in Sao Paulo, where they performed to tens of thousands of visitors, each robot 
developed distinct characters. On my return to the gallery to de-install the work I was 
amazed to find the gallery attendants responsible for taking care of the robots had 
individually named each robot, and could speak at some considerable length about their 
individual personalities. This was unexpected, as the impression of these robots as living 
creatures had not been in the work’s original design intent, however, it quickly became its 
key talking point. Meanwhile my interest in discussing embodied and adaptive behaviour 
would at times be overlooked. The hook was the animacy, and the intellectual pursuits of the 
project became secondary in conversation. This was a useful lesson, and also seemed to be 
advantageous in public galleries, where audiences are often seeking playful and intuitive 
interaction first, and challenging ideas later. 
 
86 
 “Performative Ecologies moves beyond more simple reactive paradigms 
which have become standard fare in interactive installation, but which 
amount, most commonly, to little more than virtual button pushing. Here 
Glynn succeeds in three related goals which together are something of a 
holy grail for researchers in robotic arts - to develop a system in which 
agents change and develop as a result of their experience; to share their 
knowledge with each other; and to make that learning and exchange 
directly and immediately sensible by humans.” 195 (Penny, 2009) 
My motivation for Performative Ecologies was not to achieve life-like behaviour, it was to 
question interaction models, particularly what differentiated reactive from interactive 
behaviour. The cybernetic and ecological notion of adaption seemed most important. 
Embodiment was not necessary, but the potential for what Pask called a “prevailing mode of 
discourse” to develop, seemed essential. The issue of long periods of time required in an 
environment for Performative Ecologies to adapt was not in my mind a problem. The work in 
the context of its production at the Bartlett made me comfortable with change occurring 
potentially over months, seasons, or even the life time of a building, rather than over the 
course of brief interaction encounter, such as in a gallery environment. The true spectators of 
the interaction were the gallery staff and they developed the strongest sense of these 
machines’ ‘lives’, with a rich account of the robotic dancers development and emergent 
eccentricities. For the public visiting the gallery, there is still a simpler but nonetheless 
irresistible sense of life without the need to witness or appreciate their adaptive behaviour. 
The robots purposeful motion, orientating their heads towards inhabitants, and then aligning 
their bodies once ‘eye-contact’ had been established, created the immediate sense they 
were actively observing and performing to visitors. 
2.6 Aesthetics of Cybernetic Life 
A decade after Musicolour, Pask developed his Colloquy of Mobiles installation. The “socially 
orientated reactive and adaptive environment”196 was presented at the Cybernetic 
Serendipity exhibition (1968) curated by Jashia Reichardt, and his paper A Comment, a 
Case History and a Plan was published as part of the exhibition publication Cybernetics, Art 
and Ideas197. In it he discusses the properties of “aesthetically potent environments” 
designed to encourage pleasurable interactions. He gives such an environment four key 
attributes: 
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It must have sufficient variety to provide the potentially controllable novelty 
required by a man (however, it not swamp him with variety - if it did, the 
environment would merely be unintelligible). 
It must contain forms that a man can interpret or learn to interpret at 
various levels of abstraction. 
It must provide cues or tacitly stated instructions to guide the learning and 
abstractive process. 
It may, in addition, respond to a man, engage him in conversation and 
adapt its characteristics to the prevailing mode of discourse.” 198 (Pask, 
1971) 
In particular, it is in the final attribute that Pask describes the potential for interaction with an 
aesthetically potent environment. His use of the term conversation, predating his formulation 
of ‘Conversation Theory’199, points to exchange between participants, rather than top-down 
master-slave control. “Close participant interaction” develops, through a circularity of 
communication, as both human and the machine adapt and learn about each other. He 
rather modestly states that his own work only goes “some way” towards satisfying attribute 
(d) and makes the point of asserting that machine interaction is not a necessity of an 
aesthetically potent environment. 
 “A painting does not move. But our interaction with it is dynamic for we 
scan it with our eyes, we attend to it selectively and our perceptual 
processes build up images of parts of it... Of course, a painting does not 
respond to us either. So once again it seems deficient with reference to 
d. But our internal representation of the picture, our active perception of it 
does respond and does engage in an internal conversation.” 200  
(Pask, 1971) 
His discussion of the experience of paintings as similar in some respects to the dynamics of 
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cybernetic artworks, is a clear attempt to bridge two disparate cultures of designing machine 
behaviour, and the production and reception of the arts. Pask’s notion of an internal 
dialogue, constructing experience, emerging from active perceptual processes, is 
quintessentially cybernetic. His contribution to the field is to recognise that this internal 
dialogue can be considered aesthetic, and that the dialogue can be shared between the 
artwork and audience. A new domain of aesthetic dialogue created between the performative 
agency of the artwork and performative agency of gallery visitors. 
 “Man is prone to seek Novelty in his environment and having found a 
novel situation, to learn how to control it...These propensities are at the 
root of curiosity and the assimilation of knowledge. They impel man to 
explore, discover and explain... they lead him into social communication, 
conversation and other modes of partially co-operative interaction... My 
contention is that man enjoys performing these jointly innovative and 
cohesive operations. Together they represent an essentially human and 
inherently pleasurable mode of activity.”201 (Pask, 1971) 
For Pask, who explored behaviour through a performative lens, the social and exploratory 
behaviour that came from encountering novel situations, driven by an unquenchable human 
curiosity, supported learning. The impulse to learn, to take control of one’s environment, is 
pleasurable. Aesthetics might, within a cybernetic lens, be considered a feedback reward, 
towards control. These highly novel experiments challenged preconceptions of the art 
objects. With their lively behaviour, at an anthropomorphic scale, they would have trigger 
ambiguous perceptions of animacy that encouraged audiences into participatory interaction 
to make sense of these experiences. 
By contrast, Herbert Franke’s Cybernetic Approach to Aesthetics202 follows the informational 
model of Claude Shannon, and tackles aesthetics as a mathematical theory of 
communication. This leads to reductivist and contentious statements, such as “a new 
guideline for making artworks can be proposed: artists should provide a flow of information of 
about 16 bits/sec. If this is done, one might expect feelings to be stimulated that are 
associated with beauty, harmony, etc.”203 Franke’s version of cybernetic aesthetics attempts 
to reach a more “objective means of evaluating the effectiveness of artworks”, but finds itself 
raising more questions than it answers, not least because of the implausible challenge of 
measuring the ‘amount of information’ in an artwork at any one moment. Similarly, the 
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‘Information Aesthetics’, of Max Bense draws influence from cybernetics, though again 
leaning heavily to Shannon’s computational communication theories and David Birkoff’s 
mathematical theory of aesthetics (1928-33). 
“Today we have not only mathematical logic and a mathematical 
linguistics, but also a gradually evolving mathematical aesthetics. It 
distinguishes between the 'material carrier' of a work of art and the 
'aesthetic state' achieved by means of the carrier. The process is devoid of 
subjective interpretation and deals objectively with specific elements of the 
'aesthetic state' or as one might say the specific elements of the 'aesthetic 
reality'. These elements are pre-established and their appearance, 
distribution and formation is described in mathematical terms. Thus this 
new aesthetics is simultaneously empirical and numerically orientated.” 204 
(Bense, 1971) 
Bense’s rationalist theories of aesthetics were quintessentially Cartesian, and it is striking 
that they appear in Cybernetics, Art and Ideas205, alongside Pask’s paper A Comment, a 
Case History and a Plan. As a field, cybernetics had already begun bifurcation into new 
disciplinary fields, adopting particular features of its progenitor. The rise of digital 
computation, encouraging rationalist aesthetics, to match the media of enquiry. As he was 
head of the Stuttgart school206, Bense’s ‘Aesthetics’207 were influential on the first wave of 
generative computer artists, including Frieder Nake and Georg Nees. Their means of 
production was based on the algorithmic use of simple rules, to generate complex aesthetic 
results. By contrast, Cybernetic art embodied in Pask’s Colloquy of Mobiles, pursued the 
manageably complex from the extremely complex. A similar comparison, I would argue, 
could be made between Cartesian Computationalist, and embodied cybernetic, approaches 
to understanding aesthetic experience. 
The dichotomy of Cartesian and embodied forms of aesthetics can, in part, be attributed to 
rationalist discourses of the Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant’s claim that, “a judgment of taste 
is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one” has the 
effect of devaluing questions of aesthetics to a murky domain of subjectivity, discouraging 
scientific study and placing it in the domain of art history and criticism. This led to the 
bourgeois notion of aesthetics, disconnected from daily existence. Philosopher of aesthetics 
Mark Johnson gives an example of this transcendent attitude to aesthetic experience from 
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English art critic, Clive Bell208. 
 “For, to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no 
knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions. Art 
transports us from the world of man’s activities to a world of aesthetic 
exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from human interests; we are 
lifted above the stream of life.” 209 (Bell, 1914) 
Kantian Aesthetics were fundamentally Cartesian, drawing distinction between perception 
and conception, reasoning and emotion, and relegating aesthetics to non-cognitive, non-
rational and private judgments of feelings, separated from the rational construction of 
meaning. Contemporary embodied theories of aesthetics promoted by Mark Johnson, 
however, present the opposite notion, that in fact aesthetics, in the everyday, is “at the heart 
of our capacity for meaningful experience”210. Aesthetic conditions are not solely found in the 
hallowed halls of galleries, palaces and museums, or on stage in theatres. Rather aesthetic 
experience is pervasive, constituting our “visceral, emotional, and qualitative” 211 relationships 
to our world. 
Johnson’s notion of embodied aesthetics builds upon the biologically grounded discussion of 
John Dewey’s Art as Experience212 that describes man, whom he calls the “Live Creature”, 
actively constructing his experience situated and physically bound to his environment. He 
states, “An experience is a product, one might almost say bi-product, of continuous and 
cumulative interaction of an organic self with the world. There is no other foundation upon 
which esthetic theory and criticism can build” 213. Dewey’s call for a ‘pragmatic aesthetics’ 
dissolving the notion of aesthetics theory as a separate subject to that of our everyday lived 
experience of the world. Recent neuro-scientific studies of aesthetic experience also support 
the understanding that there is “no specific neural network dedicated to aesthetics”214. 
Aesthetic discourse in the context of the arts practice represents an intensified focus on the 
daily processes of constructing meaning, heightening particular qualities that might otherwise 
be difficult to articulate in words or concepts. 
 “Reasoning must fail man—this of course is the doctrine long taught by 
those who have held the necessity of divine revelation...ultimately there are 
but two philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all its 
 
91 
uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half knowledge and turns that experience 
upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and 
art.” 215 (Dewey, 1934) 
Johnson picks up on Dewey’s continuity between mind and body, placing the body at the 
centre of mediating ‘meaning-making’, in interaction without environment. Meaning emerging 
bottom up from qualitive sensory motor sensations, our emotions, and our imaginative ability 
to synthesise experience. Johnson argues, “qualities provide the most primordial meaning 
available to us prior to, and underlying, any conceptual abstraction or conscious reflection we 
might engage in”216. An embodied aesthetics focuses attention, therefore, on these percepts 
that interact to create emergent phenomenal experience. It also recognises the importance 
of emotions in particularly memorable aesthetic experience, and their role in decision-
making. 
As Antonio Damasio points out, “emotions provide a natural means for the brain and mind to 
evaluate the environment within and around the organism, and respond accordingly and 
adaptively”217. Instinctual emotional responses, positive and negative, are the result of 
evolutionary development of tendencies to avoid threats, or be drawn to favourable features 
of our environment. Deep-rooted survival responses can trigger visceral neural and chemical 
bodily responses to basic fears of predators. Sudden unexpected motion in an environment, 
or unfamiliar, uncanny encounters can trigger a release of adrenaline, sometimes referred to 
as the ‘fight or flight’ hormone, raising our heart rate and sharpening our mental focus. An 
embodied aesthetics, attends to these non-conscious psychophysical responses to animate 
life in our environment, which seem essential to better understand our experiences of Lively 
Artefacts, such as cybernetic arts. 
 “Once we realize that works of art do not re-present objects, events, 
meaning, knowledge, or experience, but instead that they present and 
enact possibilities for meaning and value in an exemplary manner, only 
then will we understand the significance of art.” 218 (Johnson, 2015) 
New media artist and academic Simon Penny’s recent publication of the “rudiments of an 
aesthetic theory” 219 of behaviour, was motivated by his view that new art forms of automation 
presented a new aesthetic realm that, “Conventional art theory or art-historical approaches 
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are of scant value”220. Penny constructs an overarching framework from a constellation of 
critical histories of technology and cognitive theory, some aspects of which I have also 
touched on in this chapter. 
However, in an effort to encapsulate the heterogeneous qualities of interactive new media art 
forms within a unifying ‘Aesthetics of Behaviour’, Penny does not address any specific quality 
of an ‘Aesthetics of Behaviour’ in any great detail. As I have stated, I believe the results of 
this thesis contribute toward the pervasive and critically important quality of animacy or 
liveliness often found in behavioural artefacts. 
2.7 Conclusions 
Grey Walter’s tortoises demonstrate that even an ‘extreme economy’ of design does not 
have to lead to an economy of behaviour when one conceives of animate behaviour, as 
bound between agent and environment. This is a simple but immensely important point to 
recognise for designers of animate artefacts. One might choreograph animacy through the 
design of an agent, but equally through the design of that agent’s environment. Cybernetics 
encourages us to balance our attention to problems of behavioural design between agent 
and environment. An immensely architectural idea that is yet to be appreciated in fields of 
robotics. 
Margaret Boden notes that, “During Grey Walter’s lifetime, his tortoises—like Vaucanson’s 
flute player, which in fact had also been theoretically motivated— were commonly dismissed 
by professional scientists as mere robotic ‘toys’” 221. She attributes this to the “vulgar publicity 
they’d attracted in the mass media around 1950”, diminishing its theoretical importance for 
furthering a model intelligent machine behaviour grounded in continuous interaction with its 
environment. 
 “In fact, his anticipatory work is now sometimes praised as the pioneering 
effort in ‘Real Artificial Life’. One might quibble about the laudatory definite 
article. For his fellow Ratio-member William Ross Ashby, inventor of the—
much less entertaining—Homeostat machine, arguably has an equal right 
to the accolade. That, however, is a different story. What’s not deniable is 
that Grey Walter’s engaging little tortoises had a serious scientific purpose 
that’s widely recognized today.” 222 (Boden, 2007) 
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The ability for Walter’s robot tortoises to steer towards light and avoid obstacles gave them a 
compelling appearance of animacy, not previously available in predictably performing 
automaton. Their balance of purposeful, yet somewhat unpredictable movements, created an 
impression of free will that would lead to even the most serious of observers turning to 
psychological explanations of behaviour where there were none. Braitenberg would later 
note that making such machines is a pleasurable pursuit and from my own experiences, I 
would wholeheartedly agree with him. 
I have sought to demonstrate in this section that machines have long shaped our 
conceptions of the nature of life and intelligence. Cybernetic’s homeostatic machines and the 
robotic artificial life work that followed them have played a pivotal and provocative role in 
shaping today’s embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E-cognition) theories, that 
contrast the Cartesian nature of classical computational cognitivist models. It is however 
rarely recognised. One explanation for this comes from a favourite quote from Gregory 
Bateson. 
 “I think that cybernetics is the biggest bite out of the fruit of the Tree of 
Knowledge that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years. But most such 
bites out of the apple have proven to be rather indigestible – usually for 
cybernetic reasons.” 223 (Bateson, 1966) 
I have presented behavioural robotics, embodied artificial life, and the cybernetic machines 
that proceeded them, as pursuing the manageably complex from the chaotically complex in 
contrast to Cartesian attempts at artificial intelligence and digital life that pursue complexity 
from simple rules. Cybernetic bottom-up approaches to machines seem to easily ‘come to 
life’, while top-down methods at intelligent behaviour can struggle to negotiate complex, 
natural and built environments. Despite an awareness of intelligence as embodied being a 
subject of discourse back to pre-Socratic thought and found throughout the history of 
philosophy, such ideas have met continuing resistance to scientific scholars whose intellect 
is often traded in words and algorithms, rather than in practices, such as making and 
performance. I have addressed how embodied practices of machine makers and artists 
working with cybernetic machines and new fields of behavioural arts have led practitioners to 
question Cartesian doctrine and its implications for the design of human-machine interaction. 
Rodney Brooks’ bottom-up robots encouraged him to argue that 97% of human intelligent 
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behaviour is non-representational. David Kirsh proposes a less radically behaviourist 
position, arguing human thinking should be charted along a continuum where walking 
occurs224 at one end of the gradient and intensive cerebral pursuits – what Clark calls 
“representation-hungry activities”225 – such as writing appear, at the other end. It is certainly 
hard to argue, engrossed in writing a doctoral thesis, that the brain does not trade in 
representations, but the notion of representations as discrete symbolic tokens is becoming 
increasingly untenable, though still common in an age where digital computers shape the 
popular conception of the brain. Second-order cybernetics, in acknowledging the observer, 
demands we ask questions about the observer as well as the observed system. 
Central is the idea that a system is a personal construct - that our reality is personally 
constructed and a construct of our embodied cognitive apparatus within our environment. 
Autopoietic theory explains that any organism from bacteria to human beings have a 
cognitive apparatus developed to perpetuate itself within an environment. For life to exist, it 
must be responsive to its environment, with an organisation that seeks to increase its 
potential to survive, and so this shapes the way, for example, the eye processes visual 
stimuli. The eye of the frog is an active and specialised interface for the frog’s own purposes 
within the frog’s world. The human eye, as I will discuss, is also an active and specialised 
interface for human purposes, including the perception of animate life for social interaction 
and other purposes of survival. This point is discussed in detail in chapter three. I raise it 
here to emphasise that to reach a deeper understand of our lively animate behaviour, 
reductive models of human reasoning fail to recognise the fundamental cognitive reflexes 
that foundationally construct these experiences. And any aesthetics that does not 
acknowledge this remains tied to limited Cartesian modes of discourse. 
 “By virtue of evolutionary selection, there is direct cognitive correlation 
between the world and the bodily experience of it. This results in a kind of 
(performative) knowledge and (non-)cogitation irreconcilable with the 
cognitivist ‘physical symbol system hypothesis’. But it is this embodied, 
situated knowledge which provides the basis for precisely such cogitation, 
and for introspection. This is the lived solution to the symbol grounding 
problem.” 226 (Penny, 2013) 
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3. Life in Motion 
 “If asked what aspect of vision means the most to them, a watchmaker 
may answer ‘acuity,’ a night flier ‘sensitivity,’ and an artist ‘color.’ But to the 
animals which invented the vertebrate eye, and hold the patents on most of 
the features of the human model, the visual registration of movement was 
of the greatest importance.” 227 (Walls, 1942) 
3.1 Introduction 
When we enter a room, with the quickest of glances, we can tell whether there are living 
entities present. We are highly attuned to social perception and it is the visual detection of 
motion that appears to be the primary stimuli for making such judgements. Throughout the 
animal kingdom, distinguishing between animate and inanimate motion is critical to detecting 
prey, mates and predators, so our sensitivity to animacy is deep within the primitive 
architecture of our animal brain. Children under the ages of three do not demonstrate a 
theory of mind, yet they are capable of recognising the difference between animate and 
inanimate motion, and engaging in a variety of interactions with animate agents. This would 
suggest - and research in the field of human visual motion perception supports - that our 
experience of engaging with animate entities is formed not solely by reasoned acts of 
anthropomorphism, but also powerfully by instinctive, emotional and automatic processes of 
cognition. However, these matters are sometimes overlooked because of Cartesian modes 
of thinking that remain dominant in certain fields including human-robotic interaction (HRI) 
where design of ‘intelligent’ behaviour is typically structured from the top down, through 
language and other forms of symbolic logic. 
Theories of human experience in HRI have been built primarily upon the complementary 
logic of Computational Theory of Mind - the idea that we ‘mentalise’, or construct rational 
mental models, of other animate entities, such as animals or robots, in order to hypothesise 
on their beliefs and motivations. The anthropomorphic explanation is convincing, in as much 
as we all recognise that we enter into these mental processes naturally when we observe 
and interact with others. However, such a theory of mind does not give us a satisfactorily 
complete theory of these experiences. 
To address the gap, this chapter takes a counter approach, working bottom-up beginning 
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with reflexive visual processes of animacy perception that appear to be innate. The 
automatic nature of these percepts can, in part, explain how certain vocabularies of motion 
seem so irresistibly animate. A case study of Edward Ihnatowicz’s cybernetic artwork 
Senster demonstrates how, unknowingly, artists tune their work into these innate 
psychological responses. Together with a discussion about the neuro-aesthetics of Calder’s 
mobiles I highlight the role the arts have long played in exploring the hold on our attention 
and imagination animate motion has. 
I examine the motion cues that perceptual research has identified to date and discuss the 
theories of fast heuristic processing of basic behavioural typologies. Social scientists 
hypothesise that these may act as an innate structural skeleton for the development of more 
sophisticated learnt social perceptions. Jean Piaget’s studies of young children’s primitive 
distinctions between animate and inanimate objects are an early example of this hypothesis. 
The naive connection between motion and life has had a profoundly vitalist influence on 
conceptions of our world. As American psychologist Julian Jaynes explains, for millennia, 
motion and life were bound together creating a holistic field of animacy that remains in 
certain Eastern animist philosophies, but have been largely exorcised in Western philosophy. 
 “Motion is now the domain of physics but before the seventeenth century, 
motion was an all-encompassing mystery… Because [the stars] moved, 
the stars were thought by no less a scientist than Kepler to be animated. 
Motion perplexed Gilbert who became convinced that magnets had souls 
because of their ability to move and be moved. And Campanella in his 
Neapolitan prison, when he understood what Copernicus was saying, that 
the earth really moved, exclaimed, "Mundum esse animal, totum sentiens!" 
In a world so sentient and alive, motion is everywhere.” 228 (Jaynes, 1970) 
Complementing the catalogue of motion cues and behavioural heuristics established by 
scientific research, I will examine the art of animation, the established principles of orthodox 
forms of Western character animation. I discuss Kenny Chow’s notion of Technological 
Liveliness229, which supports my own view that animation as a field extends out into our built 
environment and draw synergies with his discussion on the experience of animation being 
bound to our embodied knowledge of own animate behaviour. 
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3.2 Visual Motion Perception 
Motion perception is critical to essential tasks involving spatial navigation and the registration 
of depth and separation of form, from predicting collisions and making judgments of motion 
direction and speed, to perceptions of surrounding animate activity. Motion perception often 
allows us to compensate for deficiencies in other forms of visual information. For example, 
the following four images (Figure 24) show frames from a video where a person is 
performing a common action. No single frame conveys sufficient spatial structure to permit 
recognition that a person is present, let alone recognition of what the person might be doing. 
However, the complex patterns of visual motion generated when these frames are displayed 
as part of a video convey immediately that a person is present and that the person is in the 
process of sitting down. 
 
Figure 24. Four still frames cut from a video by Bobick and Davis230 
Another example is found in physiologist and experimental photographer Etienne- Jules 
Marey’s illumination of limbs in motion, conveying vivid and compelling impressions of 
human animation which disappear into a muddle of meaningless lights if the walker stands 
still. People are remarkably adept at recognising the actions performed by others, even when 
the kinematic patterns of their movements are portrayed by nothing more than a handful of 
light points (Figure 25).attached to the head and major joints of the body 231. The information 
is sufficient to discriminate the sex and other details of the walker, and can be interpreted by 
young infants 232. What these experiments demonstrate is that, contrary to any notion that we 
need detailed visual information to recognise animate behaviour, our visual system can 
discriminate features of motion essential to social perception and interaction, with even the 
most limited of stimuli. Detection of the point light walkers, what Johansson called ‘Biological 
Motion’ are detected quickly – within 200 milliseconds 233 – demonstrating how highly attuned 
the human visual system is to motion information that supports social perception. 
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Figure 25.Composite image from screenshots of 1971 movie of Swedish Psychologist Gunnar Johansson’s point 
light experiments with perception of biological motion234 
From birth, motion innately attracts our attention 235 236. Before the evolution of colour or form 
recognition in the animal eye, motion recognition motivated the development of vision. 
Virtually all animals use motion detection to evade predators and seek out prey. Very few 
can retrieve information from static visual stimuli 237. Motion is the cornerstone of 
communication and interaction between animals. Courtship displays throughout the animal 
kingdom feature sophisticated body movements, demanding sensitive visual processing 
mechanisms to assess potential suitability. In human communication, language can mask 
our true intentions, but our bodies often ‘give us away’. Our physical gestures, less subject to 
conscious control, convey the unconscious, emotional, embodied “truth” of ourselves. In 
theories of social interaction, verbal rather than body language is often prejudiced, though 
our perceptual systems are acutely attuned to the unconscious messaging of the subtlest of 
body movements. 
It is useful to note some of the principles that shape the working methods in psychophysics 
that sit between neurological and perceptual science. 
 “In a sense there is only one problem of psychophysics, the definition of 
the stimulus. . . The complete definition of the stimulus to a given response 
involves the specification of all the transformations of the environment, 
both internal and external, that leave the response invariant. This 
specification of the conditions of invariance would entail, of course, a 
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complete understanding of the factors that produce and that alter 
responses.” 238 (Stevens, 1951) 
A highly controlled environment and repeatability of stimuli have been essential to 
experimental methods in psychophysics. Contemporary techniques often use computer 
generated animations, where parametric control allows for the careful manipulation of form, 
colour, motion and other variables. Earlier methods have included cell based animations239 
and mechanical contraptions240. The recurring challenge of work in this field is to isolate 
stimuli. Take, for example, the variable of velocity. It can be dissected into time and distance, 
but intervals between stimuli and repetition may also factor in. An extensive review of these 
challenges can be found in Croner and Albright’s Seeing the Big Picture: Integration of 
Image Cues in the Primate Visual System241. What is useful for the purposes of this thesis is 
to characterise how researchers in the field minimise environmental noise, carefully isolate 
visual stimuli and modify parameters to study changes in cerebral responses. 
Using electrodes embedded into the visual cortex of monkeys, David Hunter Hubel and 
Torsten Wiesel’s 1968 landmark study242 of stimulus-response mechanisms in single cells 
found visual information from the retina of the eye to be topographically mapped onto the 
visual cortex. Neighbouring cells represented neighbouring regions in the visual field and 
these cells were found to be differentially ‘tuned’ so that one cell in a neighbourhood may 
respond strongly to vertical edges, while others were responsive to horizontal or other 
orientations. These so called ‘simple cells’ are commonly found throughout the visual cortex. 
Hubel and Wiesel were also able to identify ‘complex’ and ‘hyper-complex’ cells that 
responded to more elaborate combinations of the simple features, for example, two edges 
intersecting at right angles to one another. These observations suggested that a hierarchy of 
feature detection took place, with higher level features triggered by patterns of response in 
lower level cells. As these patterns of response travelled up to higher level cells, more 
sophisticated perceptions were possible. 
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Figure 26. "Visual processing-streams in the primate cortex. Simplified diagram; bidirectional pathways not 
shown. LGN, lateral geniculate nucleus; V1-V5, visual cortical areas; ITC, inferior temporal cortex; PPC, posterior 
parietal cortex."243 
 
Signals from the retina arriving at the primary visual cortex V1 are generally subdivided into 
two streams of processing: one for colour and form, the other for motion and location. These 
are called the ventral and dorsal streams, and due to their functioning sometimes called the 
‘what’ and the ‘where and how’ pathways 244. The ventral pathway V4 processes the form 
and colour of objects and is largely insensitive to the motion of those objects. The dorsal 
pathway in the V5 region or MT (middle temporal), responsible for motion detection 245 246, is 
largely unresponsive to static visual stimuli or the shape of objects. 
Travelling up the pathway of the ventral and dorsal streams, the receptive fields of the 
neurons increase, responding to larger fields of view. At the same time, the hierarchical and 
functional organisation increases, so cells become less attuned to local stimuli but rather to 
emerging global patterns 247. Advances in brain imaging techniques, particularly functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have allowed for more precise recognition of regions 
associated with these stimuli. A growing body of research has identified more than a dozen 
regions where neurons are stimulated by motion, revealing that V5 does not process motion 
information alone 248 249 250. The interconnected relationships are complex, including back- 
projection of V5 onto V1 251 that may be important for conscious awareness of visual motion 
252, and exercises to map the region are ongoing. The key principles to recognise are that 
there is specialisation of function in the visual brain. These are hierarchical and operate 
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parallel to one another. As the processing time of signals can vary, processing is “massively 
asynchronous” 253. 
Applying understandings of the modular functionality of the visual cortex to aesthetics, Zeki 
and Lamb’s 1994 paper, The Neurology of Kinetic Art254, offers a behaviourist interpretation 
of our cognitive experience of the work of artists, such as Alexander Calder and Jean 
Tinguely. Though the field of neuroaesthetics has received considerable critique for its 
reductive, rationalisation of complex aesthetic experiences, this does not disqualify the value, 
in my view, of interpretations of work through different (sometimes narrow) disciplinary lens. 
A bottom-up approach to cognition will inevitably involve the layering of stimuli, some 
stimulus response, and then increasingly higher orders of complexity, reaching conscious 
awareness. Zeki and Lamb’s key observation is that the artists appeared to be seeking to 
“obtain aesthetic effects by stimulating optimally only a limited number of visual areas in the 
cerebral cortex”255. These artists were not just creating work that emphasised motion, but 
were equally de-emphasising of other qualities, such as colour and form. 
They suggest the artists’ practices unknowingly exploited the organisation of our visual 
system, driven by a deeper artistic awareness of their aesthetic potential. They theorise that 
Tinguely’s ‘Métamatiques’ stimulate regions of the visual cortex in V3 and V5. Meanwhile the 
limited use of colour would minimise responses in V4. The formal simplicity of Calder’s 
mobiles, go a further step, they argue, reducing form sensitivity, focusing cerebral responses 
even more. The presence in both works of orientated lines or edges is believed to maximise 
V3 stimulation. 
They stipulate that additional factors, such as attention are likely to play a role. Evidence of 
attention modulating activation of cells in V4 256 257 and V5 258 259 again raise interesting open 
questions of the degree of top-down control the viewer immediately has on aesthetic 
experience. Zeki and Lamb’s paper is speculative, but grounded in established neurological 
understandings of the architecture of the visual brain. They point out that V5 is not a terminal 
station for motion perception, but rather connects onto many cortical areas that will likely 
perform roles in the aesthetic experience. Evidently V5 is essential to motion perception and 
without it we would not see, let alone appreciate, kinetic art. 
Creating a plausible neurological discussion of the brain experience of kinetic art, it raises 
more questions than it answers, revealing a field of study rich in potential. The opportunities 
for the arts to provide useful insights for the scientific study of motion perception and, 
reciprocally, for neuroscience to offer potentially useful insights for artistic practice are 
growing with the advances in medical imaging and physiological sensing technologies. 
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Perhaps one of the most interesting open questions left unanswered relates to the possibly 
innate foundations of our aesthetic responses. 
 “The early maturity of the cortex of V5 probably indicates its importance in 
early vision. Is it any wonder that babies should find mobiles, a central 
feature of kinetic art, so attractive? In fact, motion is one of the most 
primordial of all visual percepts; even animals with more primitive visual 
systems have a well-developed system for detecting visual motion.” 260 
(Zeki and Lamb, 1994) 
The popularity of Calder’s mobiles to audiences of all ages suggest they must stimulate an 
innate, non-cognitive processes of perception. Something distinct from an aesthetic 
engagement of intellectual, higher-order forms of cognition. To better understand these 
cerebral mechanisms is essential to better understanding the effects of movement in 
everyday objects, as much as in works of art. 
 
Figure 27. Alexander Calder. Antennae with Red and Blue Dots c.1953 
 
Calder’s mobiles are passive, driven by their surrounding air currents. This dynamic external 
energy source, coupled with the many degrees of freedom inherent in the mobiles 
construction, precipitate a highly unpredictable performance. Chance movements were a 
central feature of Calder’s work and its success. It broke away from the history of automaton 
art that he had earlier explored, giving the work a greater autonomy. However, surprisingly, 
and sadly, many Calder works hang in galleries motionless or only ever so slightly trembling. 
At the recent show at the Tate Modern261 signs on the walls instructed viewers “not to blow” 
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on the art. A kind of communal mischief emerged that Calder would have likely enjoyed, 
when visitors – myself included – pretended not to see those signs. All too easily art critics 
and historians talk about kinetic artists bringing ‘sculpture to life’, yet for all of the visceral 
qualities of seeing Calder’s work in motion, the one quality undoubtedly missing in the 
installation was any sense of animacy in the mobiles. 
3.3 Animating Sculpture 
Perhaps one of the most celebrated early cybernetic artworks was Senster (1970) by Edward 
Ihnatowicz, developed as part of Philips’ Evoluon exhibition space in Eindhoven. Ihnatowicz 
(1926–1988) was an artist first and for most, practicing as one for almost two decades before 
he engaged in cybernetics. He, like Ettiene Jules Marey, had taken and studied many time 
lapse photos of animal movement, developing a sensitivity to the qualities of animate motion. 
“The Senster’s behaviour is completely unexpected because it is so close 
to that of an animal that it is difficult to keep in mind the fact that one is in 
the presence of a machine. It is as if behaviour were more important than 
appearance in making us feel that something is alive.” 262 (Reichardt, 1978) 
Senster, built at the University College London’s department of Mechanical Engineering, was 
the first example of a digital, computer-controlled, robotic artwork. Once built and installed at 
the Evoluon, Ihnatowicz spent time sitting in the exhibition hall making modifications to its 
code while observing the unfolding behaviours occurring between the machine and the 
public. Visitors to the Evoluon were very quickly and willing to imbue Senster with life. The 
2.4m tall steel armature structure, moved smoothly and silently, with a barrier around it 
keeping excited children at arm’s length, helping to create an atmosphere of a zoo. Alex 
Zivanovic, while visiting Scholar at the Lansdown Centre for Electronic Arts, has exhaustively 
researched Ihnatowicz memoirs, and also the hardware and code that shaped the behaviour 
of Senster. 
 
104 
 
 
Figure 28. The Senster, installed at the Philips Evoluon (1970-74). The artwork was controlled by the Philips 
P9201 computer seen on the right. 
Zivanovic identifies that part of the robot’s success in appearing so life-like, came from 
Ihnatowicz’s choice of actuators. Each of the six joints in the armature had 32 discrete 
positions controlled by a Philips P9201 digital computer, with 8k core memory. The output 
from the computer was latched as sixteen data bits. The 16 bits were split into two sets of 
five bits, which represented the next required position for an actuator, thus each joint had 32 
(25) discrete positions. This was a very low position resolution but was overcome by the use 
of a circuit called the predictor. Each set of five bits was passed to a digital to analogue 
converter and then to the predictor. The predictor was a sophisticated arrangement of op-
amps, which operated as a second-order low-pass filter, setting the time by which all the 
joints had to reach the next set positions, so that they all arrived at the same time to make 
the movement look natural. 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Senster smoothed output simulated by Alex Zivanovic263 
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Today, with many orders of higher-resolution computing, this smoothing can been replicated 
digitally through a second order low pass filter algorithm. The most efficient (least 
expenditure of energy) motion can be shown mathematically to be when velocity has a 
parabolic profile. As Zivanovic points out, the actual shape produced by Senster was not the 
ideally efficient motion found in modern robotics. It was asymmetrical (the peak velocity 
occurring before the half-way point) and tailing off gradually. 
 
Figure 30. Left: Senster’s smooth motion simulated, Right: bio-mechanical smoothing of human arm264 
The comparison in Figure 30 shows Senster’s movement profile (normalised velocity against 
normalised time) compared to the profile of a tracked human arm.265 We can see they 
compare well and as Zivanovic suggests, this smoothing implementation was perhaps the 
key reason why the movement of Senster was regarded as looking so natural, and capable 
of eliciting perceptions of animacy. 
Ihnatowicz, as an artist understood there was aesthetic potency in drawing an audience’s 
attention to animate motion, while minimising attention to other visual cues. His practice of 
crafting specific qualities of motion sits alongside the work of Calder and Tinguely in this 
respect, and can be read in the context of Zeki and Lamb’s theory of artists unknowingly 
exploring the perceptual, instinctive reflexes of our human visual experience of motion. 
 “I can be very precise about when I discovered technology - it was when I 
discovered what servo systems were about. I realised that when I was 
doing sculpture I was intrigued or frustrated, because I was much more 
interested in motion, I was trying to make my figures look as if they were 
about to take off and start doing something. We respond to people's 
movements to a much greater extent than we are aware of.” 266  
(Smith, 1984) 
There is a further feature to Senster’s motion that makes it distinct from the work of Calder 
and Tinguely, and this was the responsive and purposeful nature of its behaviour. Cybernetic 
 
106 
machines were by definition, purposeful. Grey Walter’s tortoises, were first to demonstrate 
how goal directed behaviour, visibly responsive to an environment through their motion, 
appear life-like. Walter’s tortoises moved without the smooth motion control achieved by 
Ihnatowicz, yet were still irresistibly animate. While smooth motion may be a cue for 
judgements of animacy, it does not appear to be essential. 
Working with students using robotics for the first time, I have found that even quite crude 
motion can elicit irresistible impressions of life when behaviours appear responsive to their 
environment, and especially when these motions are responsive to people or other agents. 
Questions about the saliency of particular motion cues is an ongoing subject of discourse in 
the science of visual motion perception and specifically within social perception, where 
researchers seek to quantify and catalogue the relative importance of cues for animacy, and 
finer grain perceptions of typologies of animate behaviour, such as chasing or playing. 
3.4 Social perception 
An Experimental Study of Apparent Behaviour 
Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel’s 1944 landmark study in perception of social behaviour 
was the first work in experimental psychology to demonstrate that objects with simple 
geometric appearances could trigger strong impressions of life in observers through motion 
alone, but only when these movements have particular characteristics. 
 “When the perception of movement is investigated, it is with the purpose of 
finding out which stimulus conditions are relevant in the production of 
phenomenal movement and of determining the influences of the 
surrounding field. Only when we attempt to answer these questions can we 
hope to deepen our insight into the processes of perception, whether of 
movement or of other human beings.” 267 (Heider and Simmel, 1944) 
Their study consisted of a two and a half minute animation (Figure 31) shown to 
undergraduate students, who were asked questions about one circular and two triangular 
black figures, moving at various speeds and directions around a flat 2D world. A further 
figure, a large hollow rectangle also features in the film, but is motionless. At points in the 
film, the hollow rectangle is entered by the circle and triangles through what appears to be a 
latched door. 
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Figure 31. Screen shots from Heider and Simmel's experimental film, ‘An experimental study of apparent 
behaviour.’ (1944) 
Virtually all the students perceived the figures as animate beings. In most cases they were 
perceived as persons, in two cases as birds. Although differing in detail, participants 
interpreted a narrative with surprising uniformity as a succession of motivated actions and 
reactions. What was interesting was the way students attributed complex personality traits, 
such as shyness, bravery, irritability or aggressiveness and changing emotional states, such 
as frustration and anger, to simple geometric figures, without any figurative cues. Here are 
excerpts from three of the student’s descriptions that reveal the complexity and creativity of 
interpretations when faced with nothing but motion to make sense of social behaviour. 
 “The first man goes back and tries to open his door, but he is so blinded 
by rage and frustration that he cannot open it. 
Lovers in the two-dimensional world, no doubt; little triangle number-two 
and sweet circle. Triangle-one (here- after known as the villain) spies the 
young love. Ah! ... He opens his door, walks out to see our hero and his 
sweet. But our hero does not like the interruption […] he attacks triangle- 
one rather vigorously. 
Man (T) finds himself in chaos, which finally resolves itself into a sort of cell 
representing Fate. He is able to free himself (but only temporarily), when 
Woman (c) accompanied by Evil (t) comes upon him, and disrupts 
his momentary peace. He feels called upon to rescue her, but Evil 
imprisons them both by Fate, from which Man escapes, leaving the woman 
there for safe-keeping. “ 268 (Heider and Simmel, 1944) 
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Heider and Simmel’s view was that perception of animate social behaviour was 
fundamentally determined by the “temporal succession and spatial proximity” of the figures. 
The characteristics of movements, and the kinetic relations between movements, were 
critical to stimulating perception of animate behaviour. This view has stood the test of time, 
with Philippe Rochat, a half century later, reasserting that “Phenomenal social events and 
social attribution are thus shown to depend on particular dynamic stimulus configurations”269. 
As this chapter will examine, specific perceptual cues from these experiences, and a review 
of the latest research offers useful understandings for how we experience and 
consequentially design animate encounters. 
Although the study by Heider and Simmel is over seventy years old – and for a moment 
putting aside the veracity of their original observations – I am struck by how compelling the 
animation is to audiences when I share it in lectures. Without giving it any introduction I have 
many times enjoyed playing the film and watching how people’s attention becomes acutely 
fixed on the geometric objects’ motion. Smiles grow on people’s faces, nervous giggles, 
gasps and laughter are often heard. With little more than a series of movements, a dramatic 
aesthetic experience is often enjoyed by its audiences. 
At the time of the research, Heider and Simmel were motivated by what they saw as a lack of 
understanding of the fundamental stimulus conditions that lead to the perception of our social 
world. Perception in their use of the word covered all cognitive processes beginning from the 
bottom-up stimulation of visual receptors. Their critique of the perceptual research of the 
time, had been concerned with the issue of ‘correctness’, that perceptual mechanisms are 
studied “only so far as they impair the correctness of judgement”270. They rejected the 
premise that there must be a correct understanding, focusing on the observer’s relationship 
between stimulus-configurations and their determining interpretations. While their experiment 
is seminal in demonstrating the rich unfolding interpretations that motion alone can stimulate 
– regardless of formal appearance – the sheer variety of movements made by the figures in 
their animation make isolating specific relations for study impossible. 
Perception of Causality 
Albert Michotte’s studies on perceiving interaction between simple geometric objects271 were 
essential in founding a scientific rigor to future research. Michotte contrived a mechanical rig 
that controlled the movement of two objects projected onto a screen. Each object was 
independently timed to move in either a right or left direction at varying speeds. By modifying 
the parameters of the rig, he could observe how small variations in their motion led to large 
variations in perception. 
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Like Heider and Simmel, Michotte questioned his subjects on their perceptions. Certain 
motions routines resulted in mechanical descriptions of causal interactions. For example, 
one object appears to collide with a static object that immediately begins moving on contact. 
Other motion routines, however, led to far more animate descriptions, inferring motivations 
into the causation of their motion. 
"The little ball is trying to play with the big ball, but the big ball doesn't want 
to play so he chases the little ball away. But the little ball is stubborn and 
keeps bothering the big ball. Finally, the big ball gets mad and leaves." 272 
(Michotte et al, 1964) 
Whereas Heider and Simmel’s animation has been widely criticised for having too many 
complex stimuli interacting to be able to draw out which stimulus conditions are most 
relevant, as it claims to do, Michotte’s work isolated individual variables that laid the 
foundations for empirical methods of study in perception, cognition, developmental 
psychology and neuroscience. 
Michotte was “convinced that we can perceive actions performed by objects or animate 
beings (“agents”) on one another in the same way as we can see simple kinetic movements” 
273. For Michotte, causality was a foundational percept of the human visual system. 
Developmental studies have since been examining at what stage sensitivity to the 
phenomena emerge, in infants 274 275 276 277. A number of researchers have persuasively 
supported the view that these causal perceptions are developmentally foundational 278 279, 
that may suggest that perception of causality is innate 280. 
In a similar fashion to other specialised mechanisms in the core visual system, there have 
been a number of suggestions made that our mechanisms for causal perception may be 
evolved rather than learnt 281 282 283, as the ability to recognise agency would be an 
evolutionary advantage. There is still, however, considerable uncertainty in the field, and 
definitive evidence for or against Michotte’s claim that the causal perceptual mechanisms are 
innate. There is, nonetheless, wide recognition that by the ages of six to seven months, 
young infants are able to perceive and interpret causal motion, indicating these abilities are 
developed early to form a skeleton for more sophisticated social cognition to develop. 
It might appear obvious that we recognise cause and effect, for example, when one snooker 
ball collides with another. The importance of Michotte’s work can therefore be easily 
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overlooked, however, his insight was to look at this seemingly mundane cognitive process 
and realise that it revealed that the visual system not only recovers the physical structure of 
the world, but also seeks to recover the causal social structure of the world. 
 “Before Michotte, nearly all writers had treated causality as a high-level 
cognitive concept, and tended to think of the currency of perception in 
terms of only lower-level properties such as color, texture, and motion. 
Michotte, in this context, demonstrated that even seemingly – “cognitive” 
properties such as causality may be processed in the visual system.” 284 
(Wagemans et al, 2006) 
This is a radical idea because social behaviour, which is commonly held to today to be a 
cognitive process of the higher orders, is far more primitive and automatic than common 
sense may suggests it is. Michotte’s experimental methods are also of great significance. 
Michotte published more than a hundred studies of stimuli, examining speed and direction, 
path lengths and angles, the relationships between object sizes, colour and shape, to name 
a few. His careful separation of variables, using mechanical rigs, provided a scientifically 
robust means to study phenomenal percepts. His animated displays inspired scientists to 
develop a variety of innovative parametric systems 280 285 286 287 to study event perception, 
intentional, biological and animate motion perception. 
Primacy of Perception 
As cognitive scientist and philosopher Zenon Pylyshyn points out, “although the study of 
visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of 
cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to 
cognition.”288 He defends the case that ‘early vision’, the fastest percepts of the visual 
system, are important and “cognitively impenetrable” from higher-order processing but 
drawing clear lines is notoriously difficult. The common distinction is that perception is a 
collection of processes that are relatively automatic and irresistible. On the other hand, 
higher-order processes involve learning of concepts, and conscious introspection. 
Peter White 289 hypothesises that infant perception of continuity and discontinuity of motion 
originates in the early stage visual processing – namely the iconic region of the visual cortex. 
Contrary to previous views that this region functioned only to collect and integrate incoming 
visual stimuli, White argues, and more recent research supports 290 291, that causal perception 
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begins within this primary stage, lasting less than 250 milliseconds. As iconic processing is 
considered automatic, this supports the view that our perception of causality begins with 
automatic reflexes, before any form of conscious introspection may occur. 
Perceptual Knowledge of Animacy 
An ongoing and central debate in psychology is the degree to which concepts may exist in 
some form from birth, and provide the essential scaffolding for cognitive development. 
Discussing the source of these innate concepts, psychologist Elizabeth Spelke states, “there 
surely is a time in human development, prenatal if not postnatal, when human beings know 
nothing” 292. However, she suggests that as a result of natural selection specific mechanisms 
could have evolved giving rise to forms of knowledge. These innate mechanisms, she 
argues, shaped by perceptual systems, may parse the world, structuring the learning 
capabilities of new-borns. 
Innate perceptual reflexes, define entities as domain specific and, in turn, allow structured 
learning to occur. If an entity in motion fails to conform to particular perceptual cues, it may 
not be selected for attention in relation to the domain of animacy. If indeed such perceptual 
mechanisms safeguard particular concepts, then these are difficult if not impossible to be 
unlearnt or disregarded 293 294. These perceptual reflexes shape the way we encounter our 
social world, and develop in sophistication with age, but are, at their core, innate, automatic 
and irresistible. 
Perceptual attentiveness to animacy 
From birth, motion attracts attention 295 296, but more interestingly, it appears that there we 
are born with a pre-conscious bias towards motion stimuli with social cues. Questions of 
early social cognition are so fundamental to psychology, there is a rich literature on child 
development, encompassing a variety of theoretical frameworks and methodologies. Non-
verbal methods with infants through to interview based studies with older children are used 
to examine static and dynamic stimuli. Klein and Jenning’s 1979 study of infant attention to 
persons versus a musical mobile 297 found, within weeks, looking time favoured people. This 
and other studies using props, such as toys 298 299, show signs of person-object distinctions 
appear soon after birth. 
Contrasting with the once cardinal assertions of Jean Piaget that the concept of life 
developed slowly, research since the 1970s has supported the view that young infants make 
distinctions between animate and inanimate objects from an early age 300. The Origins of 
Reciprocity: The Early Mother-Infant Interaction by Brazelton et al 298, demonstrated that by 
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two months, infants appear to show pleasure, smiling to a responsive adult while not to a 
static toy monkey. The evident pleasure supports the argument that our evolutionary 
psychology is positively wired towards attending to dynamic social cues. 
Questions remain about the relative importance of figurative cues versus dynamic cues. 
Figurative research on facial recognition, for example, has demonstrated newborns of less 
than an hour old are more attentive to faces with eyes and nose features in correct 
configuration, than those scrambled 301 302. The evolutionary roots are primitive with all major 
vertebrate species appearing reactive to dark eyes or black discs. One of many examples 
can be found in a study of infant jewelfish that showed that a pair of horizontally aligned 
black discs triggered an evasive reflex, while other spatial configurations of discs did not 303. 
Eyes and gaze detection are widely considered a primary method of predator detection 304. 
Such features are important cues in human and other animal social interactions from an 
early age, and the success of my Performative Ecologies installation to trigger impressions of 
life no doubt was in part elicited by the horizontal arrangement of the illuminated LED eyes. 
However, as the dynamic motion cues of Heider and Simmel’s experiment in Apparent 
Behaviour compellingly demonstrated, perception of animacy can be irresistible without 
figurative cues. 
3.5 Motion Cues to Animacy 
Acceleration and change of direction 
Just as depth perception emerges bottom up from a range of cues, including motion parallax, 
occlusion and binocular disparity, animacy too is detected from a variety of cues that have 
been isolated and studied in recent decades. Patrice D Tremoulet and Jacob Feldman’s 
experiments in motion perception within a featureless environment 305 demonstrate that 
animacy can be elicited solely from simple motion profiles. Motivated by a critical view of 
earlier research – including that of Heider and Simmel – that says the motion of their 
geometric figures too often contained complex trajectories and interactions, they argued 
these variety of cues made it “difficult to isolate motion factors essential to the judgement of 
animacy”. Tremoulet and Feldman instead constrained their study to the movement of a 
single figure travelling across an otherwise empty circular display laid on a floor and viewed 
by subjects from above. 
Whereas early experiments in the field had been hand crafted using cell animation, or 
puppetry techniques, Tremoulet and Feldman used a series of algorithmically generated 
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motion paths. The use of computational techniques prevented any trace of animacy coming 
unintentionally from researchers manipulating the stimuli directly. Minimising stimuli, in a 
similar fashion to psychophysical research, enabled Tremoulet and Feldman to develop a set 
of primary cues for animacy, and to measure the subtleties with which animacy perception is 
influenced by each of them. Subjects watched a single figure crossing a display and 
changing direction and/or speed in a single instance. Direction change ranged from -80° to 
80° which was set randomly. Speed changes ranged between a multiplier of 0.5, 1, 2, or 4 of 
the initial velocity. Change of speed, and change of direction, were the sole motion stimuli. A 
third factor was the shape of figure, with a circle, dot and rectangle tested. The rectangle was 
tested as aligned in direction of travel and misaligned. 
Figure 32. “Shape/alignment conditions: (a) dot condition (also shown are the motion parameters); (b) aligned 
condition; (c) misaligned condition.”306 
The researchers found that all three factors had significant influence on animacy ratings. 
Figures that accelerated and changed direction the greatest amount, had the highest 
animacy ratings. Figures that decelerated were rated with the lowest rating below those that 
showed no change in speed. On the influence of the figures’ alignment to direction of travel, 
they reported, “Animacy ratings were highest in the aligned condition, intermediate in the dot 
condition, and lowest in the misaligned condition” 307. As the circle revealed no cues to 
orientation it was neutral in its effect. Rectangular figures that aligned with the direction of 
travel were perceived to be the most animate while when misaligned had lowest animacy 
ratings. 
 “Some of our subjects informally reported that the object in the misaligned 
condition appeared to have been `struck' or `kicked.' The apparent passive 
response to impact (ie failing to align its axis with the new motion direction) 
might be an example of a positive cue to inanimacy.” 308 (Tremoulet and 
Feldman, 2000) 
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Tremoulet and Feldman make an “energy conservation” argument for the higher animacy 
ratings of object/figures that accelerate, over those that remained constant or slowed. 
Figures that accelerate suggest internal energy reserves to self-propel their motion. 
Acceleration and change of direction both give an impression of ‘volitional control’, 
something one would expect typically from living entities. Tremoulet and Feldman are careful 
to stress that they believe these inferences occur automatically and are perceptual in nature. 
Recent research studying infants supports this view, finding they look longer at accelerating 
motions than constant motion309. 
Speed 
Perceptual psychologists Paul Szego and Mel Rutherford study in 2007 established animacy 
ratings could be influenced by speed without acceleration310. In a simple experiment, 
subjects watched two geometric figures simultaneously move across two identical circles, 
each travelling at different speeds. Again, the screen was presented horizontally so that the 
observer looked down. They asked subjects to select which of the two figures seemed more 
alive, finding the relatively faster figure perceived more animate. 
Extending this study in 2008, the team demonstrated a “dissociation between perceived 
speed and perceived animacy, apparently resulting from the human visual system taking 
gravity into account” 311. This dissociation occurred when displays were presented vertically 
upright, as opposed to the earlier mentioned experiments where screens were laid 
horizontal. Circles moving up the screen were perceived as more animate that those moving 
down since gravity may account for perceived falling but any rising effect would suggest the 
entity has an internal energy source of propulsion. 
These results they conclude “are consistent with the idea that the human visual system is 
designed to perceive animacy in a functionally reasonable way, given the terrestrial 
environment in which it evolved” 312. Put more plainly, the human visual system has 
developed within a gravity field where there are evolutionary advantages to distinguishing 
between jumping prey and falling leaves, for example. Therefore, perceptions of animacy 
occur within the context of our visual system’s embodiment in a physical world, and the 
observer and observed agent’s 
relative orientation should be considered in any account. If physical principles are innate in 
our perceptual processing, it would endorse Stewart’s view that motion paths caused by 
external forces, such as collision or gravity, are seen as inanimate, while motion that violates 
“Newtonian laws of motion” 313 are seen as animate. 
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Intention 
Following Heider and Simmel’s foundational Study of Apparent Behavior in 1944, progress 
with further experimentation was limited besides Michotte’s perception of causality work. 
John Bassili published a 1976 report, Temporal and Spatial Contingencies in the Perception 
of Social Events 314 that reignited interest, pioneering computer animations of circles moving 
on a featureless background. 
Like Heider and Simmel, he found that spatial and temporal contingencies between two 
geometric figures in motion produced perceptions of intentional and social behaviour. As 
widening access to computer generated graphics opened up new experimental methods, the 
ability to not only carefully manipulate animations, but also to code goal-based behaviours 
between onscreen agents helped researchers to systematically study the stimuli relations 
between moving, as well as static figures. Studying the relationship between animacy and 
intention perception, Dittrich and Lea 315 proposed that animacy perception could be 
understood by bringing together two key factors. 
That absolute motion kinematics (spatiotemporal trajectories) and relative 
ones (relations between trajectories) are both likely to be relevant for the 
interpretation of motion displays as intentional.” 316 (Dittrich and Lea, 1994) 
If animacy required, both suitable motion profiles and relational motion, then why does 
Tremolet and Feldman’s motion of a single object in a featureless environment trigger 
animate percepts? Their own explanation is that, when sudden changes of direction or 
acceleration occur, and there is no evident physical explanation (i.e. collision), the reflex is to 
attribute an intentionality to that figure’s behaviour regardless. Without any visible context in 
its environment to infer the goal target, the observer appears to infer a goal target beyond his 
or her own field of view. Dittrich and Lea’s own studies of the Visual Perception of Intentional 
Motion317 support the same view that “The impression of intention depends crucially on the 
movement being directed towards a goal (…); it is relatively little affected by whether or not 
that goal can be seen” 318. 
Tremolet and Feldman are keen to stress the bottom-up and automatic nature of visual 
processing of absolute and relative motion stimuli processes while Dittrich and Lea prefer to 
distinguish between the two emphasising “perception of intentionality is strongly related to 
observers' use of conceptual knowledge“. While this statement suggests higher-order 
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reasoning, Tremolet and Feldman point to Michotte’s studies to show that fundamental 
causal processing appears perceptual in nature. Examples include perceiving collisions 
“launching effect”, as well as the avoidance of obstacles. The middle ground may be as 
Philip Blythe and his colleagues propose – as I discuss later – that innate heuristics could 
have evolved to process visual information 319 automatically predicting intentions in moving 
stimuli without the need for conscious reasoning. 
A developmental argument supporting this comes from research showing that causal motion 
draws attention from an early age. John Watson 320 reported that two month old infants were 
found to respond with similar amounts of cooing and smiling to responsive caregivers and 
responsive mobiles. This appears to suggest that the contingent behaviour of the mobiles 
may have appeared social in nature triggering positive social responses from the child 
without the need for supplementary facial, or otherwise human, visual features. 
Context 
Understanding the influence between absolute and relative motions has been widely 
examined, however, distinguishing relative importance of stimuli has been challenging to 
isolate. Retaining the essential ‘minimal’ characteristics of their earlier work, Tremoulet and 
Feldman, in their follow-up research to featureless environments, examined the “influence of 
spatial context” 321, adding a second geometric figure, first as a static entity and then in later 
experiments as a dynamic entity. Their aim, as they stated, was to “identify the specific 
motion/context pairings that produce an impression of animacy” 322. 
Repeating their approach of a moving figure accelerating and or changing direction half way 
along a trajectory path across a circular screen, they placed a second figure they called a 
‘foil’ (a static white dot) in five possible positions (Figure 33), three of which might support 
intentional explanations (Prey, Predator and Obstacle), and a further two that served as 
controls (Irrelevant and None). The rate of speed, acceleration and change of direction were 
varied as in their earlier experiments. 
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Figure 33. Tremoulet and Feldman, “The influence of spatial context and the role of intentionality in the 
interpretation of animacy from motion” Experiment 1. Five different environment (foil location) conditions. 323 
Prey behaviour was deemed most animate, followed by Predator and then Obstacle. Lower 
ratings were given to Irrelevant and None conditions. As they had found in earlier 
experiments, acceleration and larger changes of direction continued trigger more animate 
readings. Even a minimal static contextual cue was found to influence the level to which a 
movement conveys animacy. Not only may it increase animacy ratings where an object 
approaches another, but where objects are ignored, animacy rating may also be suppressed. 
They did, however, note that in the first experiment, the effect of the environment (including 
the static dot), were small compared to speed, acceleration and direction of change factors. 
They suggest this may indicate that “context generally contributes less to the percept of 
animacy than motion” 324 leading to a follow-up experiment (Figure 34) where, in two out of 
four conditions, the moving object collided with a ‘paddle’ (a static white rectangle). 
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Figure 34. Experiment 2. Four paddle condition 
The Goal condition, similar to Prey, was rated highest followed by the Irrelevant condition. 
Observers would perceive physical causality in collisions (similar to Michotte’s early work) in 
Bounce and Skew. Although the Skew condition did not reflect the moving figure in an 
accurate manner relative to its orientation, animacy perceptions were suppressed. The 
impression of a passive change of direction, more or less accurately, follow Newtonian laws. 
Again, faster movement increases in speed and more dramatic changes in direction were 
found to have the highest rating. 
The researchers concluded that acceleration is “such a compelling cue for animacy that it 
can significantly increase ratings, even in the presence of at least one cue for inanimacy” 325, 
which in these cases was a static feature of their environment. The results of these 
experiments also support the view that static context in an environment can “enhance” the 
influence of speed and direction changes in animacy percepts. 
Their third experiment retained the same four paddles but now moving for the first half of 
each motion sequence, stopping immediately upon the change in direction of the figure they 
titled “particle” (Figure 35). The final position of the paddles was identical to experiment 2. 
The Goal condition, where the paddle appeared to be followed by the particle upon its 
change of direction and acceleration, making its behaviour appear highly contingent upon the 
particle’s. This spatial and temporal contingency gave the impression of social interaction 
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between figures. 
 
 
Figure 35. Experiment 3. Four paddles in dynamic conditions. 
The Goal condition gives a strong impression of being ‘chased’, which has been found of the 
most salient types of animacy perception 326 327. Bounce and Skew conditions were seen 
again as passively obeying Newtonian Laws, the energy of the paddle being transferred into 
the motion of the particle. Finally, in the Irrelevant condition was perceived with some 
animacy as its behaviour was temporally contingent upon the particles behaviour, though not 
spatially contingent. Consistent with all experiments, greater speed, acceleration and change 
of direction were more highly rated for animacy. Throughout the study, slight manipulation of 
context was found to significantly change how the motion of a moving geometric figure is 
perceived. “Spatial context can augment or suppress this impression, depending on how it 
relates to the target’s motion trajectory” 328. In terms of the relative importance of stimuli, 
Tremoulet and Feldman emphasise that “the effect of context on animacy ratings was 
consistently small, compared with the effect of acceleration.” However, when motion of an 
entity is contingent on its environment, static or dynamic, impressions are enhanced. The 
appearance of dynamic social relations is most animate. By developing a deeper 
appreciation of these contingency cues, spatial and temporal, impressions of animacy can be 
predictably manipulated. 
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Orientation 
As we have already seen in Perception of Animacy From the Motion of a Single Object, the 
orientation of geometric object/figure in relation to its path of motion, particularly after a 
change in direction, can affect perceptions of animacy. Alignment with a path of travel 
indicates control and purposeful movement rather than, for example, appearing to be blowing 
in the wind. A compelling and viscerally engaging experiment is titled the ‘Wolfpack Effect’ 
329. Its authors Tao Gao, Gregory McCarthy and Brian J. Scholl explore the influence of 
orientation of moving figures to one another through a series of films and interactive studies. 
The work persuasively argues that animacy perception in itself, is not the end state of 
perceptual visual processing, and that a richer set of phenomena are available (some of 
which are still likely undocumented) that powerfully shape our experience and interaction. 
“The perception of animacy [is treated] as a sort of epiphenomenon, such 
that there has been a considerable amount of research into the causes of 
perceived animacy, but very little research on the systematic effects of 
such processing on downstream perception and action.” 330  
(Gao et al, 2010) 
The first thing to recognise about this research is that these experiments are not easily 
communicated through written accounts or illustrations. Usefully, the authors have shared 
video documentation of their animated displays online 331, which are essential viewing 
alongside their report. Their study extensively explores subtle changes in context that I will 
not review in total, rather I will focus on a few key observations. 
 
 
Figure 36. Left: First frame from Animation S1.1: Basic Demonstration of the Wolfpack Effect. Right: First frame 
from Animation S1.2: Basic Demonstration of the 'Perpendicular' Control for the Wolfpack Effect 
The Wolfpack Effect occurs in conditions where a group of figures appear to orientate 
themselves towards a single figure. In this example (Figure 36), a single green circle is 
controlled by subjects of the experiment (using a mouse), who move around trying to avoid 
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collisions. The white arrows, or ‘Wolves’, did not pursue the circle, rather moving randomly 
around the screen, keeping their orientation pointed directly at the human controlled figure. 
Subjects commonly described animate behaviours, such as “Many white arrows were 
chasing after the green dot”, “The triangles . . . follow the green dot wherever it goes”, and 
“There were triangles trying to hit me.” 
For a comparative experiment, the direction of the arrows was turned 90 degrees, making 
their orientation perpendicular. Subjects no longer invoked animate behaviours instead 
describing “arrows that went in random directions”, “chaotically floating white chevrons”, and 
“a bunch of white snowflakes or jacks swirling tumultuously around my green circle” 332. The 
results indicate that the Wolfpack Effect can overcome what would otherwise appear to be 
passive motions following Newtonian laws. I would additionally add that watching these two 
films I found myself more anxious and viscerally engaged in watching the Wolfpack Effect 
compared to the ‘Perpendicular’ condition. Although no questions were asked to the subjects 
on this matter, it would seem likely from their descriptions of the behaviour that impressions 
of being chased (although motion was in fact random) would heighten the experience. 
The researchers followed up on the impression of being chased, in an experiment examining 
whether the Wolfpack Effect could actually impact a chasing behaviour (Figure 37). For their 
‘Search-For-Chasing Experiments’ they produced a film, with a single randomly moving 
green rectangle and six white arrows. One arrow was a ‘sheep’, chased by another arrow 
‘wolf’ and there were four ‘distractors’. Both the sheep and distractors moved randomly. Only 
the wolf moved with purpose approaching the sheep with some deviation rather than a 
precise ‘heat-seeking’ trajectory. A series of conditions were tested where all the arrows 
orientations performed in the same way. In Wolfpack, all the arrows, Distractors, Sheep and 
Wolf pointed at the randomly moving rectangle, in Perpendicular condition all the arrows 
turned 90 degrees to their Wolfpack condition, in Match condition the arrows orientated to 
their direction of travel, and Disc condition showed no orientation. 
 
Figure 37. Search-For-Chasing Experiments (a) Sample Display (b-e) Four Conditions tested. Wolfpack 
prevented detection of chasing, while Match supported motion profiles in detection. 
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In all conditions, subjects were asked to pick out the Wolf chasing the Sheep. The 
researchers found that in the Wolfpack condition, its effect impaired the detection of the 
pursuit. This is a surprising result since chasing is considered among the most salient forms 
of animate behaviour 333 334. In the perpendicular, Match and Disc conditions, detection of the 
Wolf was considerably higher. Match featured as the condition were detection of the Wolf 
was easiest with all figures orientated in their direction of travel. 
In their follow-up ‘Don’t Get Caught’ experiment (Figure 38), a game version giving subjects 
control (using a computer mouse input) of the position of the Sheep represented by a green 
circle demonstrated similar results. The subjects were instructed to detect and evade the 
Wolf chasing them which they found easier when the arrows were in their Perpendicular 
condition. They found the Wolfpack Effect clouded the ability to make judgments about the 
arrows based on motion profiles because of its apparently dominant influence. In crowded 
kinetic conditions, orientation appears to compete with judgements of intention from motion 
profiles creating ambiguity. When motion profiles and orientation are in alignment it becomes 
easier to interpret intention accurately. 
 
Figure 38. (a) Don’t Get Caught Experiment in Wolfpack condition (b) Leave Me Alone (Darts) with two quadrants 
in Wolfpack condition and two Perpendicular (c) Leave Me Alone (Eyes) half the screen in Wolfpack condition and 
the other Perpendicular 
A further experiment titled ‘Leave Me Alone’ reveals something important about the fast, 
perhaps reflexive nature of decision-making by subjects in these dynamic and interactive 
contexts. Twelve arrows they termed ‘Darts’ were distributed around the screen, three in 
each quadrant moving randomly but staying within their quadrant (Figure 38b). Subjects are 
asked to control the position of a green circle and tasked with avoiding the other figures 
moving randomly. Two of the four quadrants are set in Wolfpack condition, while the others 
are in Perpendicular condition. Subjects were found to spend more time evading the Darts in 
the Perpendicular quadrants. 
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 “On the basis of the phenomenology of the displays, we suggest that the 
avoidance may have been due to the fact that observers felt that darts in 
the wolfpack quadrants were actively pursuing them, even though the darts 
were in fact moving randomly.” 335 (Gao et al, 2010) 
To determine if this effect was the result of merely the perceived “sharpness” of the figures, 
the researchers replaced the darts with circles featuring two dots that appeared to be eyes 
(Figure 38c). The experiment followed the same method. Either the eyes in a quadrant would 
orientate towards the subject in Wolfpack condition or they were turned away 90 degrees. 
Again, subjects spent less time in the Wolfpack quadrants where the eyes appeared to 
‘watch’ their green circle, than in the quadrants where their gaze was averted. 
What all of these results point to is the understanding that dynamic orientation is a powerful 
social cue. It generates compelling perceptions of animacy and can complement or conflict 
with other motion cues. The environment of these experiments features many moving figures 
compared to the earlier examples, making “comprehension” at any one time, of all of 
individual behaviours of the figures difficult. Subjects instead have to rely on instinctual, 
reflexive responses when overwhelmed by the variety and ambiguity of motion cues. This 
tight coupling between perception and action for the subject suggests interactive experiences 
turn to animate cues to make fast decisions. Orientation cues appear particularly important. 
The Wolfpack Effect is a recently recognised (previously undocumented) perceptual cue still 
to be fully understood. As many researchers in the field point out, it is likely that there are 
more cues to discover that may not just be useful to perceptual research in this field, but also 
to designers. One can argue that designers and artists have already come upon these 
perceptual responses tapping into it for aesthetic potential. Random International and Chris 
O’Shea’s Audience installation (Figure 39) from 2008 featured 64 servo driven mirrors 
tracking inhabitants. My own Performative Ecologies Installation also perhaps harnessed this 
cue, quite accidentally. Indeed, it is likely that artists in their own experimental practices are 
discovering and manipulating a variety of currently undocumented perceptual cues, which 
could be of benefit to scientific research. 
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Figure 39. Audience by Random International and Chris O’Shea (2008) 336 
Case Study of Behaviour Perception: Chasing 
From a young age children play chase. Evolutionary and developmental psychologists have 
argued that there are clear fitness and survival benefits to such play. Variations include hide 
and seek or tag, and carry into aspects of adult sports. Interest in the dynamics of chasing 
spreads across disciplines from ethology, game theory, geometry and linear algebra, to the 
computational algorithms that drive autonomous robots and heat-seeking missiles. Chasing 
has its own body of research, namely ‘Pursuit Theory’, that is as important for understanding 
evasion as it is for understanding chasing. 
 “If you should encounter a mountain lion […] there are two things you must 
not do, according to the Mountain Lion Foundation: turn your back on the 
animal or run away. Either of these behaviors would trigger the lion's 
predatory chase behavior, transforming you from startled hiker into 
potential prey. It is possible to avoid becoming prey by denying the lion's 
perceptual system the cues that normally accompany being a mealtime 
animal.” 337 (Blythe et al, 1999) 
Not only are there evolutionary arguments for our playful desire to chase, but also our 
perceptual capabilities to quickly detect chasing. Like the Mountain Lion, Humans are very 
adept at making such behavioural judgments from simple motion patterns. These have been 
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extensively studied in developmental psychology. For a recent discussion on this body of 
literature, see Frankenhuis, et al Infants’ Perception of Chasing 338. One of the studies cited 
is Gao, McCarthy and Scholl339, authors of the aforementioned Wolfpack Effect. Indeed, the 
effect had been discovered though the researchers’ earlier studies of chasing using the 
same metaphor of the Wolf and Sheep. Using algorithmically driven computer displays the 
researchers were able to, in a systematic manner, manipulate subtle motion parameters to 
understand “the nature and limits of this percept” 340. 
 
Figure 40.The psychophysics of chasing: (a) Graph showing chase was present, as a function of chasing subtlety 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, chasing was most salient where the Wolf followed a direct path of 
pursuit - a heat-seeking behaviour. Levels of detection remained high even when there was 
some deviation of up to 30 degrees, until a sudden drop occurs indicating that the correlation 
between perception of chasing and angle of pursuit in not linear. As detection rates drop off 
towards 60 degrees an interesting phenomena appears where the Wolf is still making 
indirect progress towards the Sheep, getting closer and closer, yet undetected. The 
researchers describe this as a stalking behaviour, operating outside of the parameters of the 
perceptual cues for chasing. 
These results point to is the subtlety with which parameter changes can alter observers’ 
perception, and it is worth mentioning again that detection does not appear to be consciously 
reasoned about – in any sense of involving higher-order judgements – but rather appears to 
be instinctive. Again, we see animacy not as a perceptual “end product” but rather as having 
these downstream heuristic reflexes that require further study. As Scholl and Tremoulet point 
out in their conclusion to their summary article Perceptual Causality and Animacy, “rarely in 
experimental psychology or vision science has such a rich set of phenomena been so 
understudied”341. 
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Heuristics 
As we have seen in motion perception, the visual system selects salient cues of social 
significance fast, enabling immediate decision-making to take place even where there is 
insufficient information or time for higher-order reasoning processes to function. This is 
sometimes called a ‘gut reaction’ or ‘gut feeling’342, idioms which touch on the sense of 
bottom-up, rather than top-down, control - irresistible, reflexive, and heuristic in nature. 
 “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal 
of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more 
complex methods.” 343 (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) 
Through the lens of evolutionary psychology, we can assert that nature, through selection, 
has shaped the heuristics that govern instant social perception. But what about when there is 
sufficient time and information available to make more considered decisions? Contrary to 
rational theories of social cognition, heuristics may continue to take a leading role, partly 
because of its primacy in response time, but more significantly because of the cognitive 
theory of ‘accuracy-effort trade- off’344 - the idea that we compromise on accuracy to save on 
effort, or put plainly, sometimes we simply just rely on our instincts. 
There is an underlying assumption that putting more time and mental energy into gathering 
and processing information leads to more accurate judgements, but contemporary studies of 
heuristics are beginning to challenge this modern viewThe computational culture of the 20th 
and 21st centuries has strongly asserted its dominance in defining rational decision-making. 
Where information is known (and accurate), decision-making through statistical and logical 
methods can be very effective, especially within the fully defined, discrete spaces of digital 
environments. 
However, in the context of human social relations, in a complex, and uncertain world, recent 
studies of heuristics have shown that the theory of trade-off between accuracy and effort are 
false. Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues at the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition 
at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development suggest, “simple heuristics perform 
comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data – 
simplicity leads to robustness” 345. We are all familiar with the argument that complex 
problems require complex solutions. This, they argue, is not always the case. Gigerenzer 
gives a critical example of a tendency towards computational concepts in contemporary 
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discussion of cognition, picking on a quote from Richard Dawkins. 
 “When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again, he 
behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the 
trajectory of the ball... At some subconscious level, something functionally 
equivalent to the mathematical calculation is going on.” 346 (Dawkins, 2016) 
In an exercise in Occam's razor, Gigerenzer strips away the computation suggesting a 
simple “Gaze heuristic” 347 operating upon simple feedback control. 
 “Fix your gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust your running speed so 
that the angle of gaze remains constant. A player who relies on the gaze 
heuristic can ignore all causal variables necessary to compute the 
trajectory of the ball––the initial distance, velocity, angle, air resistance, 
speed and direction of wind, and spin, among others. By paying attention 
to only one variable, the player will end up where the ball comes down 
without computing the exact spot.” 348 (Gigerenzer et al, 2011) 
What Gigerenzer is describing is the same heuristics understood to be used by various 
animal species in predatorial behaviour, from fish and birds, to cats and dogs. For example, 
in 2004, Shaffer, Krauchunas, Eddy, and McBeath studied the behaviour of dogs chasing 
and catching Frisbees, finding they hold a constant optical angle between themselves and 
their target. They then collated that the “dogs use the same viewer based navigational 
heuristics previously found with baseball players” 349. 
It suggests that animal species sharing an evolutionary lineage of the visual processing 
system of the vertebrate eye, share heuristic strategies in their behaviours. One might have 
expected Dawkins, a proponent of evolutionary theory to offer an explanation in line with the 
hypothesis that perceptual heuristic processing has fitness advantages, over explanations of 
higher-order reasoning. However, Dawkins, first recognised for his work in computer 
simulations of evolutionary processes, draws upon computational thinking. Evidence, in 
itself, that even those firmly in the bottom-up camp, can still be seduced by top-down 
computational reasoning. 
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Gigerenzer suggests that ignoring information has often been mistaken as a form of irrational 
behaviour – the argument suggesting, the more you know, the more likely you are to make 
the rational decision. He argues that the real skill is knowing what one doesn’t have to know. 
His research group’s compendium Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, opens with the 
infamous Herbert Simon statement. 
 “Human beings viewed as behaving systems are quite simple. The 
apparent complexity of our behaviour over time is largely a reflection of the 
complexity of the environment in which we find ourselves.” 350 
 (Simon, 1996) 
This bottom-up approach to heuristics, bound to its environment, in the immediate sense of 
embodiment, and shaped by adaptation over its evolutionary history is distinct from common 
notions of computational heuristics, such as ‘expert systems’ that are top-down. Gigerenzer 
and his group describe themselves as ‘ecological rationalists’ a name that echoes underlying 
principles of cybernetic thinking, recognising the combined roles of agent and environment in 
emerging behaviour. While computationalists focus on the internal organisation of rational 
behaviour, an ecological model emphasises cognition as a continuous exchange with an 
external environment. Rationality is context specific. To understand an ecological rationality, 
one must not only analyse the structure of the heuristics, but also what Ashby called the 
‘Environmental Half’ - the role that the structure of the environment takes in the emerging of 
rational behaviour. 
3.6 Agents 
 “A creature that can solve any problem given enough time - say a million 
years - is not in fact intelligent at all. We live in a time-pressured world and 
must be able to think quickly before we leap.” 351 (Dennett, 1984) 
Parameterising Behaviour 
Taking the ecological perspective of what shapes the heuristics of animacy perception, the 
question that emerges is what are the most important and distinct categories of social 
behaviour for survival and success? Two distinct fields of research, artificial life research and 
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perceptual psychology had approached this question from quite different directions, 
synthesising for the first time in Blythe, Miller and Todd’s Human Simulation of Adaptive 
Behavior Interactive Studies of Pursuit, Evasion, Courtship, Fighting and Play 352. 
Their ALife research focus on ‘Simulation of Adaptive Behaviour’ – primarily motion based – 
was, in their own words, too often reliant “on the creators’ subjective impressions of whether 
a certain behavioural trajectory generated by a simulated agent was sufficiently lifelike or 
animate in a particular task” 353. Seeking to overcome individual subjectivity, they devised an 
experiment where human subjects, controlled a ‘bug’ on a computer screen, simulating the 
motion trajectories of six behaviours they were asked to act out. The motion characteristics 
of these behaviours were then analysed, with the aim of revealing cues that are statistically 
correlated with categories of animate behaviour. 
The behaviours selected by the authors were deduced from positive and negative ‘fitness 
affordances’ – attraction to food and mates on the one hand, and on the other repulsion to 
predators and sexual competitors. Five initial categories were pursuing, evading, fighting, 
courting and being courted. A sixth play was added as it was seen as a behaviour 
sometimes used by animals for learning the five others. As the experiments were based on 
social cues, subjects were paired so that, for example, two subjects with their two bugs on 
screen were asked to fight or one was asked to pursue and the other evade. 
 
 
Figure 41. Samples of courting trajectories (left), and fighting trajectories (right) between two human operated 
“bugs” on a 2D Screen, with position represented on x and y axis. 
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Quantitative analysis of motion parameters over the 90 second trails was initially measured 
on average velocity, kinetic energy (sum of acceleration and deceleration), vorticity (the sum 
of direction change), and radial distance (distance between bugs averaged). They found, for 
example, that velocities were continuously high for pursuit and evasion maintained over a 
large distance, contrasted against courtship’s slower and restricted movements. Courtship, 
however, involved high levels of kinetic energy, the result of rapid increases and decreases 
in speed. The courtee and courter were distinct by the Vorticity of the motion. The bug that 
was courting turned a lot, while the bug being courted turned much less. Playful behaviour 
inputted by the subjects appeared to combine features of the five other behaviours. 
The recordings of the (human controlled) bug behaviour and the statistical analysis of motion 
cues provided the team with the data to invent a computer algorithm that could categorise 
animate motions 354. In preparation for its development, a new group of human subjects 
unfamiliar with the earlier experiment, watched the recorded bug movements and, limited to 
a ‘forced choice’, were asked to pick between the six categories. Although Play was often 
confused with Pursuit, and Fighting was also confused at times with Pursuit and Evasion, 
participants often selected the correct categories, and certain behaviours were never 
confused, such as Pursuit and Courtship. The researchers, satisfied that the available cues 
in this minimal display were sufficient for categorisation, proceeded to explore a range of 
computational approaches. Essential to any recognition algorithm are its input parameters, 
which must be carefully considered. Positional information of an entity, for example, is 
irrelevant unless relative to the position of another entity, the same goes for orientation. 
Isolated motion cues discussed in Tremoulet and Feldman’s research, namely speed and 
direction change, are also fundamentally important. Blythe and his team refined their data 
down to “seven simple, ecologically relevant cues” – individual and social: individual bug 
absolute velocity and vorticity, alongside relative velocity, vorticity, heading and angle 
(orientation). These were measured, and simply averaged, over the time of each recording. 
The second step in designing a recognition algorithm is to develop a strategy for processing 
inputs. Their immediate choice was a parallel computing approach using a typical three-layer 
artificial neural network (ANN), trained using the researchers’ 300 total bug motion 
recordings. Following this training exercise, the ANN categorised 90% of the recordings 
correctly. This is not entirely surprising as the training data and the testing data were 
identical, so the ANN was fed a new sample set and the results showed 67% accuracy. An 
impressive result considering the human subjects only scored 49% accuracy though, to be 
fair to them, they were not ‘trained’ on the data set before the experiment. 
 
131 
The researchers also explored linear computing approaches to the recognition algorithm. 
Three versions of heuristic ‘if-else’ logics were tested, however, none of them were as 
accurate at categorisation as the neural network. There is one caveat to that result. When 
particular input cues were omitted from the ANN, it was less effective than the heuristic 
approaches that were developed with the understanding that of the seven cues, not all are 
necessary to recognise certain behaviours. Absolute velocity was found to have provided the 
most accurate categorisation, followed by relative angle and then relative velocity. Their 
Categorization by Elimination heuristic algorithm checked the cues in a defined order, only 
using as many cues as (minimally) necessary making it “fast and frugal”. 
While it may not have been their primary intention to build a ‘universal movement grammar’, 
their ecologically rational approach offers a compelling method to identify a base set of 
animate behaviour categories. More complex examples involving three or more animate 
entities – such as the protective behaviours witnessed in Heider and Simmel early animation 
– are further interesting and unexplored building blocks. The Wolfpack effect also suggests 
categories that involve many animate entities, opening up a fertile research space, currently 
understudied. More recently Viksit Gaur and Brian Scassellati have presented a feature 
recognition approach for spline curves based on average coordinate points. This has 
enabled them to add an additional ‘Straight Line’ cue, the argument being that animate 
things do not typically move in perfectly straight lines355. 
As a final note on Blythe and his colleagues’ work developing a “Motion Turing Test”. Human 
subjects watched and identified behaviours of two bugs controlled by a computer, 
parametrically generating motion paths based on the six behaviour cues. For example, a bug 
performing pursuit behaviour would have high absolute velocity, with low relative velocity and 
low relative angle (as it is pointed at its prey). A bug evading pursuit would have the same 
high absolute velocity and low relative velocity, but differ in its high relative angle (as it is 
pointed away from its predator). The most noteworthy result from the study came when two 
computer- controlled bugs performed together, their behaviour was perceived as 
“mechanical and stereotyped”, but when a human controlled one of the bugs, the behaviour 
of the computer-controlled robot became “very animate”. One can only conclude that the 
animacy of the human controlled bug agent was reflected in the behaviour of the computer-
controlled agent. The environment of the computer-controlled bug (namely the human bug 
agent) was responsible for giving it greater animacy than its own algorithms were solely 
capable of. 
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The Limits of Reactive Agents 
The ability for agents to move around and navigate the features of their environments is a 
primary perceptual cue for determining animacy. Pathfinding algorithms are particularly 
common techniques for steering agent behaviour in environments that have developed out of 
AI research. Gaming systems typically use fast "grid-based pathfinding" approaches, such as 
the “A*” (pronounced A star) heuristic 356 technique, based originally on computer scientist 
Edsger W. Dijkstra’s graph-based algorithm 357, developed in the late 1950s. The motivation 
behind the development of the A* algorithm by its primary author Nils Nilsson, was to 
accelerate path planning for the first major mobile robot in AI research, Shakey (1966-72). 
Named so, for its jerky motion, the robot was built upon "information processing" models of 
the mind, articulated as the physical symbol systems hypothesis of Newell and Simon 358. 
Developed at the Artificial Intelligence Center of Stanford Research Institute, the robot had 
limited success as a mobile agent for reasons well documented in Rodney Brooks and 
Hubert Dreyfus’ aforementioned criticisms of classical reductive AI systems in complex 
environments. The A* algorithm, however, would be widely adopted in computer gaming 
because it worked well in discrete, well-defined environments. When these algorithms are 
found to be ineffective, due to obstacles in these digital environments, game designers may 
often choose to modify the environment rather than solve the potentially more time 
consuming and complex challenge of modifying the algorithm. A luxury not so easily afforded 
to designers of mobile robotics for physical and complex environments. 
In the field of computer game design, rule bases for behaviour have been crafted in 
innumerable forms to develop a wide variety of agents. With limited computational capacity 
in early computer gaming devices, developers needed to find simple rule sets to create 
compelling impressions of intelligent agent behaviour. An iconic example can be found in the 
programming of the four “Ghost” agents that gamers would excitedly try to evade in the 
classic arcade game Pac- Man. Developed by just three team members, it earned more than 
$1 billion in quarters within 15 months of its U.S. release 359, by creating an addictive tension, 
as the human controlled agent Pac-Man was chased by ghosts each with their own 
unpredictable autonomy. Their ghosts’ names were Blinky, Inky, Pinky and Clyde. Their 
original Japanese names translated as Chaser, Fickle, Ambusher and Stupid, and gave away 
a bit more about the underlying rules that steered their behaviour. All the ghosts cycled 
between two states, called scatter and chase. In scatter mode, the ghosts would move 
toward their respective four corners of the screen (Figure 42). 
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Figure 42. Left, Pac-Man environment at start of game. Right, behaviour in Scatter mode where Ghosts would go 
to predefined screen corners and follow paths. 
In chase mode, each had more bespoke coding. Blinky was a simple ‘chaser’ agent with his 
target as Pac-Man, who he follows around. His speed increases as Pac-Man gets closer to 
achieving his goal of collecting all the yellow ‘Pac-Dots’ within the maze. Pinky’s strategy is 
more sophisticated always aiming for four spaces ahead of where Pac-Man is heading. 
Clyde’s behaviour can appear more unpredictable but does have an underlying logic with 
rules that change based on proximity. At more than eight square-distance, Clyde behaves 
like Blinky, chasing the target of Pac-Man, but when he reaches less than eight squares, he 
beings moving toward the bottom left corner of the maze. This gives Clyde the impression of 
being indecisive, at one moment, acting like a predator and then the next like prey. Finally, 
the most puzzling behaviour is Inky’s. His chasing target is not only based on Pac-Man’s 
direction and position, but also on Blinky’s, drawing a line between the two and moving 
toward a position double the distance from Blinky. 
The result of this is that Inky will show quite random movements at distance, but when Blinky 
closes in on Pac-Man, so will Inky. Skilled Pac-Man players can use all these simple rule 
sets against the ghosts – The Pac-Man Dossier by James Pittman catalogues these 
strategies 360 – but for the many millions of casual users of the game, the interaction of these 
simple rules creates a perfectly balanced and addictive game. A less inventive programmer 
may have simply made the ghosts chase Pac-Man, but chief designer Toru Iwatani was 
careful to craft a more multi- dimensional set of behaviours, by using a combination of state 
changes between scatter and chase, as well as individual behavioural traits in the agents, 
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that led to far greater of variety of game play. 
From early arcade games to contemporary game design, much of the so called ‘intelligence’ 
of computational agents is driven by a variety of simple rule-based algorithms, combined with 
a measure of random functioning, leading to purposeful behaviour without being predictable. 
Fuzzy logic is also popular for employing probabilistic methods that lend degrees of 
uncertainty to purposeful behaviour, making computer-driven agents appear more animate. 
These reactive approaches shortcut the need to develop adaptive forms of interactive 
behaviour, sufficiently convincing game-players, that they are encountering intelligent 
agents. Such a strategy could be called a form of ‘Shallow AI’, to use the term Persson, 
Laaksolahti and Lonnqvist 361 chose to describe simple heuristic strategies for designing 
“Socially Intelligent Agents”. They acknowledge that these approaches to intelligent 
behaviour do not reflect cognitive models of human-like intelligence, yet they can create 
compellingly social and animate perceptions and interactions. The tense pace at which these 
games take place often demands fast heuristic decision-making by the gamer, and complete 
attention, leaving little time for them to question the calibre of their computer opponent’s 
intelligence. 
This has not deterred the industry, however, from claiming to have developed advanced AI to 
sell games. The development of genres of narrative gaming involving social interaction with 
computer driven agents, such as turn based adventure, borrowed from the decision tree logic 
of ‘Choose Your Own Adventure’ formats in book publishing. These relatively linear, 
‘progression-style’ productions, with tightly defined sequences of events have led to criticism 
of repetitive behaviour in computer agents, and abnormal responses if human agents do 
things developers don’t expect. The limitations of decision tree techniques, can lead 
consequentially to frustration and loss of immersion in gaming environments, as a direct 
result of the loss of belief in the ‘life’ of computer agents. 
With the growth of gaming into an industry comparable in gross earnings to film, the 
complexity of these ‘hand scripted’ worlds has grown exponentially, as have the budgets to 
build more complex decision trees to overcome their limitations. These manually 
programmed hierarchical if-else logics are similar to those taken in classical AI approaches, 
such as the aforementioned CYC Project 362. The practical limits of such approaches, and 
dissatisfaction with long-term interaction with primitive reactive agents, have led many 
gamers to go online and interact with other human players in networked multi-player games. 
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Simulated Adaptive Agents 
In linear progression-style gaming environments, simple automatic and reactive agents can 
be ideal for performing pre-choreographed sets of behaviours at set locations. This is often 
an advantage for the game developer working in a similar fashion to a film director, crafting a 
scene with a very defined vision and scripted actors. For some game designers, giving 
agents adaptive behaviours makes them too unpredictable, with the potential to “throw a 
wrench in more traditional game production processes” 363. However, interest from game 
developers and consumers alike, for non-linear open-ended games created a fertile space 
for innovation in emergent forms of behavioural design. Artificial life approaches found a 
natural affinity with the genre of ‘God’ games in the 1990s where the goal was explicitly to 
nurture the ‘life’ of virtual computational agents, whether simulations of micro-biology, bugs, 
human beings, cities or entire civilisations. 
 “I am just making insects and eventually I want to make mice and rabbits. 
There are millions of species on this planet and I see no reason to fear yet 
another species. Steve Grand interview for New Scientist.” 364  
(Graham-Rowe, 2000) 
Steve Grand’s 1996 game Creatures was the first ambitious attempt to incorporate 
developments in genetic algorithms and neural network machine learning techniques, to give 
game players the chance to evolve and train their own agents. The pioneering aim of the 
game being to harness the creative parallel processing of many users to develop 
increasingly intelligent agents. Grand’s design for his agents involved brains driven by use a 
neuronal processing system called ‘State Value Rules’ The brain made up of 10 lobes, each 
with specialist behaviour functions, and 900 neurons with thousands of dendrite connections, 
was linked to the creature’s individual simulated biochemistry creating a complex 
interweaving of internal variables to determine behaviour through interaction with its 
environment. 
By the second iteration of the game, its main character species featured 771 genes. 
Mutations in genetic material allowed for new features to emerge beyond the developer’s 
expectations. Harnessing the community-building power of the internet, players could trade 
creatures and breed new offspring, creating the biggest web user community in the world 365. 
The project has been credited with inspiring a new generation to explore the field of artificial 
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intelligence though has received criticism for the limitations of the design of the Creature’s 
environment366, populated with few pre-defined objects constraining the variety of adaptive 
behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 43. Packaging for Creatures the commercial artificial life game. 
One defining difference between the scholarly exploration of computational ALife research in 
simulating life-like behaviour and the gaming industry is the focus on human interaction. 
Steve Grand explains his motivations for exploring life through playful gaming was to make 
people care for their creatures, rather than “passively watching hundreds of successive 
generations of norns blundering around the landscape, in the hope that one would finally 
evolve the ability not to bump into things” 367. 
The motivation to create direct human connection between human life and artificial life has 
proven aesthetically potent, particularly where users nurture their computer agents. 
Emotional bonds sometimes referred to as the “Tamagotchi effect” drawing on a whole 
number of emotive human psychological tendencies that shape these experiences, and are 
discussed in the following chapter. A principle contribution of game development has been to 
bring the Promethean pursuit of artificial life to a far wider audience, exploring its application 
and ramifications to direct interaction with human life. 
The gaming industry has also, as a bi-product of aims for commercial success in 
entertainment, financed the research and development of a far greater variety of agents than 
would otherwise occur in highly specialised AI research. Game developers have even 
opened their games to allow community contributors to develop agent intelligence. A notable 
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example is the Quake gaming franchise by id Software, who actively assimilates some of the 
most successful community made ‘bot’ agents into its game, with developers openly sharing 
their design strategies368. 
 
 
Figure 44. Google Deepmind. Agent training of Capture the Flag over hundreds of thousands of generations. 
Agents trained on changing environments so agents generalise for unvisited maps. 
Recently, this has led to the relationship between gaming and AI research becoming closer. 
In 2018, Google’s AI subsidiary DeepMind, modified a version of the Quake III game engine, 
to explore whether machine learning techniques could adaptively develop agents that could 
compete with human players in the canonical strategy game Capture the Flag (CTF) 369. To 
make the challenge particularly difficult, each time the agents were trained, the procedurally 
generated environment of the game changed, so agents needed to generalise for unvisited 
maps. This prevented agents developing strategies that were specific to a particular map, but 
may otherwise be ineffective in other contexts. DeepMind’s team used an increasingly 
popular method of reinforcement learning, where an agent learns how to behave in an 
environment it is placed into by performing actions and measuring the results. This 
behaviourist approach, where agents receive rewards for performing actions deemed 
positive against some goals defined by the designer, was used to train a population of 
agents to learn CTF, by playing alongside and against each other. The agents generate their 
own internal goals that begin to correlate with the reward signal they receive for their 
behaviour. In other words, they are not told anything about the game, but still learn the 
fundamental concepts of the game and develop an ‘intuition’ for how to win CTF. 
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Figure 45. Google DeepMind, Phylogenetic Tree of agent species. 
Analysis of the developed neural network showed that the importance of knowing whether an 
agent’s teammate was holding the flag began ‘early’, after 45,000 games. This knowledge 
became represented by a single neuron after 200,000 games, which the team suggested 
was reminiscent of Rodrigo Quian Quiroga’s theory of concept cells. A class of “Highly 
selective neurons that seem to represent the meaning of a given stimulus in a manner that is 
invariant to different representations of that stimulus” 370. 
 “DeepMind’s agents not only learned the basic rules of capture the flag 
(grab your opponents’ flag from their base and return it to your own before 
they do the same to you), but strategies like guarding your own flag, 
camping at your opponent’s base, and following teammates around so you 
can gang up on the enemy.” 371 (Verge, 2018) 
When they tested their agent’s skills against human two-player teams they found them to be 
superior competitors at Capture The Flag - a complex game that requires strategic, tactical 
understanding of complex multi-agent environment, collaborative behaviour and navigational 
skills. This was all achieved without human supervision of the learning process, yet “agents 
in fact learn human-like behaviours, such as following teammates and camping in the 
opponent’s base” 372. John E. Laird and Michael van Lent suggest that “interactive computer 
games provide a rich environment for incremental research on human-level AI” 373. 
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Following Brooks’ criticism that much of AI research involves highly specific research, too 
specialised to lead to general intelligence, they suggest that gaming may fill this essential 
gap, particularly as the complexity of these virtual environments increase. A testament to the 
intersecting research worlds of gaming and AI research was the adoption of blockbuster 
driving game Grand Theft Auto V by researchers 374 in autonomous vehicles. The high 
budget production’s realistic graphics and physics engine made it an ideal platform to train 
car agents, interacting with other simulated car agents, pedestrians, weather and urban and 
rural contexts. At the University of Michigan Ford Center for Autonomous Vehicles (FCAV) 
375, researchers screen-grabbed the near-photo-realistic imagery from the game to generate 
‘annotated data’ that can then be used to train with. Comparing the effectiveness of their 
trained agent in a virtual world against an agent trained on photographic data (KITTI vehicle 
detection data set 376) they were able to prove their synthetic data to perform better than 
current real-world data sets. Other ongoing projects include exploration of convolutional 
neural networks (at Princeton)377, in order to learn safe following-distances to cars, while 
responding to lane markings, orientation of vehicles, and other essential variables for 
autonomous driving. Non-academic led initiatives include OpenAI and DeepDrives 
collaboration to develop an agent within Grand Theft Auto V that was shared publicly until 
issues of intellectual property 378 led the project to be ported to an open non-commercial 
engine 379. 
In September 2017, Unity, a cross-platform game engine released its Machine Learning 
Agents (ML Agents 380), an open-source beta initiative, to make its virtual gaming 
environments into training grounds for agents. The implication for gaming are more intelligent 
computational competitors to challenge game players, but the potentially larger implications 
are the harnessing of these agent behaviours out into the physical world, whether it is for 
autonomous vehicles, or ever-more sophisticated socially intelligent agents for human-
centric interaction. Unity’s AI and Machine Learning team now counts over 100 employees 
demonstrating the importance of these techniques in agent design. The next great challenge 
will be “porting” these gaming agents into the physical world. 
Embodied Adaptive Agents 
Embodied agents are subject to the laws of physics and behave as complex dynamical 
systems by virtue of both their morphological computation and electro- mechanical control 
systems, in interaction with the physical world. The shift in the past decade from classical 
focus on central processing in the “brain” towards a focus on adaptive and embodied 
interaction with the environment has seen a growing adoption of bottom-up strategies for 
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behaviour design. Grey Walter’s tortoises were the first example of an embodied agent that 
was also given adaptive capabilities with the addition of CORA, an electrical learning circuit 
called a Conditioned Reflex Analogue that demonstrated simple Pavlovian learning. The new 
circuitry included some alterations to the sensors with a sound detector, light detector and a 
bump switch. Just as Pavlov’s dogs were reported to salivating on hearing a bell, after 
training to associate the bell with food, Walter was able to train different behaviours by 
stimulating connections between the sensors and motors. 
 “Its education consisted very simply of trying to teach it that sound meant 
obstacle, which in turn meant trouble. The schooling was to blow a police 
whistle and kick it. After it had been whistled at and kicked about a dozen 
times, it learned that a whistle meant trouble. We then removed the specific 
stimulus—the stool. The whistle was blown, and it avoided the place as if 
there were a stool there.” 381 (Walter, 1956) 
Grey Walter’s pioneering work remains an important foundation to reinforcement learning for 
embodied agents, one that that Margaret Boden suggests may have all been forgotten if it 
hadn’t been for “the end-of-century work in situated robotics and computational ethology” 382. 
As we have found in examining developments in gaming agents in the previous section, 
connectionist computational architectures, such as deep neural networks, are now proving 
their superiority in making competitive and believable animate agents, versus classical 
reactive agents. The implication is that these approaches will solve the problems classical 
robotic agents face in physical environments, through embodied learning. 
One facet of this emerging approach to embodied agents is the way it enables them to ‘Self-
Model’, rather than rely on a manually constructed mathematical model, to determine 
strategies of locomotion. Roboticists Josh Bongard, Victor Zykov and Hod Lipson argue this 
makes robots more resilient to changes in their physical state caused by mechanical wear, or 
other unexpected damage caused through physical interaction with their environments - if 
they can continually restructure their internal self-models they can generate compensatory 
behaviour383. The teamed work with a four-legged shaped robot, driven by eight 
servomotors, that began with no self-model, only a large combinatorial range of possible 
models for a machine with eight motors. First, the robot makes an arbitrary motor movement 
and captures the sensory information of its resulting orientation (using tilt and motor angle 
sensors). A set of 15 ‘candidate self-models’ are compared, to explain the detected sensory-
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actuation causal relationship. It then generates new movements that are likely to gain further 
information for the self-modelling process. Through this adaptive process a model develops 
that eventually resembles well the physical configuration and leverage of the robot’s motors 
and limbs. The standard configuration chosen for the robot was four legs each actuated by 
two motors. Once the robot has self-modelled this, it self- generates motor sequences that 
give it locomotion. 
 
 
Figure 46. Robot self-models through cycles of action execution and self-modelling. It is later able to use its 
model to develop motion profiles to locomote. 
The resulting gait in their experiments, were surprisingly life-like in quality. Footage shows 
the robot shifting is centre of gravity to propel itself forward rolling its limbs in a motion unlike 
any particular animal, yet familiar to invertebrates, such as snails, slugs, mussels, or 
octopuses. When a limb of the robot is intentionally damaged, its movements become even 
more remarkable. The researchers explain, “If the robot detects unexpected sensorimotor 
patterns or an external signal as a result of unanticipated morphological change, the robot 
reinitiates the alternating cycle of modelling and exploratory actions to produce new models 
reflecting the change”384. 
Compensatory behaviour is self-generated to recover functionality and the robot manages to 
maintain locomotion. Its compensatory motions appeared to use the broken leg like a crutch 
to press off against. This is a surprising strategy, perhaps not one that programmers might 
have considered themselves, yet the robot was able to adaptively find a solution itself, based 
on its new morphology. The behavioural possibilities of such self-generated motion 
strategies in robotics are a fascinating area of research, but there is also something more 
immediately engaging for audiences of the robot. 
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When I have shared the research footage in lectures, people often respond with empathy to 
the ‘injured’ robot, that cheerfully overcomes its limitation, with its somewhat tragic new gait. 
The limping motion is irresistible perceived as weakness. One might hypothesise that 
perhaps its motion triggers a percept rooted in our innate detection of prey and predators. 
The surprising behaviours that emerge out of an agent’s embodied interaction with the world 
demonstrate the potential of these machines to both produce novel solutions beyond the 
imagination of the designers, and also compellingly animate perceptions from processes of 
learning. 
Deep learning techniques for image and speech classification have made rapid progress in 
recent years. As I have discussed, learning techniques for decision- making in virtual 
environments, particularly games, are now making rapid progress too. Decision making by 
agents in physical environments, however, remains more challenging, because, for robots to 
act with intelligence they need to make decisions quickly about temporal relationships of 
cause and effect, and predict the results of their behaviour within far more complex physical 
environment than gaming agents face in virtual environments. All of this complexity 
increases further when robots must remain safe, robust and able to adapt to human 
behaviour and instruction. 
This has not deterred researchers and recent developments in deep neural network 
algorithms are enabling robots to learn by trial and error. By coupling the recognition of 
physical objects with motor skills, within a single deep convolutional neural net, recent work 
at UC Berkeley 385 has examined whether “training the perception and control systems jointly 
end-to-end provide better performance than training each component separately”. This is 
distinctly different to classical approaches, which would separate problems of visual 
perception from motor control. The team describes the approach as closer to how an infant 
develops coordination and problem solving through play. Using a two-armed robot and single 
camera, they trained the robot to insert Lego Blocks into each other, and a variety of other 
coordination tasks typical for early child development, such as placing a peg in a hole. 
Roboticist Sergey Levine, co-investigating the robotics research at UC Berkeley with Pieter 
Abbeel, explained in a recent interview that, “The capabilities of this robot are still limited, but 
its skills are learned entirely automatically, and allow it to predict complex physical 
interactions with objects that it has never seen before by building on previously observed 
patterns of interaction” 386. The fascinating result of this approach is the verisimilitude with 
which the robots behave like infants and so unlike classically programmed robots. The 
fledgling robots began to develop behaviour where they would try and land the peg 
 
143 
somewhere close the hole, so that it was in contact with the surface around the hole and 
then drag along that surface, sensing resistance until it disappears and then push the peg in. 
The motion is perceived as remarkably life-like, as the somewhat messy, self-correcting 
motion eventually achieves its goal. 
 
 
Figure 47. BRETT (the Berkeley Robot for the Elimination of Tedious Tasks) trained using deep learning 
techniques 
In a classical approach to the problem of putting a peg through a hole, the challenge would 
typically be decomposed into separate tasks of vision and motor control. Two computer 
vision tasks would identify the location, orientation, shape and size of peg, and the location 
and size of the hole. Then two separate motor control tasks would try and solve problems of 
picking up the peg and then moving it to be aligned with the hole to go through. This requires 
high-resolution cameras, and high precision control, and even with the highest spec input 
and output hardware, these remain non-trivial problems. Nonetheless these processes can 
all be mathematically modelled and, with sufficient programming, a robot can follow a set of 
paths to achieve the task. However, as Gary Bradski, founder of the widely used computer-
vision framework OpenCV explains, the power of these new algorithms is that, “It used to 
take hours on up to months of careful programming to give a robot the hand-eye coordination 
necessary to do a task…This new work enables robots to just learn the task by doing it” 387. 
Not only does it offer a means to achieving effective visual-motor coordination for problem 
solving, the motion of the robot using this new approach moves with an entirely different 
quality. Whereas classically programmed robots can appear unsurprisingly robotic, by which 
I mean unnatural or mechanical, the behaviour of these bottom-up approaches leads to 
highly animate, natural motion paths, and distinctly different problem-solving strategies. An 
analogy of the two approaches can be made with two approaches Gerd Gigerenzer and 
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Richard Dawkins take to the problem of catching the ball. Gigerenzer proposes simple “Gaze 
heuristic” 388, while Dawkins turns to computing differential equations and trajectories. 
The strategy that UC Berkeley’s robots develop through trial and error, which appear highly 
animate, may also begin to reveal new understandings on the nature of the heuristics 
humans and animals take to interact with objects and environments. Through this embodied 
approach to animate behaviour, it may also have the impact of offering convincing evidence 
of the embodied nature of human and animal intelligence, and help to overcome the current 
Cartesian dogma that continues to shape much discourse in cognition and robotics. 
The team at UC Berkeley are now looking to extend these skills into far wider range of 
manipulation problems, by structuring the learning around generalising to situations, giving 
machines the ability to learn what learning algorithms might work best in different contexts. 
An approach Pieter Abbeel, Director of the UC Berkeley Robot Learning Lab calls, meta-
learning 389, aimed at shortening the time it takes for agents to find solutions to problems. 
Importantly, this meta-learning approach shifts machine learning from computer scientists 
and roboticists trying to find the optimal solutions to learning a task through their own 
ingenuity, to using the experience gathered by the embodied agent to discover algorithms. 
This is an exciting step that could finally bring robotics truly out of the lab and into the vast, 
varied and complex built environment. What this work indicates is that the quality of 
behaviour these robots will bring into our built environment will be highly animate, and unlike 
the aesthetics of behaviour that have characterised robots in the 20th century. 
“A robot’s perceived intelligence is significantly correlated with animacy.”390 
(Bartneck et al, 2007) 
When Baron von Kemplen constructed his mechanical Turk in 1769 for Austrian- Hungarian 
empress Maria Theresa, he could not have anticipated the excitement his invention would 
attract. The extraordinary chess-playing automaton was, as we all know today, an elaborate 
trick perpetrated by von Kemplen and a diminutive human chess master hidden within a 
theatre of cogs and gears designed to convince observers of its mechanical veracity. So 
good were the small chess players that inhabited it over an 80 year tour of many cities of the 
world, that Turk often won, “It was even said to have inspired Jacquard to invent the 
automatic loom after it defeated him” 391. Prof Noel Sharkey suggests that Turk followed in a 
tradition dating back to the ancients, where human mechanical ingenuity mixed with hidden 
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operators would perform deceptions to audiences, as acts of persuasion. The big change, 
however, with Turk, Sharkey argues, is that “von Kemplen’s goal was to create a false belief 
in the technology rather than in the supernatural.” He extends the argument to suggest that 
“Deception is an integral part of AI and robotics” and that “In some ways AI is the science of 
illusion” 392. In reality, the state of AI and robotics has fallen far short of science fiction visions 
for machines engaged in meaningful social interaction with humanity. 
 
 
Figure 48. The Mechanical Turk of Johann Wolfgang von Kempelen 
Public displays of humanoid robots are all too often a series of pre-coded motion routines or 
‘canned’ responses to verbal instructions, little more cognitively advanced than Joseph 
Weizenbaum’s text bot Eliza393, built in the mid-1960s. 
Nonetheless, the excitement for human interaction with social robotics remains. The 
combination of the cultural myths of intelligent robotics combine with our cognitive 
tendencies to perceive life in animated objects, triggering “the active participation by the 
public in the suspension of disbelief” 394. Though some of the slow progress can be put down 
to limits in computing power, I believe the larger obstacle to progress may be in the 
Cartesian cognitive cul-de-sac that characterises large parts of the field. Not only does it 
prevent progress in building more intelligent robotic behaviour, but it also prevents the field 
from fully appreciating human experience, particularly aesthetic experiences of Lively 
Artefacts. 
The research field of Human–Robot Interaction (HRI) is a broad interdisciplinary community, 
including computer scientists, designers and engineers, cognitive scientists, linguists, and 
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psychologists, all interested in understanding, designing, and evaluating robotic systems, 
used by, or in the company of, human beings. The types of interaction are often quite one-
dimensional, such as joystick control of a remote vehicle, or interfaces for control of 
manufacturing robots. However, with more social forms of interaction between people and 
robotic agents, we find a highly multi-dimensional spaces of communication. HRI has some 
of the difficulties that dogged classical AI approaches to robotics where problems of 
perception, decision-making and actuation are decomposed and distributed between 
different departments and universities only to be brought back together later. The risk with 
such approaches is as roboticist Rolf Pfeifer explains, is ending up with an unbalanced robot 
design, with a variety of systems patched together with no overall integration. Kerstin 
Dautenhahn suggests, “only a truly interdisciplinary perspective, encompassing a synthesis 
of robot-centred, human-centred and robot cognition-centred HRIs, is likely to fulfil the 
forecast that more and more robots will in the future inhabit our living environments” 395. 
Methodologically, HCI and HRI are closely aligned, with HCI (the older more established 
field) having a significant influence of the formulation of HRI. This has shaped a tendency 
toward computationalist thinking with its Cartesian models of intelligence, and master-slave 
models of control. A continual discussion centres around the ‘Llevels of Autonomy’ (LOA) a 
robot is given. A commonly cited measure of this is Tom Sheridan and Bill Verplank’s 10 
level scale396 of autonomy, developed to reflect on their research with unmanned underwater 
robots. At the low end of the scale, they describe how the “Computer offers no assistance; 
human must do it all”. The robot is a direct tele-operated extension of human agency and 
makes no decisions itself. At the other end of the scale, “The computer decides everything 
and acts autonomously, ignoring the human”. Most of the middle ground in the scale involves 
semi-autonomous machines that do actions based on commands reflecting HCI master-
slave models. Note, Sheridan and Verplank’s association between the computer and 
intelligence, with no mention of the physical intelligence of the robot itself. 
Cartesian views of intelligence remain pervasive. Goodrich and Schultz’s397 survey of the 
field of HRI explains that “A common autonomy approach is sometimes referred to as the 
sense-plan-act model of decision-making”. Though they acknowledge Brooks’ 398 criticism of 
such top-down strategies they go on to defend classical techniques, suggesting the failures 
of early work may have been in the limited technical capabilities of these reasoning robots. 
This is a common defence of classical AI techniques in robotics, and Goodrich and Schultz 
use examples of autonomous robotics in aviation, aeronautics and missile control to 
demonstrate successful combinations of control theory and classical AI techniques. These, I 
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would argue, are quite specialised domains comparably simple to terrestrial or social 
environments. Another Cartesian methodology in wide use is John Anderson’s ACT-R 
system399 for modelling cognition. It has become a popular tool for symbolically modelling 
cognition in both human beings and robots400, through a reductive and tightly rational lens. 
Other popular symbolic frameworks include Wooldridge’s belief-desire-intention model, 
described in his book Reasoning About Rational Agents401. These frameworks build upon 
theories of mind, rooted in Fodor’s ‘representational theory of mind’, where he argues that 
mental activity involves Turing-style computation of language. 
 
Figure 49. The updated formulation of Anderson’s ACT-R model."402 
This view of cognition complimented classical AI approaches, and was developed alongside 
one another. “The philosopher Daniel Dennett coined the phrase intentional system to refer 
to an entity that is best understood in terms of folk- psychology notions, such as beliefs, 
desires, and the like”403. Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’ has become the de facto model of 
HRI, to explain how we rationally interpret agency in robotics. 
Countering Cartesian explanations of experience, Matthew Ratcliffe suggests we interpret 
agency from the expressive gestures of others, through our own bodily responsiveness to 
these perceptions. Citing evidence of mirror neurons interconnecting our perceptual and 
proprioceptive cognition, his hypothesis explains our instant and unconscious awareness of 
agency, without resorting the theorising about minds. His theory extends to construct a 
plausible account of how we are able to coordinate in collaborative activities like dance. 
Ratcliffe argues that “computing each other’s mental states on the basis of bodily 
movements in order to predict the next movements is clearly absurd” 404. 
By exploring HRI literature, I have found explanations of human experience of robots, 
mirroring how robots are classically programmed to sense-think-act. The rationalising of all 
actors, human and machine, best expressed in the wide adoption of Theory of Mind (ToM) in 
robotics, is evidently as a useful short-cut in robotic research, but simply does not give us a 
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satisfactorily complete theory of these experiences, just as strictly rational approaches to 
aesthetic appreciation of art fail to recognise the embodied and layered complexity of 
cognitive processes. 
In the 1990s and into the new millennium, examples of what roboticist Robin Murphy calls 
“hybrid deliberative/reactive” models 405 406 407 408 tried to overcome limitations of classical 
approaches, by bringing together ‘sense-think-act’ type models on top of reactive behaviour-
based substrates. The term hybrid is questionable with bottom-up and top-down systems 
operating virtually independently of one another 409. The behaviour-based components are 
often for fast-reflex aspects of motion control, such as negotiating environments safely, while 
decision-making often remains tied to classical approaches. These approaches have had 
limited success in achieving the goals of HRI to bring robots out into complex physical and 
social environments. The very recent developments in deep neural networks, with end to end 
processing using a connectionist architecture incorporating sensing, problem solving and 
actuation may finally begin to shift approaches to programming robotics. This may also help 
to progress the ways in which not only robot cognition is conceived in HRI, but also how 
human experience is discussed. 
Social Robotics 
Social robotic research is a field of HRI’s working towards ‘peer-to-peer’410 modes of 
interaction, rather than master-slave models of control. Researchers in the field develop 
machines that participate in social forms of behaviour, from primitive gestural exchanges 
through to imitating human-like capabilities. Robotics researcher Kerstin Dautenhahn offers a 
useful scale to place so called social robots along a cognitive spectrum from ‘socially 
evocative’ at the bottom – stimulating primitive perceptions of animacy – up to higher-level 
machines, where “we find socially interactive robots that possesses a variety of skills to 
interact and communicate”411. Machines at the higher end of Dautenhahn’s scale are usually 
focused on human-centric user applications and satisfying user expectations in line with HCI 
methodologies. 
By contrast, a niche field of ‘Sociable Robotics’412 explores robot-centric artificial life aims of 
emergent machine intelligence behaving like developmental infants, interacting in the interest 
of their own goals and cognitive progress. A prominent example of this bottom-up approach 
materialised out of Rodney Brooks’ research group. As its chief designer Cynthia Breazeal 
explains, “if you really wanted to understand human intelligence, it was important to have a 
human-like body, to 
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have human-like interactions with the world...[and] that in order to learn from experience, you 
have to have something to get experience through, and that of course is this body situated in 
this environment” 413. 
In 2013 Knox, Breazeal, and Stone414 published a framework for learning through human 
feedback, claiming their embodied approach demonstrates promising training possibilities for 
developing multiple behaviours in robots from “free-form human-generated feedback”, 
without algorithmic modifications. As the team at MIT are finding, this strategy of building 
human-level intelligence from the ground up, including verbal interaction skills, is extremely 
challenging and the project to develop human-like robotic intelligence remains some distance 
off the ambitions of its designers. Cynthia Breazeal is not modest about the aims of the field. 
 “For me, a sociable robot is able to communicate and interact with us, 
understand and even relate to us, in a personal way. It should be able to 
understand us and itself in social terms. We, in turn, should be able to 
understand it in the same social terms—to be able to relate to it and to 
empathize with it. Such a robot must be able to adapt and learn throughout 
its lifetime, incorporating shared experiences with other individuals into its 
understanding of self, of others, and of the relationships they share. In 
short, a sociable robot is socially intelligent in a human-like way, and 
interacting with it is like interacting with another person. At the pinnacle of 
achievement, they could befriend us, as we could them.” 415  
(Breazeal, 2002) 
Breazeal’s group at MIT continues to develop towards these, announcing their first 
commercially available social robot Jibo in 2014, and shipping first orders in late 2017. 
Competitors have also recently come to market including a penguin-like robot called Kuri, 
astronaut-like robot called Kirobo, and ElliQ from Intuition Robotics. WIRED Magazine 
described 2017 as “the year of the robot assistant”416. Although Jibo raised nearly $73 
million, and despite making it onto the Time Magazine list of the “25 best inventions of 2017”, 
plagued by a series of delays and overpromises, the company closed in 2018. Its competitor 
Mayfield Robotics has also announced it is cancelling Kuri 417. 
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Figure 50. Jibo (left) and Kuri (right). Two recent high profile social robotics projects that failed to prove 
commercial successes regardless of experienced robotics groups behind them. 
Ultimately, the problem was the rise of much cheaper and more feature-rich, though far less 
animate, home assistants like the Amazon Echo running on their Alexa AI, and Google 
Home running their Google’s own AI, Google Assistant. As Evan Ackerman, senior writer for 
IEEE Spectrum’s robotics blog explains, “Kuri, Jibo, and other social home robots have had 
to contend with embodied digital assistants that affordably duplicate a big chunk of their 
functionality. They’ve had trouble establishing compelling use cases and long-term value 
relative to their cost” 418. With relatively simple voice command interactions, and libraries of 
canned responses, or spoken search results from the internet, social robots are yet to 
develop much more than rudimentary social behaviours, and are yet to find their unique 
selling point that justifies their price to a mass market. 
Often the ambitions of researchers to explore complex interactions between robots and 
human beings are greater than the available technology or technical capabilities of their 
methods. A commonly used trick to overcome this problem is the Wizard-of-Oz (WoZ) 
technique419 420 421 - a modern day Turk. This sees human subjects encounter robots that may 
appear autonomous but are tele-operated by a hidden human. Such techniques are 
considered methodologically sound, but as the illusion can only be maintained in the lab, 
there are limits to the value of research in intelligent behaviour if they cannot be replicated 
out in the world. 
The ultimate challenge of social robots is whether they can maintain interesting enough 
behaviour to interact with over months or years? Most sustained interaction with current 
generations of social robots reveal limitations within minutes or hours of encountering them. 
Roboticists, just like game designers, have turned to computational short cuts to give the 
impression of greater intelligence in their creations. A common technique is to introduce a 
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random function into behaviour. The right balance of predictable with unpredictable 
behaviour can give the impression of intelligence, but this ‘cheap trick’ finds its limits quickly 
and, as roboticist Christoph Bartneck explains, “Given sufficient time the user will give up 
his/her hypothesized patterns of the robot’s intelligent behavior and become bored with its 
limited random vocabulary of behaviors” 422. 
Though such approaches are useful in designing virtual gaming agents, or primitive reactive 
toys, they will not bring HRI closer to finding solutions to longer- term interactions. Bartneck 
argues “Let’s not waste any more effort on implementing methods from AI from which we 
know that they will not lead to intelligent robot behavior” 423. He suggests that successful 
long-term perception of intelligence is fundamentally dependent on a robots competency and 
he proposes that robotics may hold an advantage over virtual agents, by virtue of their 
embodiment. Margaret Boden agrees, making the case that when the issue of embodiment 
is taken to be centrally important, “only robots of a very special kind (dynamically coupled 
with environment) would be philosophically plausible as bearers of psychological 
predicates”424. 
Instead, the current state of the art in commercially available social robotics overcome their 
cognitive limitations, with illusions of intelligence created foundationally by with socially 
evocative motion, and then higher-order verbal, and other auditory, behavioural cues, as well 
as formally evocative cue of living entities, such as eyes. Social robotics typically feature 
some abstraction of facial features. For example, where social robots communicate verbally, 
a visual display of the expression of mouthing words can assist in recognition425. The use of 
abstracted faces, closer to cartoon characters than human beings, can reduce our 
expectations of intelligence, and limit disappointment if its behaviours are unexpected. 
In the context of animate motion, an emerging field of social signal processing426 has 
developed over the past two decades to explore cues, particularly visual cues that reveal 
information hidden in social behaviour. A primary aim of the work in the field that 
encompasses fields of social sciences with computer science, is to provide “computers with 
similar abilities in human–computer interaction scenarios”427. This work focuses naturally on 
human social gestures, including blinks, smiles, crossed arms and laughter, rather than on 
the behaviour of abstract or non-anthropomorphic motion, leaving open an interesting area of 
performative inquiry around what can effectively make robots appear social, without simply 
imitating faces, or vocal expressions. Take, for example, mobile robots that share spaces 
with human beings that do tasks like cleaning and security monitoring. If the robot takes 
paths around people, rather than waiting for them to get out of the way, this implies a social 
 
152 
intelligence. A further parameter of consideration might be a person’s orientation. If a 
person’s back is turned to the robot, it should move slower and take a wider path around 
them. With the plethora of possible circumstances, soon such hierarchical logics may 
become unwieldy under classical approaches. 
One of the most critical social cues to animate behaviour is gaze. Robots that appear to look 
around and lock attention on human beings, or events occurring in their environment, 
immediately appear to be alive. This is well understood in puppetry and animation, and is 
discussed in the next chapter. An added layer of social intelligence can happen if the robot 
switches gaze between multiple targets. For example, a robot may look at a person looking 
at an object and turn to face the object, before looking back at the person. The impression of 
turn taking, can also enhance an impression of social intelligence. Moments of stillness, 
followed by motion, enhance the sense of purposefulness, whether there is any meaningful 
purpose to those motions or not. These types of primitive socially evocative motion cues may 
have their limitations over long-term interactions, but for short periods of gestural exchange 
they can be quite compelling and exist as a base layer upon which more specialised forms of 
social communication can occur. 
Relational Artefacts 
 “Its ability to inspire relationship is not based on its intelligence or 
consciousness, but on the capacity to push certain “Darwinian” buttons in 
people (making eye contact, for example) that cause people to respond as 
though they were in relationship. For me, relational artifacts are the new 
uncanny in our computer culture, as Freud (1960) put it, “the long familiar 
taking a form that is strangely unfamiliar.” 428 (Turkle, 2006) 
Psychologist Sherry Turkle has defined technologies with social behaviour as “Relational 
Artifacts”. She defines them as “artifacts that present themselves as having ‘states of mind’ 
for which an understanding of those states enriches human encounters with them”429. The 
term itself reflects the psychoanalytic tradition of Turkle’s practice, which sees her examine 
the psychological effects of developing relations with machines, through understanding their 
inner “mental” states 430 431. Her curiosity in these human-machine relationships came from 
encountering ELIZA a primitive ‘chat bot’ programme built between 1964 and 1966, that 
demonstrated how with clever use of linguistic 'pattern matching' and substitution techniques, 
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a superficial illusion of textual conversation between humans and machines could be 
created. 
As Turkle explains, Joseph Weizenbaum, computer scientist and author of ELIZA, found 
“students, fully knowing that they were talking with a computer program, wanted to chat with 
it, indeed, wanted to be alone with it” 432. He was disturbed by the willingness of the students 
to open up to the machine. Turkle, who co-taught classes at MIT with Weizenbaum, was less 
concerned, explaining the software acted like a Rorschach, mirroring textual inputs back at 
the users, allowing them to express themselves openly to a neutral agent. “They became 
involved with ELIZA, but the spirit was ‘as if’. The gap between program and person was 
vast. People bridged it with attribution and desire. They thought: “I will talk to this program ‘as 
if’ it were a person; I will vent, I will rage, I will get things off my chest” 433. Turkle later 
admitted that she underestimated the strength of the connection when she first encountered 
this behaviour and she has increasingly become a critic of the isolating impact of such 
technologies in her recent book Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital 
Age434. An early example of relational artifacts was the simple but phenomenally successful 
Tamagotchi toy. A handheld, LCD video game on a keychain that gave owners the 
responsibility of looking after virtual pets. The range of interaction on the 4bit microcontroller-
driven, egg-shaped device was limited to a three-button input interface and a small range of 
responding, low-resolution animations. The small library of animations was predetermined by 
the sequence of events preceding it, namely the amount and type of care they gave their 
pets. 
This was, systemically speaking, little different to a combination lock. Input the right 
information at the right time and unlock the predetermined behaviour. A simple state 
machine algorithm. Nonetheless, the limited gameplay had sufficient variety to hold the 
attention of its typically young audience, over short periods of gameplay, where they would 
care for their Tamagotchi by feeding, bathing and playing simple games with, the virtual 
animal. The phenomenal success of Tamagotchi has been attributed not to the appearance 
or movement of the agents, but rather to the emotional dynamic that it creates, as users see 
their creatures grow up as a result of their actions. 
 “I’ll eventually feel we have succeeded if we ever get to the point where 
people feel bad about switching Cog X off.” 435 (Brooks 2006). 
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The care-giving urge toward these machines is believed to occur because they trigger 
nurturing instincts within people. The Kindchenschema concept by ethologist Lorenz (1971), 
hypothesises that a deep-rooted baby schema, are triggered where the proportions and 
features, particularly facial, infer a juvenile animal. The ‘cute’ effect can be seen across 
humans, dogs and many other animals with common traits, such as smaller noses and larger 
eyes than adults. 
In social robotics, this has been widely harnessed to make machines less intimidating, and 
encourage playful and careful interaction. How far are we willing to give ourselves to these 
robots emotionally, or are our emotional responses closer to imaginary play, than true 
emotional investment? Do we feel the same pleasure from seeing a robot smiling as we do 
another human being? Of course there are the ethical issues of aiming to create robots that 
draw people into bonds with machines that are programmed to care. These questions are 
being asked in robotics 436 437, and will be shaped also by cultural aspects as well as by 
universal instinctual reflexes and individual preferences. 
These matters are not solely related to children playing with virtual creatures. Surprising 
stories have emerged of adult companionship of battlefield robots with solders arriving at 
Baghdad’s ‘Droid Hospital’, teary-eyed “carrying the blasted remains of their droid, and 
wanting to know if their little guy can be rebuilt”438. As relationships with social robotics 
become more convincing these emotional ties will only grow stronger, playing upon 
unconscious irresistible traits, which we might even call vulnerabilities. 
Weizenbaum argues in his 1976 book Computer Power and Human Reason 439, that we 
must make a distinction between decisions and choices. He categorises deciding as a 
computational activity that can be reduced down to mathematical descriptions. Choices, 
however, require judgements of non-mathematical factors, such as emotions and context, 
rather than calculations, and it is this ability to choose that makes humans so very different to 
machines, and capable of sophisticated social intelligence. Designers of social robotics are 
limited under current paradigms to harnessing a variety of rather blunt tools for emotional 
sensing, and illusory techniques for imbuing emotional life into robotics. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Movement has primacy in visual perception, and animacy detection is a priority in our 
processing of visual information. This is because movement is a property of living things, and 
the perception of animate movement is the foundation of social interaction. Our visual 
perceptual systems are highly attuned to cues for social cognition that can uncover not only 
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the conscious but unconscious state of other animate agents in our environment. Specialised 
heuristic traits of the human cognitive model have a deep evolutionary history, that 
automatically, or we might say irresistibly, trigger perceptions before conscious reasoning 
occurs further down-stream. These fast heuristic traits operate in visual-cortical hierarchy 
with parallel asynchronous computation. 
Study of these cognitive traits, in psychophysical and perceptual studies of the visual cortex, 
attempt to isolate motion stimuli for close examination. Experimentation characteristically 
involves the use of primitive geometry in motion, sometimes appearing to behave 
contingently on other geometry. Neuroaesthetic theory has pointed to the striking parallels 
that we find with abstraction in kinetic art, suggesting that there is an innate awareness in 
artists that the highly filtered stimulation of particular heuristic traits in human visual 
perception are aesthetically potent. I have also pointed to the practices of abstract 
experimental animation that seem to explore this aesthetic field, unknowing of the underlying 
mechanisms that shape our perceptions. These practices throughout the 20th century have 
operated independently of each other, and are only now finding connections through 
interdisciplinary research of the past decade. 
Behavioural, non-cognitive interpretations of aesthetic experience provide a compelling 
alternative reading of artworks to conventional art criticism. Neuroaesthetic theories are in 
themselves a form of reductive rationalisations of complex heterogeneous phenomena, but 
as animate motion perception is one of the most primordial of visual percepts, neuroaesthetic 
theories are useful in drawing more attention to reflexive, and non-conscious, foundations 
that likely shape work like Calder’s mobiles or Ihnatowicz’s Senster. 
This chapter has examined how motion is coupled to social perception. The ability to 
recognise agency through motion alone would be an evolutionary advantage, so much so 
that causal and animacy perception appear innate. The degree to this remains open to 
heated debate, but there is broader support for the idea that innate perceptual reflexes may 
provide a skeleton for structure learning to occur. 
Innate percepts may create traits that determine particular concepts developing. Even with a 
lifetime of experience, understanding the differences between living and non-living entities, 
innate reflexes continue to interpret visual motion information and shape experience. As a 
result, robots, kinetic art, geometric animations, can all appear irresistibly animate without 
even the visual appearance of living entities. 
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There is a growing tool kit of statistical information on motion profiles that trigger perception 
of animacy and then a range of primary behavioural typologies, such as chasing, or evading. 
A few parameters are central to heuristic processing. Entities that accelerate and change 
direction the greatest amount, have the highest animacy ratings. When an entity appears 
aligned to its direction of motion, particularly if it changes direction, it produces higher 
animacy ratings than misaligned movement. Gravity also effects our perception of motion, 
which is likely a result of the gravitational environment in which this perceptual trait has 
evolved. Entities that move upward against gravitational force are considered more animate 
than those moving downward. 
Animacy perception, in itself, is not the end state of perceptual visual processing, but rather 
only the beginning of downstream heuristic detection of a variety of behaviour typologies that 
remain under researched. Certain behaviours appear particularly animate, such as predatory 
motion to another agents, or the avoidance of obstacles in an environment. However, a 
richer set of phenomena that powerfully shape our experience and interaction exist, some of 
which, like only until recently discovered Wolfpack Effect, are still likely undocumented. 
Artists, in their own experimental practices, are discovering and manipulating a variety of 
currently undocumented perceptual cues, which could be of benefit to scientific research into 
the perception of animacy. 
Spatial context can increase or suppress the impression of animacy, depended on how it 
perceived in relation to an entity’s motion trajectory. However, the effect of context is still 
small when compared to acceleration, consistently is a dominant stimulus in perception. 
Absence of context, therefore, does not prevent perceptions of animacy occurring. In 
reviewing the literature of the field of social perception, I have concluded that the parametric 
analysis of animacy perception is a potentially useful resource for designing the behaviour of 
animate agents, whether virtual agents in games or robotics in physical environments. 
Animacy perception appears to be a primary percept for stimulating human social behaviour, 
but could similar perceptual capabilities be built into robotic agents? Emerging bottom-up 
strategies for robotic agent behaviour might build upon  motion variables, rather than 
classical approaches that typically employ image analysis, such as facial recognition, which 
has inherent problems with human orientation, and longer distance detection. As we have 
seen in a highlighted study, a broad variety of behaviour typologies can be defined 
parametrically, by gross movement of bodies, with a small range of parameters. These can 
be trained to an artificial neural network with a high degree of detection accuracy. This 
behavioural approach to recognition also supports a bottom-up attitude to the whole question 
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of how animacy and behaviour are cognitively processed. A variety of approaches have 
developed for making believably animate agents particularly in gaming. There is a strong 
appreciation in gaming of the balance between designing agents and their environments, 
which are both built upon the shared substrate of digital computation. This is quite unlike 
designing physical agents and their physical environment, which are materially 
heterogeneous. When these algorithms are found to be ineffective, due to obstacles in these 
digital environments, game designers may often choose to modify the environment rather 
than solve the potentially more time consuming and complex challenge of modifying the 
algorithm. This is a luxury not so easily afforded to designers of mobile robotics for physical 
and complex environments. 
Early gaming pioneered the design of agents using simple rule-based logic to operate on 
limited computational power. These reactive agents were deterministic, so a degree of 
unpredictability needed to be resourcefully engineered to keep gamers guessing, and 
prevent a game becoming boring. A degree of indeterminate behaviour made agents appear 
more animate, giving gamers the impression the agents were impulsive and autonomous, 
rather than predictable and automated. Fortunately for the programmers, human players 
feed indeterminate behaviour into the environment with their behaviour. The complexity of 
the human gamers’ behaviour can be mirrored in the agents, without it being too easily 
recognisable as we saw with Pac-Man. 
State-machines can store sets of rules that are transitioned between offering a multi-
dimensional set of behaviours. Pac-Man’s ‘ghost’ agents have individual behavioural rule 
sets that further give the impression of autonomy. At the time, another ‘cheap trick’ for 
indeterminate behaviour was to use a random noise function, in conjunction with a simple 
determinate rule sets. Fuzzy logic was also popular for employing probabilistic methods that 
lend degrees of uncertainty to agent behaviour. These strategies are still used to today and, 
while a full account of these would be sizable, I have chosen to highlight a few strategies that 
characterise steps in gaming, that move us towards evermore animate intelligent agents. 
Whereas gameplay in early arcades was based upon primitive typologies of behaviour, such 
as chasing or obstacle avoidance, the development of more powerful computing and artificial 
life techniques, for more advanced adaptive agents, opened up far more sophisticated 
worlds. In my own childhood, and occasionally adulthood, I have been particularly attracted 
to world-building games like Civilization and Sim City, that followed relatively primitive 
approaches compared to the first wholehearted attempt at an ALife Game - Steve Grand’s 
Creatures. The game represented a shift from ‘Shallow’ approaches to AI, to conceptualising 
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agents as adaptive, and capable of novel behaviour. 
The simulated evolution and cognitive development of agents opens up the potential for 
long-term experiences of animate agency with virtual agents, and even emotional 
attachment, where human behavioural tendency toward nurturing infantile creatures is 
manipulated. The gaming industry has developed into a fertile experimental space for 
training agents that may have application beyond entertainment, both in the development of 
general forms of artificial intelligence in virtual agents, and perhaps later into domains of 
social robotics. I believe the use of virtual car agents to develop behaviours of autonomous 
vehicles, is a step in that direction. 
The behavioural possibilities of self-generated motion strategies in robotics are fascinating 
on functional level, for their ability to compensate for changing circumstances, whether that is 
mechanical damage or a change in environment. In my opinion, they are also fascinating on 
aesthetic grounds, for the qualities of behaviour that we find emerging out of their embodied 
interaction with the world. There is also something viscerally engaging about seeing a robot 
solving a visual- motor skill, with uncanny similarity to an infant. A deeper sense of an entity 
with its own life, making sense of the physical world, move by move. 
When identical machines can learn in parallel to one another, the possibilities for rapid skill 
development, through collective trial and error, are tantalising. This does not make the 
project to bring robotics into the built environment immediately easier. For robots to act with 
intelligence, they need to make decisions about temporal relationships of cause and effect 
quickly, and predicting the results of their behaviour remains extremely complex - even more 
so when robots must act safely in the company of human beings. Nonetheless, the growing 
number of institutions and companies including Google, now taking bottom-up approaches 
like those discussed at UC Berkeley, demonstrate a neo-cybernetic shift towards cognition 
through embodied interaction, built upon connectionist computation. The aesthetics of this 
shift are far more animate than those that have characterised robots in the 20th century. 
This shift in technical implementation may also begin to reinforce neo-cybernetic attitudes 
towards cognition, and help to overcome the current Cartesian dogma that continues to 
shape much discourse. This is not an easy conceptual turn- around to make. Richard 
Dawkins a proponent of evolutionary and emergent thinking, demonstrates that it is all too 
easy to fall back on computationalist higher- order thinking to explain behaviour, before 
accounting for lower-order reflexes. The great virtue of embodied machines in action is they 
can make explicit the relationship between the body and its intelligence. 
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4. Aesthetics 
4.1 Introduction 
As I have established, visual perception not only constructs the physical structure of the 
world, but also its social and causal nature. This is an under-appreciated and under-explored 
topic, particularly contrasted with the enthusiasm the visual arts have shown to the aesthetic 
potential of visual ambiguity in static paintings, sculptures and installations. The aim of this 
chapter is to draw a line between psychophysical understandings of animacy perception and 
their manipulation in arts, using insights from puppetry and robotic arts to focus on embodied 
experiences, whether in the context of the theatre, a gallery or the built environment. 
I will develop the idea that experience begins automatically in the eye, irresistibly shaped by 
heuristic responses, and then draws the viewer into the participation of ambiguous visual 
information that triggers aesthetic experiences. Overlaps are found between discourses in 
arts and sciences on the notion of bistable experiences of animate motion. I examine how 
the essentialist pursuits of modern puppetry, and the related avant-garde conceptualisation 
of machine theatres, tended towards the animation of minimal abstract forms. This also 
resonates with the techniques employed by perceptual scientists in the later decades of the 
20th century creating a surprising methodological link between these very different modes of 
investigating animate behaviour. The chapter concludes by examining the role the arts have 
played in probing the aesthetic field of robotics. 
4.2 Ambiguity 
Bistable Ambiguity 
 
 
Figure 51. The wonder of illusions in the sciences, Necker cube published in 1832 by Swiss crystallographer 
Louis Albert Necker.440 
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Viewing the Necker Cube (Fig.48), we instantly perceive a 3D object. Extraordinarily, if one 
attempts to consciously flatten it into lines on a page, it resists. An irresistible sense of 
structure rises up. Even more fascinating - the perception is not entirely stable. If you 
continuously view the cube, its faces shift between two perceptual interpretations, occurring 
every couple of seconds. Interestingly, the Necker Cube can only be interpreted in one of the 
two states, at any one time 441. 
 “True ambiguity results when no single solution is more likely than other 
solutions, leaving the brain with the only option left, of treating them all as 
equally likely and giving each a place on the conscious stage, one at a 
time, so that we are only conscious of one of the interpretations at any 
given time. Thus a neurobiologically based definition of ambiguity is the 
opposite of the dictionary definition; it is not uncertainty, but certainty— the 
certainty of many, equally plausible interpretations, each one of which is 
sovereign when it occupies the conscious stage.” 442 (Zeki, 2004) 
The immediacy, and irresistible perceptual quality of the work, does not mean, however, that 
they are entirely automatic. There is evidence that the frequency of perceptual flips can be 
consciously affected 443. Attention appears also to influence perceptual ‘flipping’, according to 
the focal-feature hypothesis 444 that shows that different focal points bias towards one 
percept or the other. Saccades and blinking are also integral. Leopold and Logothetis identify 
a tight coupling between saccades and perceptual switches, with both selective attention and 
bistable perception sharing underlying motor processes 445. 
A bottom-up, connectionist account for these phenomena proposes that percept fatigue may 
be responsible. Neurons supporting a particular stable perception may, due to a sustained 
period of stimulation, exhibit short-term synaptic depression that causes a switch to the 
alternate more rested percept creating a continuous fluctuation between the two 446. Such 
mechanisms are believed to be a fundamental form of negative feedback control throughout 
the brain. Contrary to this, the strongly top-down view is that ambiguous figures are not 
spontaneously flipped by subjects, but are preconditioned by suggestion to see the 
phenomena. This does not account for Necker himself first encountering the illusion of 
course but there is evidence to support part of these claims. The popular view is that bi- 
stability occurs in the interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes. 
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Animacy Ambiguity 
Broaching ambiguity, as a form of cognitive illusion, Richard Gregory discusses these 
illusions as occurring between perceptual processing heuristics (what Gregory called 
perceptual knowledge) and higher reasoning from learnt (conceptual) knowledge. 
 “Perceptual knowledge is the assumptions that our brain takes, and can 
coexist with conceptual knowledge even when in contradiction, as in the 
case of several illusions.” 447 (Ghedini, 2011) 
Building upon Zeki’s theory that levels of ambiguity may exist in the brain, Fiammetta 
Ghedini 448 proposes four levels of ambiguity, between strongly perceptual bistable forms of 
ambiguity – the Necker Cube representing the most primitive level – and more complex 
varieties of ambiguity, occurring when intentional behaviour is perceived. 
Figure 52. Fiammetta Ghedini's 4 levels of Ambiguity449 
Animacy perception, Fiammetta Ghedini suggests, triggers a third level of ambiguity, where 
animate and inanimate perceptions coexist. The illusion creates a quale of life, regardless of 
the conceptual knowledge that geometric figures, or even anthropomorphic puppets and 
robots, are not alive. This illusion is powerful and has, in a number of studies, proven 
impossible to resist 450 451. 
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Ambiguity in Visual Arts 
As outlined, visual perception not only constructs the physical structure of the world, but its 
social and causal nature too. This is as under-appreciated and under- explored, particularly 
contrasted, with the enthusiasm the visual arts have shown to the aesthetic potential of 
visual ambiguity in such work as M. C. Escher’s impossible objects and Bridget Riley’s 
illusory patterns, or the chromatic interactions of Josef Albers’ paintings and geometric 
engravings. The aesthetic impact on visual culture, of these artistic obsessions with 
perceptual illusions, is self-evident and, in some cases, has reciprocally stimulated scientific 
discourse. While Escher was famously fascinated by mathematical objects, such as the 
Möbius Strip, Roger Penrose published research on Impossible Objects 452. 
 
Figure 53. Josef Albers’ Structural Constellation, Engraving 453 
“The function of art is an extension of the function of the brain, namely the 
acquisition of knowledge about the world, then it stands to reason to 
suppose that the mechanisms used to instil meaning into this world are the 
very ones used to instil meanings into works of art. It is those basic 
mechanisms that artists have used so successfully.” 454(Zeki, 2004) 
The potential of these intentionally ambiguous artworks to draw the participation of 
audiences, revealing the viewer’s active role in the construction of experience and the 
unstable nature of visual phenomena, has been a characteristic theme of visual arts of the 
latter half of the 20th century. In optical art and minimal art forms, paintings, kinetic sculptures 
and installations, cryptically titled with letters and numerals, resisted linguistic narrative. The 
art experience was to be participated in, independent of, and unadulterated by, an 
intellectual encapsulation. 
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Meanwhile, the ancient art of puppetry, was having an aesthetic revolution of its own, as it 
begun to strip back its traditions of dolls, stages and costumes, to minimal objects, 
manipulating the ambiguous thresholds between perceptual and conceptual knowledge, 
unaware of parallel scientific inquiries that shared some uncannily similar aesthetic qualities. 
Ambiguity in Puppetry 
Puppeteer and aesthetician Steve Tillis characterises the effect of the puppet on its 
audiences as a paradoxical form of “double-vision”455. This contradiction of sensations 
chimes with Gregory and Ghedini’s discussions on visual ambiguity. Independent of scientific 
studies, the field of puppetry has made its own attempts to explain the aesthetic experience 
of animate form. Its ambiguous nature appears to resist a common terminology, with leading 
author and theatre producer Jurkowski describing the “opalization effect”456, while 
puppeteers T.A. Green and W.J. Pepicello discusses “oscillation”457, both referring to the 
viewer’s unstable sensation of animacy and inanimacy. 
Within the constructed space of the performance, what Malkin458 called the ‘plausible 
impossible’, the ‘illusion of life’ appears and disappears with dramatic and aesthetic affect. In 
one moment, the puppet is alive and then the next, the contrivance of the spectacle becomes 
salient, before again being drawn into the imaginary. Children are particularly able to create 
a stable imaginative world within the plausible impossible, but it is not strictly age dependent. 
The puppet embodies a collective memory of childhood and innocence. The essential 
bargain between performer and audience, is a willing embrace of a naïve vision. 
The puppet exists as an invitation to participate in the creation of life, and as I will go on to 
explore, the most provocative of contemporary puppetry seeks to more than merely imitate 
life, but rather find freer, livelier, and surprising sensations of life. Though it may by now 
seem obvious in the context of my discussions on motion perception, it is worth recognising 
that, at the heart of puppetry, is the understanding that motion above all other stimuli is 
responsible for the illusion of life in objects. Motion is the beginning and end of every 
puppet’s life. 
 “The puppets’ motions convey a meaning of internal impulse 
corresponding to the impulse that produces the live beings’ movements… 
and, by contiguity, this implied meaning reflects in the spectator’s mind on 
the puppets themselves, thus tending to attribute to them life of  
their own.” 459 (Veltrusky, 1983) 
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With today’s cultural production and consumption mediated by digital technologies, it is 
perhaps surprising to find that puppetry is seeing a revival, with international sell out shows, 
such as the National Theatre’s acclaimed production of War Horse (Fig.49). In the streets, 
the historic home of the art, spectacular architectural scale puppetry by La Machine has 
brought city centres to a standstill, in astonished wonder. Some have asked why the art has 
survived and thrived even in the face of cinema, cell and stop animation and, most recently, 
in the remarkable advances in computer generated graphics. 
 
Figure 54. War Horse (opened 2009) Life-size horse puppets by the Handspring Puppet Company. 
Puppetry has a qualitatively unique aesthetic to other art forms - one that continues to 
beguile audiences with the special presence the puppet possesses. Oscillating between the 
world of the living and the dead, the puppet creates something quite uniquely captivating, 
sometimes comical, sometimes grotesque. An ancient art, with a rich, albeit poorly recorded 
history, puppetry holds a deep understanding of how the motion of an object can create 
irresistible and aesthetic perceptions of animacy. With some surprise, my review of scientific 
studies of visual motion perception found no mention of puppetry. Indeed, outside the 
literature of this somewhat mysterious art form, relatively few references are made to it, even 
when fields of research, such as robotics would seem likely to benefit from its insights. 
 “Westerners have an almost morbid fear of taking the power of their 
imagination as seriously as the power of their perception. They find the 
juxtaposition of perception and imagination, with the ensuing ontological 
paradox that threatens their understanding of “object” and “life”, to be 
unnerving, and they therefore avoid the problem entirely by condescending 
to the practice of puppetry that raises it.” 460 (Jurkowski, 1988) 
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Featuring in cultural traditions across the globe, puppetry has a unique ability to create, what 
puppeteer Nancy Staub called, a “theatre of possession”461, a visceral performative role that 
has made it a function of animist rituals and storytelling practices for millennia. Victoria 
Nelson’s The Secret Life of Puppets462 suggests its place, once in the supernatural, has 
moved into the domain of psychology. 
Puppets and automaton, now including robots and cyborgs, continue to delve into a human 
fascination with animating matter, or as Harold B. Segel described it in Pinocchio’s Progeny, 
a “yearning to play god”463, to build and breathe life into their own simulacra. 
4.3 Puppetry 
Making Distinctions 
Puppetry, derives from the Latin ‘pupa’ for doll, the ‘–et’ diminutive reflecting the historical 
role of the puppet playing miniaturised human or animal figures. As puppetry in the 20th 
century grew to find its own aesthetic, independent of actor theatre, practicing puppeteers 
and theoreticians made great efforts to relinquish themselves from this narrow and, some 
would feel, pejorative view. Puppetry scholar Penny Francis offers a contemporary definition 
that stresses the discipline’s break from the constraints and traditions of anthropomorphic 
and zoomorphic figures. 
 ‘… the puppet is a representation and distillation of a character, the 
repository of a persona perceived by both creator and spectator within its 
outward form. It can be any thing, any object, if brought to imagined life 
through the agency of a human player who inspires it and controls it 
directly.” 464 (Francis, 2012) 
Francis instead focuses on the notion of a shared participation of audience and puppeteer in 
the illusion. As a matter of technical definition, she insists on the directness of manipulation 
by the human controller, which immediately distinguishes it from automata, such as the 
aforementioned Writer by Pierre Jacquet-Droz and his son Henri-Louis. Francis’ distinction 
between puppet and automaton, on the grounds of direct human manipulation, is one 
technical differentiation, but we can also make the distinction from the perspective of the 
observer. A puppet in the hands of a puppeteer is an extension of that manipulator’s animacy 
-its potential for motion limited only to the dexterity and imagination of its puppeteer. This 
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dexterity reveals itself to the audience in the puppet’s responsiveness to its environment, 
from its interaction with other animated puppets and, in some cases, its perceived 
awareness of an audience. Historical accounts of the relationship between puppets and 
automata in theatre 465 466 467 reveals that they often shared the stage. Machines played 
secondary roles as background characters, or moving scenery, while puppets were 
foregrounded and manipulated live. Jurkowski, in his account of the decline of automata, in 
favour of puppetry explains, “puppets, due to their complicity with the human performer, have 
always been more flexible and versatile than the best automata”468. 
Robotics, the descendants of automata, may be about to reverse this trend. Theatre director 
Blanca Li’s use of Aldebaran Robotics’ Nao android is one example of where pre-
programmed robots present a compellingly animate performance, though the success relies 
heavily upon the human performers in direct contact with the advanced automaton 
performer. 
 
 
Figure 55. Bianca Li's 2018 performance at the Barbican Theatre, in collaboration with Maywa Denki and 
Aldebaran Robotics 
As I discuss earlier, robots can be built and programmed to run in both unresponsive 
(automatic) and responsive (reactive and interactive) modes of behaviour. Though early 
cybernetic machines, with primitive sensory-motor reflexes, have proven successful at 
creating compelling and sustained impressions of animate life, through their continuous 
interaction with their environment, typically robotics used in a performance context, are pre-
choreographed, automatic systems. 
Elizabeth Jochum’s recent doctoral thesis examining the use of robotics in theatrical 
performances looks the way the mixing of automatic and responsive behaviours could 
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enhance the illusion of life, compared to purely pre- choreographed routines. She also 
identifies key distinguishing features between the design of puppets and robots, arguing that 
puppetry offers design strategies that could be very useful in robotics highlighting the 
mechanical simplicity, yet effectiveness, of the art form in creating compelling and engaging 
characters. 
 “Puppets and robots both use realism as their starting point, but unlike 
automata and robotics, puppets do not aim at precise mimicry or imitation. 
They are therefore capable of creating the illusion of life (or a different kind 
of life) in ways that pure mechanical replication cannot.” 469 (Jochum, 2013) 
I too see a variety of benefits puppetry can offer robotics, not only in mechanical insights, but 
also in helping us reaching a deeper understanding of the psychological affect, and aesthetic 
potential, of animated machines. Within puppetry’s avant-garde, throughout the 20th century 
to today, mimetic priorities have been replaced with kinetic exploration of abstract and non-
figurative forms, with some remarkably similarities to the experimental work of perceptual 
psychologists. The staged performativity of puppetry, and the very physical presence of the 
puppet, give it a unique contribution alongside the aforementioned studies in visual-
perceptual science. The deep aesthetic understanding within the art form, of its visceral 
impact that puppets have on audiences, and that robots to this date have failed to replicate 
or supersede, suggests it continues to offer insights of use to designers. 
Illusionism and Primitivism 
Harold Segel remarked that “no period or movement in the history of the European stage 
ever found such creative relevance in the puppet theatre as modernism and the avant-
garde”470. As actor theatre relinquished itself of its Wagnerian traditions, to radical, dramatic 
forms of production and performance – laying itself bare to featureless stages and unclothed 
performers – puppetry’s avant-garde stripped itself back in search of its own identity. In 
accordance with the modernist project, puppetry searched for the qualities both inherent and 
unique to define its ‘puppetness’. Henryk Jurkowski’s Aspects of Puppet and Theatre 471 
describes the avant-garde’s total rejection of pretence, with the figurative body replaced by 
abstracted or found objects. He also details the arrival of the puppeteer onto the stage, 
sharing his presence alongside the puppet and eradicating the illusion of mechanical 
separation. In the most extreme cases, the puppet is eradicated altogether, the puppeteer 
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instead conjuring characters from their own body parts. Jurkowski’s described it as a period 
where all the elements of puppet theatre were atomised, even the term puppet rejected by 
some practitioners, to distance themselves from the cultural baggage of the traditions and 
perceived values of the art. 
 
 
Figure 56. Left Puppeteer Stephen Mottram's "Paracute" performance exploring human visual perception of 
abstract form. Right: Invited lecture at the Bartlett Interactive Architecture Lab in 2017 
Theatre director and puppeteer Roman Paska describes the division of the discipline 
between two groups, the ‘Illusionists’ focused ‘on representation, treating their puppets as 
independent characters’, and the primitivists. 
 “Primitivism differs from illusionism in consciously directing audience focus 
back and forth between the outward sign and the inner process of 
simulation. And the primitive puppet is flagrantly exhibitionist in exposing its 
own emptiness as a vehicle for expression in performance.” 472  
(Paska, 1990) 
Steve Tillis is less inclined than Paska to create two distinct ‘illusory’ and ‘primitive’ camps. 
Instead he distinguishes ‘imitative’ and ‘conceptual’ puppets (similar to Paska’s terms), 
placing them again in polar opposition but suggesting that any puppet could be placed upon 
a continuum between them. Tillis, as a theoretician exploring the full spectrum of puppetry 
aesthetics, looks for the middle ground. 
Paska is unapologetically a supporter of ‘primitivism’, seeing it as a form of purification - way 
to access the essential ‘puppetness’ of the art. 
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 “While illusionists hope to produce an unbroken series of moments so that 
the puppet seems always alive, primitives aim always for a series in which 
the illusion of being is consciously fragmented by the intrusion of 
awareness into the structural mechanics of animation, the real nature of 
the objects employed and the real time of theatrical activity.” 473  
(Paska, 1990) 
Puppets that attempt to imitate human movements often create a superficial sense of 
realism. Once this novelty has worn off, the audience become aware of the puppets’s 
inadequacy to replicate human action. Whereas the illusionist’s intention is to produce a 
stabile continuous scene, contrarily, the primitivist’s embraces a fragmentation and 
instability. Jurkowski talks about the essential difference for puppeteers in animating the 
representational puppets (of the illusionists) and the object puppets (of the primitivist). 
“The puppet, which is only a pictorial representation of the character, 
passes through one stage of transformation only. It was dead and now it 
comes to life, but it remains the same thing. The puppet remains the 
puppet nothing more. On the other hand, the object passes through two 
stages of transformation. First it has to take on life, and second it must 
become a character, or vice versa. This is a double transformation… In 
contemporary theatre this is considered an advantage since the 
transformation has to be more sophisticated and more intense.” 474 
(Jurkowski, 2013) 
Intensity seems to appeal to the primitivists, as performing without the support of 
anthropomorphic form, costumes and other supplementary signs, demands more of the 
puppeteer and the audience. Free from the nostalgia of character representation of folk 
stories, object theatre comes as a shock to uninitiated audiences. The puppeteer’s conviction 
for the life of an object needs to be total, but even in the hands of the most skilled of 
manipulators, it is difficult to sustain for long periods. Object theatre is most often used for 
short episodes or vignettes, which are comic or tragic 475. 
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Figure 57. Paul Zaloom workshop on object theatre at the AHRC Object Theatre Network. 
The art of this primitivist puppetry is the confrontation of interaction between the object and 
visible puppeteer. The animacy of the object inexplicably bound to the animacy of the human 
performer, a tension exists in the struggle between the artistry of the puppeteer and the 
resistance of the primitive object. The audience’s oscillation of perception of life exaggerated, 
the object itself becomes a self- reflective device about the nature of the objects and the 
theatre of the possession. 
As Roman Paska describes, “The puppet seems to come alive without pretending to be 
alive, with an effect closer to magic than technology” 476. The object puppet stripped of 
elaborate anthropomorphic mechanics, in its primitive form, reaches back to the ancient 
puppet of shamanic, and animist rituals. 
Presence 
 “When movement fully dominates an object, we feel that the character is 
born and present on stage.” 477 (Jurkowksi, 1988) 
The sense of presence is a difficult notion to define, yet we know what presence is when we 
see it and, perhaps more viscerally, feel it. It is typically a quality of living things, a vital force, 
intangible but emanating from physical living bodies. On the stage in actor theatre, presence 
is exaggerated, its energy exudes a person’s body to inhabit a site of performance. In 
Richard Schechner’s book Environmental Theater he describes presence as “an actual, 
living relationship between the spaces of the body and the spaces the body moves through; 
that human living tissue does not abruptly stop at the skin”478. An actor who is said to have 
presence, is therefore not only physically present on stage, but also commands both the 
space of performance and their audience’s attention. 
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 “If puppets can be said to have ‘‘presence,’’ it is a product of their gaze as 
well as their expressions and gestures; the degree to which they seem to 
reach out to a sympathetic viewer.” 479 (Zelevansky, 2006) 
The puppet’s presence emerges from its perceived awareness of its environment and its 
responsiveness to it, from its orientation and purposeful motion, to its expressive interactions 
with what surrounds it. The puppeteer (often visible in contemporary theatre) commonly 
attempts to minimise their presence, focusing their attention solely on the puppet, showing 
little awareness of audience or surrounding environment. Through rod, string or other 
mechanical linkage, they transmit their animacy into the puppet. This alone, however, does 
not create the puppet’s necessary presence. The puppet may be physically present and in 
movement, but it requires the additional participation of its audience. 
“In a performance where the puppeteer is characteristically visible to some 
extent, we [the audience participant] are presented not only with the index 
of human agency, but with the reality itself... the result of this juxtaposition 
of sign and reality is an oscillation between the two that heightens the 
aesthetic perception of the performance by making the performance a 
collaborative effort between performer and audience.” 480  
(Green and Pepicello, 1983) 
Puppeteer Basil Jones describes how an audience immersed “into an empathetic 
relationship with the object” 481 can sustain the presence of a puppet for a period of time even 
when it is still, recalling these as some of the most dramatic moments. For puppet artists 
aligned with primitivist object theatre, their complete rejection of visual formal signs, in favour 
of energetic and short-lived vignettes, requires the most effort by both performers and 
audience. The “conspiracy”482 to play together, in the conjuring of the puppet’s presence is, 
intensified – the oscillation between life and death more frequent and more dramatic. The 
puppet’s aesthetic presence in live theatre is quite distinct from its appearance in film 
animation, where separate cut sequences of footage dematerialise the puppet into mere 
simulation.  An essential aesthetic appeal of the puppet is its continuous proximity to an 
audience. Even in an age of screen-based media and virtual life “there is a pleasure still to 
be found in the live performance of a tangible puppet-the direct confrontation between an 
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audience and a "living" object-that is distinct from the particular pleasures of media 
puppets”483. 
Embodied Behaviour 
“Whenever the centre of gravity was moved in a straight line, the limbs 
described curves… The line was something mysterious, for it was no less 
than the path of the dancer’s soul, and he doubted that it could be found 
except by the puppeteer transposing himself into the centre of gravity of 
the marionette… The movements of the fingers are related to the 
movements of the puppet rather as numbers are related to their logarithms, 
or the asymptote to the hyperbole.” 484 (Von Kleist, H., Neumiller, 1972) 
Perhaps most influential in the early staking out of an independent aesthetic for puppetry 
was Heinrich von Kleist, with his essay On The Marionette Theatre. A century ahead of its 
time, von Kleist drew attention to two unique characteristics of the puppet, its lack of self-
consciousness as a performer, and its sublime movements formed by the rhythmic grace of 
its pendular mechanics. He writes, “where grace is concerned, it is impossible for man to 
come anywhere near a puppet. Only a god can equal inanimate matter in this respect. This is 
where the two ends of the circular world meet”485. The puppet’s purity of motion, he argues, 
elevates its aesthetics above human motion, a perspective contrary to the aesthetics of the 
time. For the romantic poet, the exquisite craft of the puppeteer was in the natural manner in 
which the mechanics of the puppet’s body reveal its performance. It would not be until the 
20th century that his ideas were more fully appreciated. 
Contemporary practitioners commonly discuss this notion of the puppet’s intrinsic character, 
as a key force within the creative process of developing new productions. The idea that one 
puppet doesn’t fit all, demands more of the designer-maker-performer, and has led to the 
emergence of an abundance of puppetry forms and techniques. Spieler provides some 
insight into the very material and physical processes of invention that so clearly distinguish it 
from actor theatre. 
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 “Each show begins with some essential core of an idea. We almost never 
begin with a formal script… I call my co-workers together with sticks, 
cardboard, cloth, tape and odd assorted instruments to “brainstorm in 
action”… From the spin of the fabric, the click of the tongue, the odd gait of 
the box moved across the floor, I catch the poetic glimpses from which I 
plan the puppet design and draw a structured storyboard.” 486  
(Spieler, 1999) 
 
Figure 58. Puppetry Workshop held at Bartlett in 2011. Organised by Ruairi Glynn and led by Pif-Paf Theatre 
Company. The workshop focused on how to design and fabricate large scale puppets with bamboo structures. 
Theatre reformer Edward Gordon Craig attributed puppetry a “noble artificiality”487. He too 
recognised behaviour latent within each individual puppet, seeing this as one of puppetry’s 
most compelling attractions. “You don’t move it, you let it move: that’s the art”488, stated 
Craig. Without the burden of a mind, its character was defined by its mechanics, it simply 
performed as itself. While human actors must pretend to play a character, Craig insisted the 
“Marionette does not play a number of parts, he plays only one … that is himself…The 
Marionette never pretends” 489. Craig’s infamous theory of the Über-marionette does not 
make direct reference to the writings of Kliest, but the similarities are evident. Craig’s 
provocation to the theatrical arts was to abandon actors altogether, for his super-marionettes 
– mechanical performers free of the egotistical appetite of human actors. 
For Vsevolod Meyerhold, a Russian theatre director and producer, the puppet embodied a 
performer resisting the role of imitating the human actor. In attempts to build more human-
like puppets, he describes how adding mechanical improvements causes them to loose their 
own compelling aesthetic appeal. 
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 “It was as though the puppet were resisting such barbarous improvements 
with all its being. The director came to his senses when he e realized that 
there is a limit beyond which there is no alternative but to replace the 
puppet with a man. But how could he part with the puppet which had 
created a world of enchantment with its incomparable movements, its 
expressive gestures achieved by some magic known to it alone, its 
angularity which reaches the heights of true plasticity?" 490 (Braun, 2016) 
The puppet in Mayerhold’s view “wishes not to copy but to create” 491. As Henryk Jurkowski 
points out, Craig himself doubted a puppet would ever be able to replace a human for an 
entire play, and debate on whether his proposition was anything more than a metaphor 
remains without scholarly consensus 492. Within the avant-garde the puppet represented the 
potential to transcend limitations of reality, by rejecting realism and searching for new forms 
of expressive life. After centuries of puppets playing the role of miniature versions of theatre, 
it began to find itself able to offer an original aesthetic contribution. 
Mechanical Abstraction 
Puppetry and robotics theorist Elizabeth Jochum encourages a reading of early 20th century 
avant-garde puppetry within the context of wider efforts to reconcile cultures of machine 
aesthetics with human performance aesthetics 493. Oskar Schlemmer’s essay Man and Art 
Figure captures the endeavour “to free man from his physical bondage and to heighten his 
freedom beyond his native potential resulted in substituting for the organism the mechanical 
human figure [Kunstfigur]: the automaton and the marionette”494. The non-human life of 
marionettes touched upon the human condition in an age of machines and mass culture. The 
marionette and the automaton featured heavily in the theatre at the time, though often 
performed by human actors. Karel Čapek’s R.U.R. which premiered in Berlin in 1922, 
famously coined the term ‘robot’, where distinctions between man and animated objects 
dissolved as actors performed as automaton. 
The semiotic and phenomenal attraction of puppetry to the avant-garde was embraced by 
Dadaists and Surrealists for its absurd and comic irrationality, while simultaneously for the 
Futurists, Constructivists and at the Bauhaus, it offered a contrasting mechanical dynamic 
rationality. Both interpretations had the capacity for eccentric abstraction. While directing the 
puppet Workshop at Tairov’s Kamerny Theatre, Russian artist Vladimir Sokolov, in an essay 
published in Das Puppentheater, described this new mechanical abstraction as an “approach 
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of true movement”, extolling “puppetry’s virtue of creative movement and gesture over 
imitative, representational qualities.” He goes as far as to suggest the “word marionette will 
disappear”, instead “played through associated or abstracted forms, through planes, lines, or 
sets of fixed points, as well as through the changing of light and colour” 495. 
 
 
Figure 59. A scene from Karel Čapek’s play Rossum's Universal Robots (1921)  
Note: robots played by human actors. 
Oscar Schlemmer, acknowledging the limitations of human performers to “laws of gravity, to 
which it is subject” 496 points to “the living geometry” of the Acrobat attempting to overcome 
this mortal obstacle. For theatre practitioners like Schlemmer, new technologies opened up 
the potential for artificial figures that would not replace the human, but rather represent in 
abstract form an “intensification of peculiar natures” 497. Laszlo Moholy-Nagy’s essay in The 
Theatre of the Bauhaus shares this vision calling for “die mechanische Exzentrik”, a 
mechanised eccentric”498. The Theatre of the Bauhaus was rebellious to traditional notions of 
the theatre, including its roles as means a communication of events or indoctrination. Light, 
motion, sounds and form had been subservient to this purpose but were now invited to come 
to the foreground, narrative plot was diminished or eliminated entirely. 
Limited by the technologies of their time, the marionette represented an immediate means to 
exploring the possibilities of autonomous and animate performance machines. Enrico 
Prampolini’s 1915 manifesto Futurista Scenografia, grasping Filippo Marinetti’s 1913 call for 
a theatre of “modern mechanics”, and Craig’s New Stagecraft, proposed performance 
machinery where the “abstract entity of the stage becomes one with the scenic action”499. 
Prampolini’s theatre envisioned an architecture, not for performance, but as performer itself – 
an “abstract, autonomous, scenic event, uncontaminated by other artistic conventions and 
constructed from the elements of pure form, colour, light, and movement”. Prampolini 
describes his Magnetic Theatre in mechanical terms, but hints at the animacy latent in its 
motion. 
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 “To these plastic constructions, ascending, rotating, and shifting 
movement are given, in accordance with necessity. The scenic action of 
the chromatic light, an essential element of interaction in creating the 
scenic personality of the space, unfolds parallel to the scenic development 
of these moving constructions. Its function is to give spiritual life to the 
environment or setting, while measuring time in scenic space.” 500  
(Kirby 1986)  
Though award winning in its proposal, the Teatro Magnetico was never realised beyond 
miniature model, nor indeed were many futurist projects. However, the proposition, alongside 
Depero’s “Teatro Magico” and Moholy-Nagy’s “Die mechanische Exzentrik”, marks the 
moment in theatre design where the kinetic stage is conceived of as a life force of its own. 
Without the presence of human performers, Elizabeth Jochum describes, “the appearance of 
a soul”, caused by “the illusion of operating independently from any human impulse”, 
suggesting Prampolini among others expected “the spectator adopt the same 
phenomenological stance towards the kinetic scenic space that they would when observing 
human actors or puppets onstage” 501. 
 
Figure 60. Oskar Schlemmer’s, Triadic Ballet Costumes Metropol-Theater in Berlin, 1926 
 
At the Bauhaus, Schlemmer and his collaborators struggled to achieve entirely mechanical 
performers, instead building geometric costumes that transformed human dancers into 
machine-like performers. In their Triadic Ballet (1922) platonic forms abstract and 
exaggerate, rather than relinquish, figurative-human form (Figure 60), but were able to 
realise and further the aesthetics of abstract form in motion, in ways that futurist theatre’s 
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naive mechanical models could not. This period of radical reconfiguration of the roles and 
relationships between the theatre, architecture, plastic arts, and human performers, was 
limited by the technologies of their time and the expertise of the artist, but the recognition of 
the aesthetic potential of abstracted animate form to create, what Prampolini called, 
“absolute synthesis” and Moholy-Nagy called a “theatre of totality was hugely influential”. 
 “The goal of these machines was not to imitate human beings, but rather 
to open up new possibilities for expression and theatrical illusion. Unlike 
lifelike automatons, these artificial actors offered the possibility for wider 
geometric expression, a freedom from natural proportions, and lent 
themselves to inventive and fantastical theatrical illusions. Like puppets, 
these autonomous machines utilized the principles of abstraction and 
dynamic movement to create illusions of liveness.” 502 (Jochum, 2013) 
At the core of this aesthetic exploration was an appreciation of the important contribution 
puppetry brought, with its deep knowledge of the primitive universal, cultural experience, to 
conjure life from the inanimate. The phenomenology of the puppet – its perceptual, aesthetic 
and metaphysical force – reflected an emerging aesthetics of purposeful, autonomous 
behaviour, in the age of machines. The limitations of the puppet to replicate human 
behaviour was not a disadvantage, but rather an opportunity that opened up "a complicated 
mix of practices encompassing old traditions, new aesthetics and technological innovations 
that have intertwined it deeply with other strands of contemporary culture"503. 
Concurrent to avant-garde theatre, new photographic and machine technologies of cinema 
opened up the emerging field of cellular animation to exploring the fabrication of life, albeit 
missing the unique presence that the puppet-object held. 
 
Figure 61. Cells from Victor Eggling's Diagonal Symphony 
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In animation’s earliest decades of open exploration, the avant-garde examined abstract shifts 
in compositions of colour, form and line, with seminal works, such as Victor Eggling’s 
Diagonal Symphony (1925), and the synesthetic experiments of Oskar Fischinger’s 
Composition in Blue (1935). 
 “Non-objective animation is without doubt the purest and most difficult 
form of animation. Anyone can learn to ‘Muybridge’ the illusion of 
representational life, but inventing interesting forms, shapes and colours, 
creating new, imaginative and expressive motions – ‘the absolute creation: 
the true creation’ as Fischinger termed it – requires the highest mental and 
spiritual faculties, as well as the most sensitive talents of hand.” 504  
(Moritz, 1988) 
Even in the early work of Disney, Jeffrey Skoller suggests, “one could glimpse the promise of 
radical aesthetics within the context of the popular culture of the animated film. Such hopes 
for radical vernacular modernism were short lived” 505. Regardless of the technical and 
aesthetic achievements of the avant-garde, audiences were to find them “difficult to relate to 
and even harder to understand” 506, turning instead to conventional narrative structures found 
within popular theatre and cinema.  
This wasn’t, however, to dissuade those animators who wished to explore territories outside 
of popular culture. For many working within animation’s avant- garde, the freedom found in 
the medium allowed them to discover very personal conscious, and sometimes unconscious, 
forms of expression. Stan Brakhage, for example, explored the use of compound solutions 
and light to create fluidic dream like visions of hell, purgatory, and heaven in The Dante 
Quartet (1987). New Zealander Len Lye’s use of batik directly onto film, allowed him to 
produce works inspired by primitive cultures.  
Just as we find in puppetry’s avant-garde, where the ‘little doll’ has been replaced by found 
objects, human limbs or other primitive forms of puppet, animators deconstructed and 
challenged the very foundations of their art form. 
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 “The method of graphic expression which merely uses primal forms is 
concordant with the animator’s atavistic intentions… a direct attempt to get 
in touch with different kinds of expression which precede Formalism.”507 
(Wells, 1998) 
Sergei Eisenstein suggests that this ‘heartless geometrizing’ in opposition to his much-
favoured Disney worlds, “gave rise to a kind of antithesis, an unexpected rebirth of universal 
animism” 508. Like alchemical experiments, the pre-rational, pre- scientific state-of-the-art 
touched upon a sense of primordial forces. Resisting subjectivity, narrative and 
representation, animation was able to disintegrate into ‘non-localised’ movement. Along with 
Eisenstein, Lamarre talks about the spectator finding themselves in the “company of animism 
and vitalism”509, a primitive mental space where “our brains must constantly fill in, correcting, 
enriching, and compensating for the poverty of actual stimuli”510. 
“Through poetic connections feeling is heightened and the spectator is 
made more active. He becomes a participant in the process of discovering 
life, unsupported by ready-made deductions from the plot or ineluctable 
pointers by the author. He has at his disposal only what helps to penetrate 
to the deeper meaning of the complex phenomena presented in front of 
him. Complexities of thought and poetic visions of the world do not have to 
be thrust into the framework of the patently obvious.” 511 (Tarkovsky, 1986) 
Without perceivable figures or narrative, abstract animations do not necessarily dissolve into 
complete disorder. A unity of its own can be found in an animation, whether material, 
rhythmic, a chosen colour palette or symbolic in nature. For the audience, they offer sensual, 
rather than structured cues to intended meanings. To the animator they offer an 
experimental space to understand their communicative potential. 
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4.4 Animation 
 “The very idea, if you will, of the animated cartoon is like a direct 
embodiment of the method of animism”… if commentators speak of the 
animism and vitalism of animation in general, it is because a general 
experience of “movement-as-life” seems to underlie these specific forms.” 
512 (Buchan, 2013) 
 
Between Experimental Abstraction and Orthodox Mimesis 
In the arts, animation is a relative latecomer to aesthetic exploration of animacy latent in 
motion. Puppetry and mechanical automaton hold histories of technical development that 
reach far back into animist and shamanic traditions. However, as a cultural phenomena of 
the past century, animation is better documented and accessible, than its historic 
counterparts. Few automata or technical literature have survived its golden age of the 
industrial revolution. Puppetry, by its very nature, is most affective when experienced ‘in the 
flesh’ - a real challenge with few dedicated theatres, and modest touring budgets for 
productions. By comparison, animation is pervasive through digital screen-based media and 
I believe is on the cusp of making an important contribution into the design of robotic agents 
that will increasingly inhabit our built environment. The sheer variety of forms of expression 
in animation makes it difficult to define a core theoretical or aesthetic concern to animation. 
Some who have attempted include Cholodenko513, Pilling514, Wells515, Furniss516, Leslie517 
and Buchan518. 
Animation and its mode of production today can be appreciated as a synthesis of the latest 
techniques in computational modelling and artificial life, meeting animist traditions of 
puppetry and theatre. Such animated mechanical wonders as Vaucanson’s Digesting Duck 
and the Droz Brothers’ Writer android, were the performative precursors to the optical 
machinery of Joseph Plateau’s Phenakistiscope and Simon Ritter von Stampfer’s 
Stroboscope, that first manipulated retinal persistence of vision to bring image to life. 
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Figure 62. Cells from Oskar Fischinger's Allegretto animation (1936) 
 
In Oskar Fischinger’s 1936 animation short Allegretto 519, 2D abstract forms, composed of 
lines and primitive geometry, move around the screen (Figure 62) to the music of composer 
Ralph Rainger. Darts move across the screen with striking similarities to the aforementioned 
experiments in perceptual psychology conducted decades later. At one moment in 
Fischinger’s two minute film, a field of darts burst across the screen with the appearance of a 
shoal of fish, or Craig Reynold’s flock of Boids. For the avant-garde of cell animation, 
experiments with audio and visual composition were always latent with moments of life, 
though contrary to popular conceptions of the art form, these animators were not universally 
interested in creating impressions of animacy. 
 
Figure 63. Craig Reynold’s Boids software demo film (1986) 
 
Alongside Oskar Fischinger, pioneers, such as Victor Eggling, Fernand Léger, Harry Smith, 
Stefan and Franciska Themerson were among a wide-ranging field of artists who pursued 
experimental practices of moving collages of image, colour and form. Jeff Malpas asserts 
that, “it is movement, rather than life that is at the heart of animation” 520, citing, as one of 
many alternative practices, Norman McLaren’s Synchromy (1971) in which sound produced 
through mark making directly onto film is both projected visually and played back 
acoustically. McClaren himself described the essential defining characteristic of the art as its 
construction of time, or as George Griffen called it an art “devoted to creating realms of 
synthetic time”521, distinguishing it from cinema’s photographic recording and playback of live 
action. 
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Unbound to physical laws, experimental animation has a metamorphic freedom to explore 
the potential for what Eisenstein called ‘plasmatics’522 - an infinite experimental world of 
alchemical transubstantiations in form, and colour. Contemporary versions of this field can 
now be found in digital motion graphics and various synesthetic audio-visual art forms. 
Theorist Pall Wells in Notes Towards a Theory of Animation: Styles and Approaches 523, 
proposes that all animation be placed on a continuum between practices of abstraction, that 
include non-figurative, rhythmic, non-linear, and “Interpretative Form”, all under a broad title 
of ‘Experimental Animation’, in contrast to what he calls ‘Orthodox Animation’, encompassing 
the character-based mimetics of the commercial animation industry. While ‘Experimental 
Animation’ is a complex field of heterogeneous practices, ‘Orthodox Animation’ has a distilled 
doctrine of techniques. 
Theoretical discourse in the field has coalesced around the field of animation studies, as a 
melting pot for media and cultural studies, sociology, film theory and history, and feminist 
studies524. Attempts to theorise animation from the outside i.e. not by practicing animators, 
has led to some fierce debate over the value of “imported” criticism. Andrew Darley’s article 
Bones of Contention: Thoughts on the Study of Animation 525 executes an incendiary attack 
against the state of theoretical discourse, arguing that literary approaches to animation have 
too often relied on “metaphorical, associative and speculative routines, which are divorced 
from real phenomena and practices”, going on to argue this fails to provide a “rational 
understanding but rather forms of rhetorical extemporization: a kind of poetical riffing with 
theoretical concepts and ideas that bear very little relation to the real-world practices into 
which they are being “shoe-horned”526. Darley’s critique gives direct reference to the widely 
cited collection of essays The Illusion of Life, edited by Alan Cholodenko527, slamming it for 
heavy handed application of philosophy and “highly tendentious argumentation… and 
endless (futile) searches for ontological/metaphysical legitimation”528. Cholodenko’s response 
Animation (Theory) as the Poematic: A Reply to the Cognitivist 529 is just as combative, and 
certainly lives up to some of the “riffing” Darley refers to. 
It is likely both feel they won the argument, and I mention this dichotomy here to say that I 
share Darley’s critique. There is an evident disconnect between the technical practice of 
animation and theoretical discourse. Cholodenko’s writing is of importance and is discussed 
later on the important subject of the uncanny, but in the context of discussing the practice of 
animating objects and images, animation studies often remains at arm’s length. This review 
of animation therefore limits itself to two ‘hands on’ aspects of the field. First, the principles of 
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animation behind orthodox practices and, secondly, an emerging theoretical discourse on 
embodied cognitive perspectives of animation that relate to the aforementioned fields of 
perceptual psychology and discourse of embodied cognition. Together, they explain the 
pervasive experiences of animate media in the technologies we encounter on a daily basis. 
Principles of Animation 
The colloquial use of the term animation immediately inspires associations with childhood 
and the giants of industry, including Disney, Warner Bros and Pixar. The cultural hegemony 
of these companies and their dominant models of production have met with considerable 
criticism530 531, for creating an orthodox style that has overshadowed the art’s early history of 
radical experimentalism and the multiplicity of contemporary independent animators. The 
industrialisation of animation in the 1920s, subsumed individual authorship demanding 
conventions for collective practice be established. Specific materials, techniques and 
aesthetics became standardised - all constraints that Thomas Lamarre suggests were 
productive in contributing “to making movement-as-life a central concern or problematic of 
animation, and maybe the central concern” 532. 
Literature on orthodox animation is consequently where practical attention is given to 
defining types of motion that lead to perceptions of animacy, whereas experimental and 
abstract forms of the art remain too heterogenous for universal rules. While orthodox 
animation seeks to sustain the life of moving characters, the appearance of lively artefacts in 
experimental work is, more often than not, unstable, fleeting and strange. 
The principle author of orthodox animation is unarguably Disney. Its core team of animators 
– who Walt Disney himself called the Nine Old Men – established widely adopted techniques 
for (figurative and non-figurative) character animation. What is striking is how their 
techniques, refined over many decades and published by veteran Disney animators Ollie 
Johnston and Frank Thomas (two of the Nine Old Men), in their 1981 book The Illusion of 
Life 533, remain doctrine to this day, regardless of the digital revolution that has occurred in 
production methods. This is evident in the ground-breaking computer generated short Luxo 
Jr. (1986), directed by John Lasseter, whose paper534 presented at Siggraph conference in 
1987, pays homage to the 12 Principles of Animation distilled in Johnston and Thomas’ 
book. 
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1: Squash and Stretch 2: Anticipation 3: Staging 
 
4: Straight ahead action 
and pose to pose 
 
5: Follow through and 
overlapping action 
 
6: Arcs 
 
7: Slow in and slow out 
 
8: Secondary Action 
 
9: Timing 
 
10: Exaggeration 
 
11: Solid Drawing 
 
12: Appeal 
 
Luxo Jr. is a useful case study, as a short film that uses the full range of Disney’s 12 
Principles with animated characters made up of rigid bodies similar in this respect to the 
mechanics of machines I have built and attempted to ‘bring to life’. As the first CGI film 
nominated for an Academy Award, it is also a masterclass in narrative story telling from a 
series of discrete behaviours. Perhaps the simplest and most immediately useful principle I 
have adopted in my own work is Arcs, which explains that curved motions appear more 
natural than straight line motion. We find this evident in the photography of Etienne Jules 
Marey, where human and animal bodies in motion are rarely linear but rather a choreography 
of curved motion profiles. This understanding of pendular motion is also later discussed in 
theoretical foundations of puppetry, where it has been long understood that natural motion is 
rhythmic 535. 
 
Figure 64. Luxo Jr. (1986) by Pixar, directed by John Lasseter 
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A quality of motion common in animation practice, but untouched in visual perception is, 
‘Squash and Stretch’. A principle John Lasseter regarded as the most important. “Movement 
emphasizes the rigidity in the object… Anything composed of living flesh… will show 
considerable movement in its shape during action” 536. Though Luxo Jr. is a rigidly 
mechanical character Lasseter explains how the principle of ‘Squash and Stretch’ is still 
used. “An object need not deform in order to squash and stretch… a hinged object like Luxo 
Jr. squashes by folding over on itself, and stretches by extending out fully” 537. We see 
Squash and Stretch behaviour, therefore, in Ihnatowicz’s Senster, as its armature retracts 
and extends demonstrating an animate quality of softness through motion independent of its 
material and structural properties. Senster also demonstrates, in its smooth motion profiles, 
the related principle of ‘Slow In and Slow Out’. The seventh principle, which in traditional cell 
animation is meticulously produced frame by frame, with speed of motion between 
‘keyframes’ determined by the number of frames in- between, and their spacing. Equal 
spacing will appear as a constant velocity. 
Acceleration or deceleration is produced by increasing or decreasing differences in spacing 
between frames. Subtle changes in these motion profiles can dramatically change the 
impression of a movement or gesture and requires constant attention by the animator. With 
the development of spline interpolation in computer generated graphics the parametric 
adjustment of ‘Slow In and Slow Out’ allows for quicker testing of the expressive range of 
these motion profiles. 
These techniques are now being deployed not only in character animation, but also often in 
graphical user interface design. For example, in Google’s Material Guidelines, we find beside 
colour, font, shadow and other visual style specifications, the required speed and 
acceleration profiles for moving elements. As Google invests into the physical animated 
world of robotics one might wonder whether we will see a unified material specification for 
virtual and physical motion profiles. 
John Lasseter explains that the character movements of Luxo Jr. are constructed in three 
parts, the movements that prepare for an action, the action itself and then the terminating 
actions. The principle of ‘Anticipation’ explains the important influence that, often small, 
preparatory movements have, before larger movements follow. A character may use a 
moment to align itself to another character or its environment before executing a significant 
motion. These small alignment motions indicate to an audience where to focus their attention 
in anticipation. Lasseter’s reflective writing on his use of the 12 principles of animation 
illustrates how thoughtful and deliberate ever motion is that appears on screen. 
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The principles of animation evidently borrow from theatrical techniques, when steering 
audience’s attention, are well understood. Lasseter discusses the ‘Staging’ principle, where 
speed of motion tells us which character to follow at which time. “As soon as Jr. hops on-
screen, he is moving faster than Dad, therefore the audience’s eye immediately goes to him 
and stays there” 538. The more animate, the more we irresistibly attend to a character, and 
when attention is secured, the animator makes use of the further principle of ‘Exaggeration’, 
to make explicit the narrative content of motion. “If a character is sad, make him sadder, if he 
is bright, make him shine, worried, make him fret, wild, make him frantic… The movement [of 
Luxo Jr.] had a sense of natural physics, yet almost every motion and action was 
exaggerated to accentuate it” 539. Used carefully and sparingly exaggeration enhances all of 
the other principles of animation. Such ideas have found their way out of the screen into the 
use of animatronics at entertainment resorts. Psychologist and scholar of human-robot 
relationships Sherry Turkle tells an anecdote about speaking to a research scientist at the 
Walt Disney Company, who was not surprised to find these exaggeration techniques change 
our expectations of animate behaviour. 
“When Animal Kingdom opened in Orlando, populated by “real,” that is, 
biological animals, its first visitors complained that these animals were not 
as “realistic” as the animatronic creatures in Disneyworld, just across the 
road. The robotic crocodiles slapped their tails, rolled their eyes, in sum, 
displayed “essence of crocodile” behavior. The biological crocodiles, like 
the Galapagos turtle, pretty much kept to themselves.” 540 (Turkle, 2006) 
Back in the world of cell animation, typically based on 24 frames per second, orthodox 
animation’s continuous smooth action is sometimes referred to as ‘Full Animation’. 
Productions of this kind are expensive and time consuming demanding industrial processes 
of production that few studios can resource. More economical technical and aesthetic 
traditions have developed internationally, such as in European animation houses where 
lower frame rates and simplified, choppier motion are still effective in creating the ‘Illusion of 
Life’. 
In contrast to Full Animation, and at the other end of the spectrum, is Japanese Anime, 
which relies on dialog primarily to maintain narrative supported by minimal motion. 
Regardless of where work sits on this spectrum between full animation’ and minimal Anime 
techniques, some motion must be maintained, as without it as Maureen Furniss explains, 
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“when an image within an animated production becomes still, its lifelessness is readily 
apparent” 541. In Anime a scene may be still but for including blinking eyes and moving lips, 
or panning shots across still characters and backgrounds, yet still delicately holds a sense of 
life. In Anime, perhaps more so than anywhere else in the field, we find that animation need 
not be always about movement so much as about the composition of movement and 
stillness. 
For the purposes of this discussion on ‘Life in Motion’, I have focused on the full animation 
techniques of American production houses, as they most closely relate to the continuous live 
experience people have when they encounter my own animated machines. Though in the 
later context of a discussion on aesthetics, I touch on the haunting aspects of minimal forms 
of animation and their potency. 
Embodiment and Animation 
Interestingly, the technical exchange of expertise between animation, computer graphics, 
gaming and emerging new media art forms, has created new spaces of discourse that are 
more technically grounded. In the past decade animators have begun to draw direct 
connections between practice and interdisciplinary theories of cognition with recent articles 
by Patrick Power 542, Jeff Malpas 543 and Dan Torre 
544. It seems that this synthesis has taken a very long time to happen considering 
psychologists have been using animation techniques since the 1940s, to study motion 
perception. One explanation is certainly the disciplinary make up of animation studies comes 
largely from the humanities. Another issue might be the perceived naivety of the subject that 
makes serious academics across arts and sciences nervous. Editor of Animation Journal 
Suzanne Buchan argues that the naive delight of animation is a strength rather than 
regressive feature of the art worthy of scholarly study 545. 
 “From this perspective, animation is a complex and sensational 
phenomenon. This means that it is composed of very different dimensions 
of reality. Once could also call these dimensions discourses. Then 
animation would be an inter-discursive phenomenon. In its prismatic 
existence philosophy, theology, media theory, engineering, natural 
sciences, the history of technology, aesthetics and ethics meet and 
overlap.” 546 (Buchan, 2013) 
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To date, the most substantial effort to bring together contemporary theories of embodied 
cognition to the experience of observing animation in digital media is by interaction design 
theorist Kenny Chow. Discussing how digital screen-based artefacts exhibit various types of 
phenomenal “technological liveliness”, such as motion, reactivity, adaption and 
transformation, he argues that we feel our bodies are in touch with these digital objects. “We 
sense that we can move them or stop them; in other words, interact with them. We are 
embodied in the digital environment through the sensorimotor experience of touching or 
moving objects”547. Chow makes the case that our experience of animated phenomena is not 
passive, but actively constructed, grounded in our own sensorimotor experience of animate 
behaviour, both our own and that which we interact with. He gives examples of how, “A bird 
flies away when someone approaches. The crowd disperses to make way for someone 
trying to cut through” 548, suggesting that when similar behaviours occur on screen-based 
media, our body relates these to a lifetime of bodily-spatial experiences. 
Though much of our digital media interaction with animated artefacts occurs on small mobile 
screens, or sat in front of TVs and computers, new domains of responsive media facades 
and digital projected art installations are becoming more common, following in the pioneering 
work of Myron Krueger. Sensing of bodily motion can range in resolution from basic 
proximity, to sophisticated computer vision techniques of gestural recognition. A common 
interface input is hand motion, which offers individual and collective forms of public 
interaction with on- screen graphics. ‘Hand waving installations’ are often very effective at 
engaging people in intuitive interactions. This is, I believe, because it sets up an immediate 
social framework for interaction. We wave towards the digital artefact and if we recognise a 
response, a social connection has been made. We may perceive life in these responsive 
behaviours and enter into extended gestural exchanges to explore these novel relationships. 
The repertoires of actions we employ reveal habituated motor habits for social interaction 
that function quickly and naturally. Bodily motion, Merleau-Ponty explains, reveals our 
consciousness as “not a matter of "l think that" but "l can'" move toward something”549. For 
example, our habituation allows us to reserve cognitive capacity for higher-order processing 
of language. Meanwhile, bodily cognition of animate interactions occurs unconsciously, in 
chorus with the emotional experience that phenomenologists, such as Roberta De Monticelli 
550, argue is deeply tied to our motor action. 
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Primary and Secondary Liveliness 
Avoiding the term animation, Kenny Chow suggests the use of the term “liveliness”. He 
argues it circumvents loaded connotations of particular fields of practice and academic study. 
For Chow, liveliness, as a term, focuses on perceptual and experiential qualities, without 
association to particular materials, media, contexts and purposes. ‘Technological liveliness’ 
focuses on how these contemporary experiences of digital media often involve dynamic 
responsive experiences with animated phenomena, enabled by computing and other related 
technologies. Despite the pervasiveness of animated digital objects in media technologies, 
Chow explains that these qualities are “commonly dismissed as peripheral concerns” in 
interaction design, game development and digital art, and argues that they “should be at the 
core of the study and creation of digital media artefacts, because they actually manifest the 
primal and persistent urge among humans to animate the inanimate that spans periods and 
cultures” 551. 
Chow proposes two types of liveliness. A primary liveliness of artefacts that have clear goal-
directed behaviours, such as chasing and avoiding, and a secondary liveliness which 
involved complex and ambiguous behaviours over fields of behaviour, such as dancing and 
flocking. Secondary liveliness, he suggests, can extend to other complex phenomena that 
are not goal-directed, such as weather formations. He makes a point of not giving 
prominence to either, even though his labels might suggest this. In his words, “They 
represent the two 'sides' of the same coin” 552. After all, the agency of a single boid may 
exhibit primary liveliness, and the flock of boids exhibits secondary liveliness. “If character 
animation is considered to display primary liveliness, motion graphics are definitely 
representative of secondary liveliness” 553. One concentrates the observer’s attention on a 
centre of action, the other on a complex transforming whole. Primary liveliness, he suggests, 
has drawn more attention because of its ease of simulation and clarity of observation, 
however, advances in computer graphics will increasingly afford opportunities to explore the 
second. 
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4.5 The Uncanny 
 “The origin of the uncanny is the natural tendency of man to infer, in a kind 
of naive analogy with his own animate state, that things in the external 
world are also animate or, perhaps more correctly, are animate in the same 
way. It is all the more impossible to resist this psychical urge, the more 
primitive the individual’s level of intellectual development is.” 554 (Jentsch, 
1906) 
For modernity at the dawn of the 20th century, animist tendencies to perceive life in objects 
represented the irrational and primitive mind. Animism was a problem, a childish and 
degenerate pathology that became the interest of Ernst Jentsch, with his 1906 article On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny taken up and developed further by Sigmund Freud in his 1919 
Das Unheimliche. Both Jentsch and Freud draw up on E.T.A Hoffman’s 19th century tragic 
tale Der Sandmann – The Sandman555, where a mechanical automaton of female 
appearance gains the amorous attention of a poet named Nathanael. 
Fantasising himself as Pygmalion, Nathanael ironically casts aside his fiancée Clara (who 
embodies rationality) as a “damned, lifeless automaton!” Nathanael’s Pygmalionesque 
delusions allows him to believe the mechanical doll named Olimpia has come to life, until the 
automaton’s creators Spalanzani and Coppola dismember it to reveal its mechanically 
lifelessness, which, in turn, leads to Nathanael’s death. Olimpia, representing a liminal figure, 
between the living and the non-living, embodies both the familiar, rational and intimate 
‘heimlich’ and simultaneously strange, irrational and repressed ‘unheimlich’. For Freud the 
tension between these irreconcilable perceptions – particularly triggered by figures of dolls, 
and mechanical automata – was the principle cause of the compelling phenomena of the 
uncanny. 
 “An uncanny effect is often easily produced when the distinction between 
imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto 
regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality… It is this factor which 
contributes not a little to the uncanny effect attaching to magical practices.” 
556 (Freud, 1919) 
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Both authors understood the ontological paradox between the living and non-living as the 
primary source of the uncanny and examined its visceral emotional effects, Jentsch 
describing it as a “dark feeling of uncertainty” 557, while for Freud, the uncanny was more 
menacing, belonging “to the realm of the frightening, of what evokes fear and dread” 558. 
Freud’s Uncanny was associated with “harmful forces and the return of the dead” 559, an 
irrational dark mysticism, “the old animistic view of the universe” 560. In an age of Modernity, 
animist tendencies, once familiar, but now repressed, re- emerged through the animating 
power of technology. Hoffman’s The Sandman, and the writings of Jentsch and Freud, 
should be seen within the context of the rise of industrial automation, and the emerging 
anxieties about the potential autonomy of machines. It is no wonder then, that the avant-
garde emboldened by machine culture, embraced the aesthetics of the uncanny, both in their 
use of primitive icons from animist cultures, and in the abstract shamanism of their kinetic 
explorations of primitive form. 
Over the past century, the visceral aesthetics of the uncanny have been popularly discussed 
in puppetry and animation theory. More recently in robotics, research into the effect of the 
uncanny has received considerable attention, typically with the aim of reducing its presence 
rather than harnessing it. 
Puppetry 
 “There is something in the puppet that ties its dramatic life more to the 
shapes of dreams and fantasy, the poetry of the unconscious, than to any 
realistic drama of human life. That is part of its uncanniness, that its 
motions and shapes have the look of things we often turn away from or put 
off or bury. It picks out our madness, or what we fear is our madness. It 
creates an audience tied together by childlike if not childish things.” 561 
(Gross, 2011) 
Puppeteer Kenneth Gross describes puppetry as the art inextricably linked to “the dead, with 
the realm of the uncanny, the threshold realm of things unknown” 562. Often barely human in 
form, a foetus, a mistake of nature, a monster or a corpse, puppets instil a magical thinking, 
part wondrous, part terrifying. They elicit a visceral effect, a primitive but flickering fear of the 
dead brought back to life. 
Roman Paska describes his practice as a kind of necromancy 563, every puppetry 
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performance containing the underlying story of the puppet struggling for life, what puppeteer 
Basil Jones call the puppet’s “Ur-narrative” 564. Seen through Tillis’ “double vision” 565 or what 
Jurkowski calls “opalization” 566, the viewer can share in sensations of fear or creepiness 
and, in the same moment, the contradicting triviality of the spectacle. The uncanny of the 
puppet is a source of a strange pleasure, both frightening and at the same time compelling in 
its playfulness. Fear is overcome in the participation of ‘le jue’ of the puppet performance, in 
the embrace of the spectacle and its artificiality. In this way, the puppet can invoke gasps of 
anxiety and, moments later, turn us to laughter, or even the sublime. 
 “The audience or observer was said to derive pleasure from being 
(temporarily or potentially) overwhelmed by an object or entity that seemed 
infinite or vast, powerful or terrible, exceeding the capacities of the human 
to imaginatively grasp or understand it. Breaking with conscious control 
and individual personality or preferences, the pleasure- in-pain that was 
integral to the sublime seemed to take man temporarily beyond the human; 
but the pleasure was generated by an object – not by a god or by the 
divine – and opened a kind of split within the subject before consciousness 
and reason re-establish control.” 567 (Battersby, 2007) 
Puppetry in the context of modernising rationalism has pulled against the grain, holding onto 
a deep history of beliefs and traditions. In the face of unrelenting modernisation and 
reductive tendencies to resist the instinctual and emotional basis of aesthetic experience, 
puppetry reveals the visceral, primordial nature of the material world and its agency. In 
contemporary puppetry the atomisation of puppet theatre, reforming into primitivist 
experimental practices, continues the resistance against the imposed rationality of 
modernity. It reminds us and celebrates, like no other art form can, the un-modern nature of 
ourselves, of our deepest and most primal of social instincts. 
Animation 
With a similar bistable ambiguity found in puppetry, the theorist Alan Cholodenko affirms 
that, “Animation always has something of the inanimate about it… a certain inanimateness 
that both allows and disallows animation” 568. He too points to the phenomena of uncanny as 
“never not with us”569. Animator Paul Wells goes further by claiming that the uncanny is 
“central to the whole art of animation” 570. 
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Not all animation media has the same potential for the uncanny. Maureen Furniss suggests 
stop-motion, object animation elicits the uncanny “to a greater extent than drawn, painted or 
most digital 3D animation” 571. She suggests that stop- motion objects ‘real life’ status makes 
a tangible difference. Susanne Buchan elaborates on the important distinction and the 
perceptual differences for the spectator. 
 “Studies of object animation need different approaches that those of 2D 
‘orthodox’ animation, because it presents physical space and materials that 
occupy this space instead of a mimetic, drawn rendering of the same. 
Objects and the materials from which they are constructed are tangible and 
have an intrinsic set of references to our lived experience which is not the 
case in the fully graphic fantasy of 3D animation.” 572 (Buchan, 2006) 
The work of object and puppet stop-motion can often be where the most ‘uncanny’ moments 
and experimental practices in animation can be found. Films by the Brothers Quay, for 
example, are unsettling, enigmatic and sometimes frightening, utilising a clapping monkey, 
rotating screws, hollow-headed dolls, amongst a range of other sinister artefacts. Without a 
clear narrative to follow, they create a dark visual poetry that can be uneasy to watch 
particularly to the unfamiliar. 
 “This lack of understanding adds to the uneasiness one feels as he or she 
watches the eerie figures, confirming our darkest fears that, deep in the 
shadows, inanimate objects do in fact live.” 573 (Furniss, 1998) 
Animation as Robyn Ferrell points out, is not in a permanent state of the uncanny but rather 
is in a permanent state of potential for the uncanny. 
 “The sly turn of a doll’s head, the imperceptible flicker of a statue’s stone 
eyelids, the animal whose expression is for a moment almost human, these 
can be uncanny. The uncanny must be fleeting, peripheral, threatened. It is 
a type of moment rather than a class of object; an affect of a process of 
perceiving rather than of an image perceived.” 574 (Ferrell, 1991) 
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Whether examining the production of Émile Cohl’s hand drawings of the 1900s or John 
Lasseter’s computer-generated worlds a century later, the constant we discover across 
generations is the animator’s obsessive, repetitive and meticulous nature - the painstaking 
production of imagery, carefully timed and displayed in rapid succession. What has changed, 
are the modes of production, shifting from meticulous hand drawing and model making, 
towards equally meticulous digital methods. The ‘Digital Turn’ in animation has been the 
source of a great deal of contemporary discussion, enthused by Manovich’s polemic, 
assigning cinema as a subset of (digital) animation575. With ever increasing resolution, 
computer generated imagery has provided the live action film industry with a means to create 
synthetic worlds for actors to inhabit, at a fraction of the cost of built environments. The 
virtual elephant in the room is the question of when, one day, actors, like their sets, will be 
replaced by human simulacra? 
Animation productions, such as Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within (Hironobu Sakaguchi, 
2001), made much of their technical innovations in photorealism, but found their audiences 
critical, and ended in box office failure. Lamarre comments that it was not only the quality of 
the photorealism that came under scrutiny but the “the verisimilitude of their movements” 576. 
Regardless of the large budget – one fifth of which was spent on rendering the 60,000 hairs 
on a single character’s head – what emerged, Lamarre describes, was “the lifelessness of 
mechanical reproduction”577. 
Research in cognitive neuroscience has found correlating results. Building upon 
aforementioned Gunnar Johansson’s point light walker experiments (1973), neuroscientists 
Chaminade, Hodgins and Kawato578 examined how varying degrees of anthropomorphic 
realism in animated bodies would affect perception of movement as either ‘biological’ or 
‘artificial’. They found an inverse correlation between anthropomorphic realism and viewers’ 
perceptions of natural motion. The animated bodies that performed a simple running motion, 
it would appear, became more closely scrutinised by the added physiological detail that the 
anthropomorphic models provided. In contemporary animation, regardless of the impressive 
semblance of realism available with computer graphics, many artists are rejecting the 
technological imperative for higher-resolution and realism, returning to their core principles of 
life appearing in motion. 
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Robotics 
 “Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.” 
579 (Haraway, 1985) 
Discourse of the uncanny in robotics invariably begins with Masahiro Mori’s 1970 hypothesis 
of Bukimi No Tani, often translated as The Uncanny Valley (first by Jasia Reichardt’s 1978 
book Robots: Fact, Fiction, and Prediction). It has also been more accurately translated was 
the Valley of Eeriness, and later literature has amalgamated these into the The Uncanny 
Valley of Eeriness. Mori observed that, as robots become more humanlike in appearance, 
observers’ emotional responses increase positively, until reaching a point where there is a 
sudden drop replaced by intense repulsion. Only when appearance and movement is 
improved close to indistinguishable from human appearance could emotional responses 
become positive again. The sudden drop in the otherwise steadily increasing graph FIGX is 
the uncanny valley. Motion, Mori argues amplifies the peaks and valleys creating the most 
visceral of effects. 
 “Imagine a craftsman being awakened suddenly in the dead of night. He 
searches downstairs for something among a crowd of mannequins in his 
workshop. If the mannequins started to move, it would be like a horror 
story.” 580 (Mori, 1970) 
Mori’s observation is so commonly cited in discussion of robotics, it has reached a 
remarkable degree of public awareness, considering it was published in the rather obscure 
Energy journal 581. On a number of occasions, when discussing my research with people 
quite far removed from robotics, they have brought up The Uncanny Valley. Its ubiquity is 
perhaps a result of its unusual and memorable name, and the endless somewhat repetitive 
publicity that these creepy machines attract. Arguably its popularity has led to a doctrine 
emerging over the decades that says robotic interaction is improved between humans and 
humanoid machines, when anthropomorphic realism is pursued 582. 
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Figure 65. The Uncanny Valley hypothesis by robotics professor Masahiro Mori 
However, an often over looked paragraph in Mori’s paper discusses the appeal of Japanese 
‘Bunraku’ puppetry. He acknowledges that they fall far short of the humanlike appearance, 
yet he places them high on the scale arguing that their small stature, presented on stage is 
put aside by the “tendency [of] an audience to become absorbed in this form of art” 583. 
Instead, he suggests, it is the motion of these primitive mechanical performers that leads to 
“a high level of affinity for the puppet” 584. 
Mori’s insights on Bunraku are less discussed in favour of issues of figurative semblance. 
However, humanoid robots, such as Sophia by Hong Kong-based Hanson Robotics, and the 
long running Geminoid project of Hiroshi Ishiguro Laboratories, Osaka University, have often 
obscured a more nuanced discussion of the uncanny found in the arts, leading instead to the 
uncanny being almost universally seen as a negative effect - a problem to be engineered out 
of design, rather than a powerful aesthetic property to be harnessed. The technical 
challenges of building, and choreographing the behaviour of such machines are tremendous. 
Many passionate attempts to cross the uncanny valley have failed, particularly once robots 
are put into motion. 
A number of contemporary robotics researchers, including Ken Goldberg argue that some 
artifice is better than complete realism. Roboticist Christoph Bartneck has questioned 
whether The Uncanny Valley should in fact be called The Uncanny Cliff585. His lab’s research 
concluded that there is little added value in attempting to build highly human-like androids, 
over cartoon or toy-like figures if the aim is to increase likability. The future may be less like 
Blade Runner and more like a world of Pixar-animated robots, suggests Ayse Saygin, 
director of UCSD Cognitive Science and Neuropsychology Lab. “Wall-E is so simple yet so 
expressive and we feel for the emotion that the robot feels. The design can be very simple 
yet still press our buttons”586. 
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Though a study of cultural effects on people’s feelings towards robots is beyond the scope of 
this discussion, it is worth noting that cultural influences do affect perceptions. With the 
notable exceptions of science fiction heroes, such as Star Wars C-3P0 and R2-D2, 
Hollywood’s typically menacing dramatisation of robots (Skynet, HAL, Cylons) contrasts with 
Japanese cultural icons, such as Astroboy, a robot that saves society from its human flaws. 
Underlying these modern icons, however, is a deeper religious complex. Mary Shelley’s story 
of Frankenstein reflects Western monotheistic fears of a God, exacting punishment on the 
arrogance of man, daring to usurp their creator. Contrarily, Japan’s religious roots in Shinto 
animism, explaining all objects, animals, and people as sharing a common spiritual harmony, 
has no hierarchical structures and, consequently, embraces new technologies as 
complementary companions. The roots of this can also be traces back to Japanese traditions 
of not discarding or recycling puppets after use, rather burying them in cemeteries instead. 
Media art and robotics scholar Machiko Kusahara explains “once spirit has encountered a 
material form, the latter cannot return to mere matter set apart. A dilapidated puppet - a 
head, arms, perhaps a costume, rattles, flutes, masks - will never again be merely a sum of 
parts. Today, they are put in museums or glass cases a practice that worries many older 
puppeteers”. 
4.6 Robotic Arts 
Resisting Anthropomorphism 
 “The cybernetic automaton’s mirroring of the human body was not 
established on the basis of conventional mimicry, as in the case of 
androids and their internal parts, so much as on a common understanding 
of the similarities that existed between the control mechanisms and 
communicational organizations of machine systems and living organisms.” 
587 (Tomas, 1995) 
Human-robotic interaction research typically utilises our tendencies toward certain formal 
anthropomorphic cues (i.e. Kindchenschema) to trigger emotional responses in human 
spectators. For example, the social robot Kismet by Cynthia Breazeal and her team at MIT, 
was “explicitly designed to tug on your emotional heartstrings” 588, with infant-like features 
and exaggerated emotional expression that were designed to elicit impressions of emotion 
coming from the machine. A similar zoomorphic example is the Paro robotic seal589, 
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designed as a therapeutic aid for elderly care. 
In 2017, Sophia, Hanson Robotics’ humanoid social robot by was handed citizenship of 
Saudi Arabia - the first robot to be recognised as having legal personhood. This seemed to 
mark success in Hanson’s mission, “upending the uncanny valley”590, but the robot itself, 
covered in a sophisticated skin suit, was more publicity stunt than paradigmatic exposition of 
humanoid robotics. Yann LeCun, Chief AI scientist at Facebook, criticised it, calling it as a 
“Puppet”591, intended to deliberately deceive people into believing the machine was far more 
intelligent than it was. Such use of highly realistic anthropomorphic forms to elevate the 
status of machines raises serious ethical issues of intentional deception by the technology 
industry – being a form of deception that distinguishes them from the arts, where audiences 
are invited into a willing suspension of belief. In the animatronic arts, there are many 
examples of humanoid and zoomorphic figures, some of which that have developed into HRI 
research platforms. The RoboThespian by British company Engineered Arts is an example of 
a humanoid robot designed to interact with the public, in such places as museums and visitor 
centres, taking on roles as exhibition guide. It has also been used as a stage performer in 
theatre shows592. In these types of contexts, robots take roles that may otherwise be 
performed by human actors, and are typically limited to pre- scripted dialogue. What all these 
works have in common, to varying degrees, is a reliance on formal qualities of their 
machines to encourage audiences into emotional responses. 
 
Figure 66. Bill Vorn, robotic installation titled Red Light (2005) 
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By contrast, robotic arts have often resisted anthropomorphic works, exploring 
unconventional mechanics, morphologies and materials. A fundamental question in artist Bill 
Vorn’s work is is it “possible to create an impression of life simply through human-machine 
reactive behaviors of abstract robotic structures?” 593 He characterises his work as exploring 
perception from human and machine perspectives - how audiences experience the 
behaviour of his artworks on one side, and on the other, the robot’s perception of its 
environment, including human observers. 
Emphasising life-like behaviour over life-like form, Vorn draws upon artificial life algorithms, 
including cellular automata, genetic and reinforcement learning, to imbue his machines with 
animate qualities, stating “as long as they manifest autonomous behaviors in the interaction 
process, agents could bear any abstract visual form” 594. Elizabeth Jochum supports this 
perspective when she discusses the emerging relationship between puppetry and robotics 
practices, advocating the benefits of incorporating performance theory into robotics design. 
Her central argument borrows American theatre historian and scholar Joseph Roach’s 
phrase, “kinesis is the new mimesis”. Roach, writing in the context of contemporary dance, 
asserts that “expressive movement is becoming a lingua franca, the basis of a newly 
experienced affective cognition and corporal empathy”595. 
In the context of neurological explanations of corporal cognition, Freedberg and Gallese 
argue that “A crucial element of esthetic response consists of the activation of embodied 
mechanisms encompassing the simulation of actions, emotions and corporeal sensation, and 
that these mechanisms are universal” 596. Mirror Neurons provide an interface for our motor-
experience of our own animate motion in space, to make sense of the animate motion of 
other bodies. These it appears, are largely automatic and unconscious processes, 
streamlining social interaction by giving us fast access to interpretations of the agency of 
others and the social codes of human gestures. 
 “Engines… are really mysterious… They have their moods, unexpected 
bugs. It seems that they have personality, soul, will. It is necessary to 
stroke them and to behave with respect to them…” 597  
(Schmidt-Bergmann, 1993) 
As I have discussed, in relation to my work and the work that surrounds me within the 
Interactive Architecture Lab, that it is striking that moving bodies, which are not at all 
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anthropomorphic, can still illicit visceral perceptions of life and emotional character. With the 
“intention of producing an aesthetic medium out of machines”, Vorn explains how his “work is 
defined by an aesthetics of empathy and anthropomorphism from human reactions 
engendered by animating abstract mechanical structures”598. There appears to be something 
aesthetic in the process of making sense of other animate motion, whether the body is 
human, or somewhat anthropomorphic, or abstract, and this fascinating phenomena is 
acknowledged by many artists in the field. 
 
Figure 67. Bill Vorn's Mega Hysterical Machine (2010), non-anthropomorphic robotic installation 
Pioneer of robotic art, Louis Philippe Demers suggests that, “the role of the designer is to 
endow both structures and movements of the machine performer with some level of shared 
mutual bodily understanding with the audience” 599. Demers suggest wheels elicit a different 
response to legs, for example. Remarkably, linkages of limbs in many morphological 
configurations can be evaluated and quickly interpreted into body mappings, even when they 
are quite unlike the human body. Gunnar Johansson’s point light walkers 600 demonstrate 
how attuned we are to identify correspondences between moving parts that infer a body, 
even when the body is unlike our own. 
 “The Senster elicits from people the kind of reactions that one might 
expect when someone is trying to communicate with another human being 
or an animal. It comes close to the sort of robot which we could imagine 
must have feelings because it behaves like creatures that have them.” 601 
(Reichardt, 1978)  
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Staging Lively Artefacts 
Louis Philippe Demers maintains that the staging of his robotic artworks is important in how 
the machines are perceived as agents - the staging of his mechanical performers enhancing 
their presence as actors. In more abstract mechanisms like his Tiller Girls, he believes 
theatrical staging particularly benefits the machines as it “creates a tighter coupling of the 
animation process to the given morphology of the robot” 602. 
 
Figure 68. Louis Philippe Demers, Tiller Girls (2009), 32 small autonomous robots. 
Staged as a performance, its title inspired by the famous early 20th century dance troupe 
Tiller Girls’ swinging pendulum motions, which come from their shifting centre of gravity, are 
at times graceful, in much the way Heinrich von Kleist talks of Marionettes. Their behaviour is 
true to their morphology, harnessing the latent behaviour in their construction. 
 “In embodied AI, the notion of environment is limited to the physiological 
level. It excludes theatricality as a variable because fiction is not 
considered a scientific method. By taking an AI robot away from its lab and 
using it in a different context, I illustrated that a broader definition of 
embodiment enables a richer palette of perceived behaviours.” 603  
(Demers, 2016) 
The practice of artists, such as Demers and Vorn, to harness morphological behaviour 
reflects practices in some respects closer to puppetry than robotics. This leads to radical 
experimentation with material systems outside of the lab. Take, for example, the work of 
physicist-turned-artist, Theo Jansen. His Strandbeest (Figure 69), assembled from PVC 
conduit tubes and little else - his practice over the past two decades has been to 
metaphorically evolve his own lifeforms. He has taken on he role of artist as evolutionary 
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engine, mutating and testing out new species of beach dwelling creatures, that grow with 
sophistication over the years. Jansen’s practice seems to resist conceptual processes, 
manifesting itself instead in the materiality and latent theatricality of mechanical spectacles. 
Early machines were passive mechanisms driven by human and wind power, but later 
generations developed primitive sensory apparatus to detect when they got near to water, 
and change direction of motion accordingly. The first signs of autonomous purposeful 
behaviour. They also now have the ability to capture and store energy with pressurised air in 
plastic bottles. His latest creations feature primitive logic gates powered by the air, which 
built into networks could begin to store information and programme behaviour. One day, he 
declares, his Strandbeest might be able to pass on information to new generations. 
Jansen’s work embodies, in perhaps the purest sense, a bottom-up approach to the design 
of ‘Lively Artefacts’. His PVC tubes are the ‘protein molecule’s, for creatures akin to 
Braitenberg’s early Vehicles. Anthropomorphic design has been disregarded in order for life, 
both systemically and materially, to emerge from direct relationships between agent and 
environment. In doing so, Jansen and other artists exploring these proto-life explorations, 
merge aesthetic, philosophical and scientific questions about the ontology of machines, their 
perception, and potential sentience. 
 
Figure 69. Theo Jansen's Animaris Currens Ventosa, Oostvoorne, Netherlands (1993). 
In Scientific American 15th anniversary issue Simon Penny asks the question, “Why do we 
want our machines to seem alive?” 604 Two “persistent motivations”, he suggests, are 
mimesis and anthropomorphism. Though these concerns are typically associated with the 
arts, he contends that they are at the heart of technological developments, such as artificial 
life and artificial intelligence. 
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Mimesis is central also to interactive arts, but Penny rightly points out that much of the field 
has a kind of “Pavlovian press-the-button-get-prize quality to it”, based on tightly predefined 
interaction models. Artificial life offers a wholly different form of interactivity, where systems 
might respond in entirely unexpected ways, “These works exhibit a new order of mimesis in 
which ‘nature’ as a generative system, not an appearance, is being represented” 605. Another 
example of embodied arts practice intersecting with artificial life is Penny’s autonomous 
robotic artwork, Petit Mal - a two wheeled naturally balanced mobile reactive robot that 
explores gallery spaces responding to people and objects it encounters. 
 “The goal of Petit Mal is to produce a robotic artwork which is truly 
autonomous; which is nimble and has "charm"; that senses and explores 
architectural space and that pursues and reacts to people; that gives the 
impression of intelligence and has behavior which is neither 
anthropomorphic nor zoomorphic, but which is unique to its physical and 
electronic nature.” 606 (Penny, 2000) 
Penny explains how the “focus was on the bodily experience of the ‘user’ in the context of 
behaving installations, and on the construction of a fluid relation between bodily dynamics 
and technological effects” 607. The robot’s ability to navigate its environment, and negotiate 
space with human occupants, sets up a dance of agency, to borrow a term from Andrew 
Pickering. Careful thought was given to the scale of mobile robot which was waist height for 
an adult or roughly child height.  
 
Figure 70. Simon Penny: 'Petit Mal', (1989-2005) 
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Penny acknowledges, “Were Petit Mal twice or half the size, different emotions would come 
into play” 608. Its behaviours were hesitant, to avoid intimidating its audiences and create an 
uneasy but seemingly safe and playful scene, so people would feel confident to interact with 
it. The childlike, or pet sized, scale also sets up certain modes of interaction, with Penny 
noting people having a caring affectionate relationship with the diminutive robot agent. Penny 
notes that this affectionate interaction occurs very quickly, indicating certain instinctive 
relationships constructed when first encountering the agent. Penny emphasises behaviour in 
making these impressions irresistible, explaining, “although physical instantiation is 
fundamental to the inducing of empathy, the specific qualities of that embodiment, as 
expressed in physical form and dynamics, ensure it” 609. 
 “Uncertainty also plays an important role in the behavioral relation with the 
viewer. Animated metal parts in a robot or dots on a computer screen can 
be seen as being alive if they move and react in a non-repetitive and 
unforseeable way, giving a strong impression of self-decision and 
autonomy.” 610 (Vorn, 2000) 
Many robotic artists, like the designers of computer game agents, use unpredictability as a 
technique for enhancing the impression of intelligence in the agent. Whether it is hesitant, or 
misguided, movements, these subtle features powerfully shape our empathic perception of 
these machines. Penny’s Petit Mal named after an epileptic condition that causes lapses of 
consciousness, explores behaviour that is not perfectly engineered for optimal interaction, 
but rather has lapses of directed motion that create suspense. Moments of stillness create 
anticipation of the next move, like a creature taking a moment to consider its options before 
progressing forward. As we find in cell animation techniques, stillness and movement need 
one another, and so too animate motion needs inanimate stillness for maximum dramatic 
effect. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Kinesis is the new mimesis. Embodied cognitive theories of agency perception, hypothesise 
a direct empathic corporal interface between our own bodily agency and that of other human 
beings, as well as animals, animated characters, puppets, and robots. Moving bodies, that 
are not anthropomorphic, can still illicit visceral perceptions of life and emotional character. 
We feel emotionally the behaviour of others, not solely through rational reasoning, but 
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through deep unconscious processes of perception, both innate, and learnt heuristics. Only 
by investigating these complex, heterogeneous phenomena from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives, do we come to a deeper understanding of what shapes the aesthetics of 
animate art forms. 
Through a lifetime of embodied interactions with our environment, we develop stable 
perceptual constructs for meaningful interaction with the world around us. Instability, or 
uncertainty, is reduced through the acquisition of knowledge that refines and reinforces these 
interfaces. As a result, by adulthood, much of world we encounter in the everyday has robust 
models for interaction. Gordon Pask suggests that encountering novel situations, with 
uncertain objects, spaces and agents that contradict the models we have constructed of our 
world, draw us into interactions to restablise our models. He suggests that there is something 
aesthetic about this pursuit and, indeed, the delight of uncertainty, namely in the form of 
ambiguity611, has become a defining feature of the experience of modern art. 
The human mind is remarkably flexible in the way it negotiates judgments of uncertain 
stimuli, be they visual, spatial or social. When two interpretations share equal validity, we find 
our mind oscillating between competing perceptions, only ever holding one consciously, at 
any one time. From puppetry scholar Steve Tillis’ description of “double-vision”, to animator 
Paul Wells assertion of the centrality of the uncanny, and roboticist Bill Vorn’s tension in the 
uncertainty of behavioural relations, we find ambiguity at the heart of all animated art forms. 
The convergence of our instinctive and naive perceptual reflexes, meet contradictory rational 
understandings of the world. A visceral aesthetics emerges within the conflict between fast 
heuristics and slower, higher-order cognition. Ambiguity drives participation, encouraging 
observers to seek to resolve the uncertainty through their own action. This helps animated 
art forms set up social behavioural relations between artwork and observers that draw 
people into becoming performers themselves. 
Although visual ambiguity in the perception of form and colour has been extensively studied 
leading to various syntheses of artistic and scientific studies – visual ambiguity in the 
perception of animacy remains understudied, without synthesis, because social perception 
remains commonly considered a higher-order cognitive process, rather than powerfully 
shaped by irresistible reflexes. Robotics arts is well placed as a transdisciplinary field, I 
believe for examining this with its versatility for incorporating artistic and scientific 
methodologies. 
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For neurologists like Semir Zeki, ambiguity “gives us some insights into how activity at 
different stations of the brain can result in a micro-consciousness for an attribute”. He goes 
on to acknowledge that the neurological study of ambiguity may provide insights into the 
mechanisms that “artists have tapped to create the ambiguity that is commonly a hallmark of 
great works of art” 612. In many ways, the arts have pioneered the exploration of this essential 
human trait of animacy perception, that all social behaviour is built upon. 
Today, the venerable art form of puppetry finds new purpose in filling a theoretical vacuum 
surrounding the aesthetics of robotics. Largely a subject examined by engineers and social 
scientists, robotics fundamentally misunderstands aesthetics as only a matter of appearance. 
Aesthetics in robotics often leads to discussion of the idea of the uncanny valley and the 
aversion to it. The uncanny is treated often as a problem to engineer out of a design. 
Puppetry, by comparison, understand the uncanny as a source of a strange pleasure, both 
frightening and at the same time compelling in its playfulness. It understands that fearfulness 
is overcome in the imaginative participation of the puppet performance, in the embrace of the 
spectacle and its artificiality. In this way, the puppet can invoke gasps of anxiety and 
moments later turn us to laughter, or even the sublime. Contemporary puppetry seeks more 
than to merely imitate life, but rather to find freer, livelier, and surprising sensations of 
intelligence behaviour. It is my strong belief that the field of robotics would benefit greatly 
from examining this ancient art form to better understand its own potential. 
By comparison to puppetry, animation in an age of digital techniques, allows for the 
translation of simulated character motion sequences into physical motor control. Computable 
vectors create an easier interface for dialog between robotics engineers and animators, than 
the dynamics of theatrical arts. We have recently seen elements of the 12 Principles of 
Animation employed in research projects 613 and commercially available social robots like 
Jibo 614. Formal lessons from character animation have also encouraged robotics designers 
to appeal to our innate responses to childlike appearances. 
Perhaps less immediately obvious to roboticists, is the knowledge latent in the work of more 
experimental abstract animation. While orthodox animation seeks to sustain the life of 
moving characters, the appearance of lively artefacts in experimental work is more often 
unstable, fleeting and strange. Artists, architects and designers working with robotics may 
find the work of experimental animation offer a richer palate of inspiration for non-figurative, 
rhythmic, and non-linear behaviour. Equally, I believe that cognitive research could benefit 
from drawing on experimental animation to discover stimuli that widen and deepening our 
understanding of what motion characteristics shape social perception. 
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In abstraction, the worlds of psychophysical, perceptual and cognitive science meet 
puppetry, animation, theatre and robotic arts. As Lamarre discusses in the context of 
aesthetic experience, abstraction opens up a space for our minds to participated creatively, 
faced with poverty of stimuli. In that space of what Sergei Eisenstein called “heartless 
geometrizing”, a primitive and universal animist experience emerges. Within the avant-garde, 
animation and puppetry represented a potential to transcend limitations of reality, by 
rejecting realism and searching for new forms of expressive life. 
Elaborate anthropomorphic mechanics were stripped back to explore primitive forms 
reflecting puppetry’s pre-history in shamanic, and animist rituals. These primitive aesthetics, 
primordial in nature, represent a resistance to imposed rationality of modern aesthetics, and 
search into deeper visceral aspects of human experience. Animated art forms, whether 
spectated or actively interacted, shirk conceptualisation for immediate viscerality - the 
essential bargain between performer and audience being a willing embrace of a naïve vision, 
an act unadulterated by intellectual rationalisation. 
Across the animated arts we find the common continuum between formal anthropomorphism 
and abstraction. In puppetry, on one hand we have illusionist and on the other, primitivist 
camps. The illusionists’ intention is to produce a stabile continuous life, and the primitivists’ 
who embrace fragmentation and instability, seek short episodes or vignettes. The animate 
abstract, non-figurative objects requires greater energy and commitment from the puppeteer 
and greater leaps of imagination in the audience. The result, puppeteers have argued, is 
more sophisticated and more intense. The audience’s oscillation of perception of life 
exaggerated, the object itself becomes a self-reflective device for questions about the vitalist 
nature of the objects and the theatre of the possession. 
The rejection of anthropomorphic realism in experimental puppetry and animation, connects 
itself to the early 20th century avant-garde’s adoption of primitivistic iconography and rejection 
of rationalist modern aesthetics. The embrace of machine culture, the fears and excitement 
of automation, and possibilities of machines as performative agents, brought puppetry 
practice and scenography together to imagine a stage of animate performers and 
architecture in interaction. A living geometric spectacle that, at the time, was beyond the 
technology of the time, and the technical capabilities of the artists. As the cost of robotics, 
and ease of use improves, we may yet see the visions of Prampolini, Depero, and Moholy- 
Nagy realised. 
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5. Lively Artefacts 
5.1 Introduction 
Bringing robotics into a performing arts context opens up a freedom of experimentation not 
necessarily afforded by robotics labs. Theatres and galleries that exhibit performance work, 
create controlled spaces for a different type of lab environment, with public audiences and 
performers as the subjects. Performance spaces are also in essence, spaces of narrative 
exploration and speculation. The adoption of methodologies from human acting, and dance 
choreography challenge the kinetic affordances of these machines, and new tactics for 
behavioural design. Performing arts also offer analytical tools on human behaviour, that can 
be applied to robot behaviour, and indeed to human-robot interactions and robot-robot 
interaction, as they do to human-human interaction. 
This chapter describes a series of experiments synthesising ideas drawn out of artificial life, 
perceptual psychology, animation, robotics and puppetry. A particular focus has been made 
on examining how puppetry can offer alternative approaches to robotics design, both 
mechanically and behaviourally. These works demonstrate the practical value of a deeper 
understanding of the perceptual stimuli that determine the qualities of animacy, and aesthetic 
approaches that harness these stimuli for aesthetic potency. 
5.2 Experiments between Robotics and Puppetry 
Most types of puppets in use today, fall into four broad categories: hand puppets, rod 
puppets, marionettes and shadow puppets 615. The art of puppetry holds a wide assortment 
of techniques that, in order to understand how to animate inanimate objects, I have 
investigated through conversation and collaboration with puppeteers at the Central School of 
Speech and Drama, The Little Angel theatre and the London School of Puppetry - organising 
and participating in workshops and performances, and harnessing their expertise in the 
design of my installations. 
An important distinction between puppetry and robotics is that puppeteers directly bring 
objects to life, by transferring their own animate motion (through a multitude of physical 
interfaces) into their manipulated objects. Even modern-day 
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animatronics work on similar systems, using hydraulic or cable systems to transfer smooth 
muscle driven motion 616. While, all too often, robotic behaviour begins its development in 
digital simulation, puppeteers begin with appreciation of the latent embodied behaviour in 
their puppet’s physical organisation. They hold a tacit understanding of the influence of 
physical forces gained from an often-obsessive focus on the subtlest of gestures. There is an 
aesthetic quality to well-manipulated puppets that I do not believe can be replicated by 
robotics, and this makes them fascinating in their own right. As Kliest points out, marionettes 
also have qualities of motion that are beyond the dexterity of the human body. 
 “My reply was that, no matter how cleverly he might present his 
paradoxes, he would never make me believe a mechanical puppet can be 
more graceful than a living human body. He countered this by saying that, 
where grace is concerned, it is impossible for man to come anywhere near 
a puppet. Only a god can equal inanimate matter in this respect.” 617 (Von 
Kleist, 1810) 
Marionettes 
From an engineering perspective, the marionette is a wire- (or string-) driven multi- limbed, 
under-actuated mechanism, under the influence of gravity 618 that exhibits rich kinematic and 
dynamic behaviours. This rather reduces the sublime description of von Kleist gives, but it 
inspired me to reconcile these very different ways of looking at this extraordinary approach to 
puppetry. I began by spending time looking at the plethora of mechanisms and control 
techniques from Asian and Indonesian traditions, through to the rod and airplane techniques 
of European theatre. 
 
Figure 71. A selection of European Marionette Control Systems. 
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In my early technical investigations, I attempted to bring together the traditions of marionette 
puppetry with robotic control, developing a cable driven rig to manipulate objects. A 
marionette-like system was appealing because it offered a means to separate the clunky, 
sometimes noisy and heavy, mechanical nature of robotics, from a performing object. The 
simplest of training marionettes I found were based on three-string systems. 
 
 
Figure 72. Examples of beginner training Marionettes 
 
While there are many versions of the same principle, all of these enabled the controller to 
manipulate an object with considerable variety. Three strings, for example, attached to a 
head - one on the forehead and one on either ear - allow control of vertical lift and fall, pitch 
and yaw. Wishing to avoid figurative cues, a three-string manipulated object naturally 
suggested a triangle. Cut from a sheet of plywood and spray-painted black, a triangle, in 
homage to Heider and Simmel’s An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior, acted as an 
initial primitive puppet. 
A small number of research projects had been conducted looking at robotic systems for 
imitating traditional marionette systems 619 620 621. Three features that common to these were: 
1. The marionettes and their control systems dealt with the animation of humanoid 
marionettes. 
2. The primary actuation systems were digital servos (affectionately called hobby 
servos). 
3. The rigs developed were small, animating doll-sized marionettes. 
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Figure 73. Complex Servo rigging system to actuate a humanoid marionette doll. I-Ming Chen et al. (2005) School 
of Mechanical and Production Engineering, Nanyang Technological University. 
 
These projects were fascinating for a number of reasons. However, they were not able to 
offer any directly applicable approaches to building my own rig system for the following 
reasons: 
1. The animation of humanoid figures was extremely complex and unnecessary for the 
purposes of animating a primitive triangle. 
2. Based universally on ‘hobby servo’ systems, none of the case studies are able to 
perform smoothing in acceleration and deceleration, with the level of resolution that I 
saw as essential, following my study of biomechanical systems and the behaviour of 
Senster in particular. 
3. The size of the rigs and their marionettes did not offer human or architectural scale 
interactions to be considered. The servo technology was not directly scalable. 
The existing literature was primarily useful in understanding some of the engineering 
challenges associated with harnessing the motion of suspended objects. Murphey and 
Egerstedt 622 describe marionettes as sophisticated and challenging mechanical systems, 
and therefore represent good test-beds for many current issues in robotics, such as 
systematic modelling of relatively high degree of freedom systems, as well as high-level 
motion planning and control. Even by simplifying down to a triangle there would still be highly 
non-linear constrained dynamics and degenerate Lagrangians, due to strings having nearly 
no mass 623. Under-actuated mechanisms, under gravity-influence 624 exhibit rich kinematic 
and dynamic behaviours. 
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A few key choices were made in the rig’s development. Industrial stepper motors (typically 
used for CNC Milling Systems) were used for their resolution and relative ease of control. 
The final rig could lift to an accuracy of 0.3mm. This was essential for me to test digital 
approaches to smoothing control. Four motors were used, one for each suspension string 
and a further one for orientation. The use of steppers meant that scalability was possible by 
changing motors without the need to develop completely new control systems. A steel 
extendable frame enabled triangles of varying sizes to be suspended. Made from waterjet cut 
2mm steel it was robust enough for transportation. The entire rig was held by a single vertical 
bar, around which it rotated, allowing it complete multiple 360˚ turns, although not infinitely, 
due to power and data being delivered by coiled cables from the ceiling. On the rig, an 
Arduino MEGA microcontoller acted as the master computational system, to slave Motion 
Control MSD542 stepper controllers, mounted beside each high torque motor. Dedicated 
controllers allowed high-resolution micro- stepping. 
 
Figure 74. Prototype three string marionette control rig 
Robotic Manipulator with Software Smoothing 
With a high degree of resolution in the stepper motors, it was possible to explore methods for 
simulating the digital/analogue predictor circuit used by Edward Ihnatowicz in his Senster 
robot. As discussed earlier, Ihnatowicz’s use of a sophisticated arrangement of op-amps 
operated as a second-order, low-pass filter, which today is often simulated digitally in signal 
processing. With the support of Ihnatowicz’ researcher Alex Zivanovic, a basic second-order, 
low-pass filter was developed in Processing. For a full description of the code see 
Zivanovic’s paper Elegant Motion: The Senster and Other Cybernetic Sculptures’625. 
In my implementation of this approach there was, however, a problem with using this simple 
algorithm in a robotic system – a stepper can only move one step per time unit. Zivanovic’s 
algorithm curve does not account for this as it is not based on a particular drive technology. 
The unit of time is based on the minimal amount of time a stepper can make a move to its 
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next step, while keeping sufficient torque to lift its payload. The algorithm moving between 
two points, e.g. 0 – 100, must never move toward its target with a velocity of greater than one 
step, otherwise the stepper will not be able to keep up with the path generated by the 
algorithm. With some experimentation on the filter parameter, determined by the number of 
steps, an effective solution was found. 
 
Figure 75. Suspension of triangle as a proto-marionette performer. 
The primary conclusion from the testing of the first marionette-inspired robotic manipulator, 
was that the highly nonlinear dynamics of the suspended triangle would require feedback 
and sophisticated active dampening measures, to ever move close to the control human 
manipulators can achieve. Without measures, once any oscillation begins, it becomes very 
difficult to eliminate. Another key observation was that the use of a flat triangle was not 
suitable in a performance context as it would become almost invisible at particular angles of 
view. Future experiments would adopt a tetrahedron form instead. 
Rod Puppets 
The ‘under-actuated’ problems of driving marionettes have some similarities to those found 
in aerial robotics and legged locomotion. They require state of the art feedback control 
systems that made this approach less attractive to pursue. 
Instead, I began to examine other forms of puppetry that could work with rigid-body 
kinematic models. Rod puppets directly transmit their manipulator’s gestures into the puppet, 
without having to negotiate the complexities of string-suspended motion. Typically, a rod 
puppet is manipulated from below, or its surroundings, as we find in Japanese Bunraku 
theatre. There is also a lesser-known rod marionette (ancestor of the string marionette), that 
is typically made up of a main central supporting rod and then finer rods for manipulating a 
puppet’s limbs. 
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Bunraku puppets interested me because of their larger than typical scale, measuring 
between 4 and 5 feet tall. They are manipulated by puppeteers in full view of an audience 
controlled by short rods. Principle puppets on stage are controlled by three puppeteers who 
perform with exquisite synchronisation. 
Bunraku are also the type of puppet referred to by roboticist Masahiro Mori in his seminal 
paper on the uncanny valley, where Mori positions Bunraku rising out of the valley towards 
higher affinity and human likeness. As a matter of chance, while exploring approaches to 
three-rod puppetry, I came across a type of robotic manipulator, also made of three-rod like 
arms working in unison. The so-called ‘delta robot’ invented by Reymond Clavel in early 
1980s at EPFL Switzerland, is a fast, light payload manipulator, which immediately made it 
an ideal approach for puppetry. When the patent for the delta robot design expired at the end 
of 2007, it opened up the opportunity for experimentation beyond its typical industrial 
applications. 
Motive Colloquies, Centre Pompidou 2011 
Commissioned by the Centre Pompidou, Paris, Motive Colloquies was a collaboration 
between the Bartlett School of Architecture and the Royal Central School of Speech and 
Drama, combining expertise in puppetry, performance, robotics and interaction design. The 
result is was responsive installation and performance held within the Pompidou’s Pablo 
Picasso Gallery in May 2011. 
 
 
Figure 76. Motive Colloquies, Centre Pompidou, Paris (2011) 
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Unlike Performative Ecologies, the work needed to be free standing and placed in a brightly 
lit room. Embracing the idea of ‘full-view’ manipulation that is found in Bunraku theatre, a 
custom robotic was designing to manipulate a primitive tetrahedral form, and made from 
folded aluminium sheet. Built from aluminium box and tube sections, an inverted 2m tall delta 
robot was developed, giving the appearance of three legs. The ‘legs’ met at an elevated end-
effector, which became the platform from which to suspend a second, smaller and lighter, 
delta robot, whose end-effector held a folded aluminium sheet ‘head’. 
In Bunraku the puppeteer is often dressed in black, and distinctly different to the puppet. The 
robot manipulator and the tetrahedron head, however, were both aluminium so, rather than 
appearing as independent puppeteer and puppet, the two parts were read as one. The 
design was based on parallel robot principles. These are used extensively in the 
manufacturing industry, but not in a performance context before this work. The final strategy 
involved a novel kinetic structure combining two delta robot mechanisms. The structure of 
the manipulator read like a three-legged spider’s ‘body’, and the single moving tetrahedron, 
with its purposeful searching behaviours, was read as a ‘head’. 
Three Kinect depth sensors were hidden beneath the edges of the triangular plinth, on which 
the robot continually scanned the surrounding gallery for the movement of visitors. When 
people came into range they triggered a reactive ‘mirroring’ behaviour. This primitive reactive 
algorithm is in contrast to Performative Ecologies’ more complex, evolving behaviour. The 
only complexity of behaviour in Motive Colloquies was a direct reflection of the complexity of 
the environment it was sensing. If people crept towards it, the robot would turn and creep 
towards them. As people became more animated, the robot would become more animated. 
Due to the difference in the kinematics of its motion, compared to the human bodily motion it 
was copying, the simplicity of the mirroring behaviour was not immediately perceptible. As 
the robot was approachable from any side, and would always turn towards people who came 
closest, the dynamics of people changing proximity as they moved around it created a 
sufficiently rich indeterminate behaviour to maintain the sense of the robot’s autonomy when, 
in fact, its behaviours were extremely primitive and entirely driven by human motion. 
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5.3 Fearful Symmetry, Tate Modern 2012 
Ambition 
Following the success of the exhibition at the Centre Pompidou, I was invited to participate in 
the Tate Modern’s inaugural arts programme, launching its new gallery space, Tate Tanks. 
This was the first dedicated ‘live art’ space in a UK Gallery, and opened as part of the 
nationwide cultural events that marked London’s Olympics, over the summer of 2012. Fearful 
Symmetry was the first interactive installation to be exhibited in a programme that largely 
consisted of performances, including the work of Tania Bruguera and Teresa De 
Keersmaeker. 
The cavernous concrete chamber of the south tank, 32m in diameter, 7m tall, adjacent to the 
Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall, had previously lain dormant for decades cloaked in darkness. In 
discussion with curator Mark Miller, the idea of a ‘living luminaire’ was agreed upon. The 
luminaire moved within the darkened gallery space, it would reveal its dramatic location, and 
interact with the visiting public. 
 
 
Figure 77. Lidar Scan by ScanLab Projects of The Tanks at Tate Modern (2012). Scan gives a sense of scale of 
the space. At the center is Fearful Symmetry and the team involved in the project standing around it. 
 
217 
 
Early in the design process, I was looking for some hints as to the character of the machine I 
was to build. William Blake’s famous poem The Tyger, touched the mood of the experience I 
wanted to create, and also touched on ideas of creating life. The short poem asks questions 
about the creation of life that, like a work of art, must in some ways reflect its creator. What 
would the existence of a terrifying Tyger tell us about the nature of its creator, God? What 
does something equally beautiful and horrific tell us about our creator? This is its fearful 
symmetry. 
The poem also talks about the ‘forging’ of the life, with an anvil and furnace - a dark alchemic 
craftsmanship, with a sense of intense physical production that resonated with my personal 
experiences of making the work, and my aims for the mood I wanted to create. The opening 
lines of the poem describe the vision of the Tyger “burning bright” in a dark forest, creating 
an immediate visceral image. 
Thinking about the moment people would enter into the gallery for the first time, I wanted to 
create this sensation for the public, as they encountered the intimidating dark chamber and 
the strange ‘life form’ that inhabited it. 
 
 
Figure 78. Render of proposal for installation used to agree intention for the exhibition 
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As in earlier work, I chose to use a tetrahedron form to avoid figuratively inferring life. The 
geometry was wrapped in a cold white electroluminescent sheet material to illuminate itself 
with a perfectly flat white light. Hidden up above in the darkness, like a long rod marionette 
puppeteer, a 5m tall autonomous delta robot, custom built to manipulate the motion of the 
luminaire beneath it, moved back and forth through the space on a 21m motorised rail. An 
array of Kinect sensors mounted on the travelling robot built a real-time 3D point cloud of its 
local environment, detecting the public and reading their individual movements using gesture 
recognition algorithms and responding with a variety of behaviours drawn out of the research 
discussed in this thesis. 
Encouraging the public to suspend their disbelief and play with the living luminaire, the more 
people enthusiastically gestured to the work, the more enthusiastic its responses would be. If 
visitors were stationary it would hover over them, slowly turning mechanically and abstractly, 
almost mocking their inanimateness. With the subtlest change from mechanical to smooth 
fluid motion, the work transformed from a lifeless platonic solid, to a living performer. While at 
first intimidating to the Tanks visitors’, many of the public became increasingly comfortable 
and confident in performing with their luminous companion, as their exchanges developed. 
 
 
Figure 79. Final tests in The Tanks shortly before turning off lights and opening to public. The fine carbon fibre 
body of the delta robot rig visible holding the illuminated tetrahedron. 
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A detailed technological breakdown of the installation is provided in the introductory chapter. 
Here I will focus on interrogating the works aesthetics in relation to the multiple disciplinary 
perspectives examined in the previous chapters. I will at times shift forwards and backwards 
between system descriptions, and how the installation was perceived, between what 
Valentino Braitenberg called the "law of uphill analysis and downhill invention". 
Motion Cues 
Fearful Symmetry’s use of a moving geometric figure, through an otherwise featureless 
environment (the darkness cloaking much of the context of the gallery), shares the 
characteristic, uniform environment typically found in perceptual research experiments. 
Tremoulet and Feldman’s Perception of Animacy From the Motion of a Single Object 626, 
discussed in the chapter three, is the most similar work I have referenced, and it can, in part, 
be seen spatially manifested in the installation. The circular arrangement of their 
experimental 2D environment is, in some senses, reflected in the circular plan of the Tanks. 
Fearful Symmetry hovered beneath the dark ceiling of the Tanks, rising up and descending 
down, remaining just out of reach of the visitors beneath. When it ascended, these moments 
of elevation, of defying gravity, violating “Newtonian laws of motion”, as Stewart might 
describe it 627. Spontaneous accelerated and decelerated motion implied internal energy 
reserves that encouraged an immediate sense of the tetrahedron’s autonomy and vitality 
 
Figure 80. Mirroring behaviour: Fearful Symmetry hovers almost motionless  
above child stood motionless beneath it. 
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Sometimes the robot would appear motionless or very slow moving. At other times it would 
traverse the gallery quickly with dramatic changes of speed and direction. These energetic 
moments of behaviour were the most perceptibly animate, though they benefitted from 
moments of stillness. When there were changes in speed and direction occurring 
simultaneously, they appeared controlled, and purposeful. 
The mounting of a pan and tilt servomotor mechanism, on the end effector of the delta robot, 
gave the tetrahedron the ability to orientate itself towards its direction of travel, as it moved 
around the gallery. This gave the impression of it ‘looking where it was going’. Even if there 
was no visible target in the darkened environment to explain its movement, the correlation 
between orientation and motion direction created strong impressions of purpose in the 
tetrahedron’s movement. These observations support Tremoulet and Feldman’s findings that 
orientation plays an essential role, alongside the speed of motion and degrees of directional 
change, in perceptual judgments of animacy. 
There are, however, contradictory instances where lack of motion, or directional motion 
misaligned with orientation, to create equally compelling impressions of animacy, suggesting 
other stimuli could be as important in shaping the observers’ experiences. One particularly 
strong factor was the quality of movement that occurred when the tetrahedron would turn 
away from the direction of motion and towards a member of the public, seeming to hold its 
gaze upon them. Again, a strong impression of purposeful behaviour is at the centre of this 
effect, but it is amplified by the sensation that Fearful Symmetry is responsive to human 
presence. This creates a whole set of psychological effects beyond the scope of visual social 
perception studied, that I will address later. The closest phenomenal effect that we can draw 
from perceptual science could arguably be related the Wolfpack Effect 628, though, in this 
case, there is only a single robotic agent. It could be argued that the Wolfpack Effect, was 
perceived in the attention behaviour of the many visitors to the gallery, observing individuals 
or small groups interacting with the machine. 
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Figure 81. Wolfpack behaviour: Audience surrounding the single illuminated agent 
Efforts were made to make the gallery as dark as possible. These including the use of a ‘light 
trap’ tunnel at the entrance to the Tanks. Though this darkness helped to cloak the spatial 
context of the luminous figure, the light it emitted locally began to reveal the features of the 
Tank, as intended. As discussed in the chapter three, animacy attributions can be elevated 
or suppressed by context 629. The gallery environment amounted to a curved perimeter wall 
with four central columns - a relatively simple space. Due to the mechanical limitations of the 
rail and delta robot, Fearful Symmetry’s range was limited to between the columns. The 
motorised rail was placed centrally and perpendicular to the entrance to give the strongest 
immediate impression of movement to visitors entering into the space, and hide any 
impression that the robot had a limited range of travel. 
Tremoulet and Feldman had observed that acceleration has more influence in readings of 
animacy than contextual cues, suggesting fundamental motion percept’s have considerable 
influence on overall perceptions of animacy. They qualify this conclusion by recognising that 
their environments may have not had much effect due to their limited features, but in the 
context of Fearful Symmetry this is relevant. In the event of limited stimuli, to make 
judgements on the status of objects in our environment, we rely on reflexive responses to 
these primary cues, and they are most powerful in these conditions. 
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By darkening the Tanks, I had attempted to focus perception of the work on the quality of the 
motion, however, the role of visitors willing to participate in the performative interactions of 
the piece were essential to the work, and created a more complex environmental context 
than we find studied in the controlled environments of psychophysical and perceptual 
sciences. 
A couple of other clear differences can be drawn between the installation of Fearful 
Symmetry and the environments that characterise visual motion perception experiments. 
From Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel’s 1944 landmark study 630 with simple geometric 
stop frame animations, to today’s parametric software animations, screen based 2D 
environments remain common experimental spaces, regardless of developments in 3D 
graphics that arguably reflect more the context in which the human eye, and our social 
perceptions, have evolved. By contrast, installation work is essentially spatial and agency 
occurs within a shared space. 
While contemporary perceptual research examines short animations, with modifications to 
discrete events, physical installation experiences are continuous for viewers. The events that 
occur before, set the context, and upon entering the gallery, an observer’s understanding of 
the animacy of the work is constructed through a succession of observed movements, 
leading more complex interpretations of animate behaviour to narratively unfold. 
Agency 
Practical aspects of the exhibition shaped the strategy for developing Fearful Symmetry’s 
behaviour. The Tate Modern had a busy rolling schedule of artworks on display within the 
Tanks over the Cultural Olympiad that accompanied the 2012 London Olympic Games. The 
entire 21m motorised rail, Delta Robot, sensing system, sound and control systems had to 
be installed within 24 hours and open to the public the following morning. There would be no 
time to develop code in situ, so it would have to be crafted offsite. 
Finding alternative spaces that offered the volume of hanging space proved challenging. 
Behaviours were prototyped first in animations produced in Autodesk 3ds Max, and then 
simulated in the opensource Java framework, Processing. A sufficiently lengthy warehouse 
in Tottenham allowed for the install of the 21m long rail, at 3m off the ground. Though this 
was 4m short of the rail’s planned height in the Tanks, it was tall enough to hang the delta 
robot and the tetrahedron head just above the ground, however, not to walk underneath the 
work, or allow for interactions to be easily prototyped. Therefore, I was able to test all the 
hardware, but not to test the entire system until installation at the Tate itself. 
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My strategy for dealing with this was to stick to simple rule-based logics that generated three 
main behavioural typologies: pursuit, evasion and play. These were three of the five 
behaviours that Blythe, Miller and Todd 631 examined and developed into distinct parametric 
features, and that I discussed in chapter three of this thesis. These behaviours were easily 
simulated in Processing code sketches, but making sure that this translated into sensing of a 
physical environment and motor control was only completed onsite, with minutes to go 
before the opening. 
The short nature of the two-day exhibition precluded exploring the aesthetic possibilities of 
adaptive algorithms as there would be too little run time to see behaviour develop. It also 
would have added an extra layer of complexity to code when I would have limited time on 
site to make adjustments. Complexity in behaviour would be drawn from the complexity of 
the environment, namely the visitors that populated the sensing space within the gallery, 
where the robotic rig travelled with an array of Kinect sensors. This strategy of using an array 
of Kinects to ‘feed’ life into the installation was similar in some respects to Motive Colloquies, 
but the types of responsive behaviour were entirely different. 
 
Figure 82. Search behaviour: Fearful Symmetry travels though gallery till it locates visitors and then closes in. 
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Fearful Symmetry’s 21m motorised rail offered the possibility to really explore pursuit and 
evasion behaviours. It would have been difficult to elicit such behavioural perceptions in 
earlier work, as they were fixed to the ground or ceiling. The possibilities for playful actions 
were also far greater with this extended range of interactions. The range of this mobility was 
unlike typical kinetic installations, and amplified the sense of the robot’s autonomous 
freedom. This correlated with the idea that when agents move around and navigate the 
features of their environments, this acts as a primary perceptual cue for determining 
animacy. 
The aim of the behavioural design was to make explicit changes between three primary 
modes, and trigger fast heuristic perceptions that, though abstract, are coherent. The 
architecture of behavioural control was a state machine. Putting to one side the states used 
for start-up, debugging and manual control, there were in total four states. These were 
Search, Play, Chase (pursuit) and Escape (evasion). 
 
Figure 83. Behaviour Chasing: Fearful Symmetry circles in on visitors’ movements 
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Search 
Condition: If no human sensed in over ~30 seconds the robot switches 
to Search mode. 
Behaviour: Chooses a random location along the motorised rail and 
travel to it. On arrival search for human presence making ~4 random 
movements with Delta Robot (not Rail), orientating head towards 
direction of travel. 
 
Play 
Condition: If in Search, Chase or Escape mode and person detected. 
Behaviour: Mirror back the behaviours of people in sensing area. If 
they move enthusiastically, the tetrahedron responds back 
energetically. If people stand still below the work, the piece 
hovers above them motionless. 
 
Chase 
Condition: If in Play mode and person moves off the edge of the 
sensing area 
 
Escape 
Condition: If in Play mode and >2 people sensed 
Behaviour: Chooses a random location along the motorised rail and 
travel to it. 
 
The use of a random speed function in most moves – sometimes a bit faster, sometimes a 
bit slower – and a random function on search and escape targets, added degrees of 
indeterminacy that contibuted significantly to a sense of animacy rather than repetitive 
robotic control. The constantly changing environment also feeds variety into the system, so 
that the performance remains continually surprising, yet the simple rules also add a degree 
of predictability, and it is this careful balance between chaos and order that gives the 
impression of intelligence. 
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Such a strategy may eventually prove to become boring but only after long periods of 
observing exchanges with the public. While I would agree with roboticist Christoph 
Bartneck’s statement that “Given sufficient time the user will give up his/her hypothesized 
patterns of the robot’s intelligent behavior and become bored with its limited random 
vocabulary of behaviors” 632, such a strategy works very well in gallery contexts. It would have 
limited value, however, in longer-term contexts, such as social robotic interaction. It may also 
be limited in robotic work installed in wider built environment, where interactions may occur 
over weeks, months or even years. However, the counter argument may be that carefully 
crafted rules, in concert with human behaviour can create enough variety to continue to 
generate novel interactions. 
As I have discussed in chapter three, the gaming industry, particularly in its early years, was 
arguably defined by clever use of minimal computing power to create compelling but 
‘Shallow AI’ 633. Multi-dimensional sets of behaviours using a combination of state changes in 
agents led to far greater variety of game play. 
Though I did not explore adaptive behavioural approaches in this installation, there are 
clearly some exciting possibilities to extend this work to learn and change over time that I 
may explore in the future. 
 
 
Figure 84. Behaviour Play: the energetic movement of the children is mirrored back in the movement of the 
tetrahedron. 
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A feature of the behavioural system I have skipped over was a manual control mode that 
would allow me to treat the installation as a mechanical Turk, what is sometimes called 
Wizard-of-Oz (WoZ) technique 634. This was used on a couple of occasions, where the lights 
were put on and I was able to demonstrate the work piece by piece to the press, and at the 
opening private view. For health and safety reasons, my team always had a person in front 
of a keyboard and mouse controller with CCTV footage of the gallery. Though this was only a 
precautionary measure, on more than one occasion, I found team members in our technical 
room beside the gallery, manipulating the robot to prove play with the public. 
In our technical room we also had our sound team made up of Sam Conran and my brother 
Emmett Glynn, who live-mixed and manipulated audio signals from contact microphones on 
the robot motors, to create an atmosphere and amplify the motion of the robot. The sound 
system could have been automated given sufficient time onsite to develop software, but for 
practical reasons we kept this element of the performance safely in human hands. 
Ambiguity 
The cold and perfectly flat white light that wrapped Fearful Symmetry’s tetrahedron had an 
unexpected visual effect when viewed from across the gallery. Depth on its surfaces was 
imperceptible because of the consistent luminosity of the electroluminescent sheet material, 
and at only 0.3mm thickness, the triangular faces of the geometry butted up tightly 
preventing gaps at its edges. As it rotated it became difficult to determine its form, as edges 
and depth disappeared. The ambiguous form, was at one moment like a flat triangle, the next 
like a kite, trapezium or other varieties of quadrilaterals. As we find in illusory optical arts, 
where unstable visual phenomena are leveraged to draw participation, the ambiguity of the 
form brought people closer, encouraging participation. Only by getting close would visitors 
start to make out the faintest of lines at its edges which helped with perceiving its orientation. 
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Figure 85. Electroluminescent sheet faces of the tetrahedron 
Considered in the context of animation aesthetics, and drawing upon Furniss635 and Wells’ 636 
proposed continuums of animation, Fearful Symmetry sits firmly towards the abstract, rather 
than mimetic/orthodox bounds of animation. In visual terms it resists figurative interpretation 
in the same way as animators Victor Eggling’s Diagonal Symphony (1925), or Oskar 
Fischinger’s Composition in Blue (1935), have done. The glowing tetrahedron, in its 
“heartless geometrizing”, to use Eisenstein’s earlier cited phrase, is in opposition to any 
orthodox objectivity of animation and “rebirth of universal animism” 637. 
The tetrahedron’s luminous geometry is not without semiotic hints of animist, alchemical and 
esoteric vocabularies. The title of the work, borrowing from freemason William Blake, also 
suggests parallel connotations. This semblance of the archaic and vitalist is purposeful, yet 
as Tarkovsky suggests 638, left ambiguous enough to encourage the audience to actively 
engage and would, I believe, answer Moritz’s demands that abstract animation “have an 
intriguing spirit and integrity of its own... suggest[ing] more meanings, various, almost 
contradictory depths and speculations beyond the surface value” 639. 
Roman Paska’s distinction of illusory and primitive, or Steve Tillis’ distinction of imitative and 
conceptual puppets, share similarities with the continuums of animation theory, drawing the 
distinction between figurative imitation and abstract aesthetic practices. As I discuss in the 
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previous chapter, the imitative, or illusionist intention is to produce stabile continuous scene, 
while the primitivist, in opposition, embraces a fragmentation and instability. Fearful 
Symmetry’s aesthetics follow the later approach, distancing itself from the baggage of the 
traditions of figurative puppetry and humanoid automaton. Similarly, we could also draw on 
Kerstin Dautenhahn’s continuum for social robotics 640 and position Fearful Symmetry firmly 
at the socially evocative end of that spectrum, as it does not attempt to create the illusion of 
human-like behaviour, such as speaking or being voice responsive. Nor does it attempt to 
replicate human gestures. The strategy of the work, by the nature of its primitive geometry, 
probes the primitive gestural exchanges that underpin all social behaviour. 
As the most skilled puppeteers have acknowledged about work at this primitive end of the 
continuum, ‘life’ is difficult to sustain for long periods. Its fleeting, fluctuating nature intensifies 
the drama of what Pepicello called ‘oscillation’, Steve Tillis called ‘double-vision’, and 
Jurkowski described as the ‘opalization effect’ 641. The primitive nature of Fearful Symmetry’s 
appearance requires intense acts to animate, as the robot must first appear alive with motion 
– its first transformation – and then take a further step to have character through the enacting 
of the rules of its behaviour – its second transformation. This demands more of the audience 
as well, which in contemporary theatre is considered an advantage as the transformation has 
to be more sophisticated and more intense. The tetrahedron becomes a self-reflective device 
about the nature of animated objects and the theatre of the possession. 
The essential bargain between Fearful Symmetry and the audience relies our willing 
embrace of a naïve vision. Children at the Tate quickly and easily threw themselves into 
expressive exchanges with the floating tetrahedron. Adults were often more cautious but 
would gradually become more playful. The robotic puppet offered a way for audiences to 
access their childish side - their playfulness and innocence. At the same time, the dark 
space, the natural home of the uncanny, would have triggered naïve fears of the dark. This 
contrast is common to puppetry creating an aesthetics of ambiguous emotion, where fear 
and a playful wonder exist simultaneously. 
Staging 
Approaching the gallery, visitors arriving at the Tate Modern in daylight (the exhibition taking 
place at midsummer) would walkin through a long dark corridor built to accommodate 
people’s eyes adjusting to low light, much like entering a theatre. As their vision adapted, 
they could hear the strange filtered sounds of the machine amplified within the chamber, as 
their first sense of what was to come. Finally, and often with some trepidation, they entered 
into the Tanks, where their first sight was the luminaire (anywhere between 5 and 25m away 
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from them) moving above the heads of other visitors. This confrontation demanded the 
viewer come to terms with the intimidating darkness, the resonating chamber and the 
strange glow of the electroluminescent lighting - flat, featureless and uniform in appearance 
upon the tetrahedral geometry. 
In its staging, my ambition was to create an immediate visceral effect and, I hoped that, 
before any interaction took place, the very coldness and hostility of the initial encounter 
would create a contrast to which the animation and perceivable personality of the performing 
machine could then bring a warmth and playfulness. As the only light source in the gallery, 
the position of tetrahedron and the light radiating off it became the focal point of the space, 
wherever it was positioned. Visitors who found themselves immediately under the light were 
most brightly illuminated. This in effect created a stage for a human-robotic performance, 
while other visitor hung back in the darkness as an audience surrounding the dance. 
There was a tangible sense of presence from Fearful Symmetry that went beyond its 
proximity, physicality or luminosity. The installation commanded presence, much like an 
actor on stage - the intensity and purpose of its motion, giving the impression of life and 
emotional character. 
 
 
Figure 86. Participants perform centre stage in interaction with Fearful Symmetry, while other visitors spectate 
hidden in darkness 
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As an abstract entity and, simultaneously, a performative installation, the work resonates 
with some of the theatrical ambitions of avant-garde pieces, such as Enrico Prampolini’s 
Magnetic Theatre, Moholy-Nagy’s Die Mechanische Exzentrik and Oscar Schlemmer’s Living 
Geometry. The artists of the Futurist and Bauhaus movements struggled to achieve even 
primitive mechanical performers – turning instead to geometric costumes, such as in 
Schlemmer’s Triadic Ballet (1922). Today, robotic systems seem to offer the possibility of 
realising these visions - to achieve an aesthetic of what Prampolini called “absolute 
synthesis”, and Moholy- Nagy called a “theatre of totality”. The theatre of lively machines 
foregrounds absolute immersion in light, motion, sound and form, resisting dramatic 
traditions of narrative plot, and choosing instead the radical aesthetics of abstract 
performance and primitive universal experience. 
Fearful Symmetry, like much abstract animation, is not intended to be viewed ‘from beginning 
to end’. The performance is already in motion when the public enter, and continues when 
they leave. Duration of stay was also undefined and in some cases people left quickly, 
intimidated by the darkness. In others people engaged only for a few minutes, while some 
sat or lay on the ground, occupying the chamber for much longer durations, congregating, 
taking in the installation, comparing experiences, or watching others’ interaction. Regrettably, 
no record of audience duration was taken. I believe the attraction of the work, for those who 
chose to stayed for longer periods of time, could be explained by the meditative qualities of 
the space, compounded by the vivid, hypnotic light, and resonant frequencies of the live 
audio synthesis performed into the chamber. Here, I think the work touches upon ideas that 
Maureen Furniss discusses, related to Mandalas. 
5.4 Conclusion 
My purpose at this point, in elucidating the experiential stimuli of the installation, is to draw 
out the fundamental difficulty in making comparisons between the highly reductive 
environments of perceptual psychology experiments, and the complex conditions found in 
the installations I have produced. Such a direct comparison between a simple screen-based 
environment and a complex built environment has its limits, but in the field of perceptual 
science, I have found a very useful means to unravel the complexity of encounters within my 
work, and better understand how primitive cues in motion begin to shape our experience. 
How much a perceptual scientist could learn reciprocally from observing human response to 
my work is untested, however, I believe it seems unlikely. Discussing the experimental 
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method of field of visual motion perception research, Graham cautioned that, “we must take 
care that parameters are not confounded, a danger that arises only too readily from the fact 
that velocity itself involves the variables of distance and time. In any given experiment the 
variables of time, distance, interval between stimuli, and cycle of repetition of stimuli must be 
clearly analysed before we can be confident that unequivocal conclusions may be drawn”642 . 
Research in visual motion perception has, in the context of modern computing, benefitted 
from the use of parametrically generated animations allowing for precise modification of 
stimuli and measurement of response. Brain imaging has also facilitated an added layer of 
reading. An interesting, currently unexplored, potential benefit might be the quantifiable 
behaviour parameters, if they can offer useful transferable data, to be fed into the behaviour 
of physical objects. 
Returning to Tremoulet and Feldman’s single moving object, we can see that impressions of 
animacy can occur by virtue of motion alone. Fearful Symmetry neither supports or casts 
doubt on this research. What Fearful Symmetry does highlight, however, is that perceptions 
can be very different when spatial, and causal inferences can be made. This suggests that 
the use of parametric data, derived from perceptual research to drive lifelike behaviour, is 
limited in its application to complex environments. Conclusions on approaches to designing 
Lively Artefacts discussed in chapter two, and in chapter five, are brought together in the 
following final chapter. 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Introductory Restatement 
The makers of animate machines, or what I have called Lively Artefacts, have long had a 
difficult a relationship with academia. Take, for example, David Brewster’s 1832 Letters on 
Natural Magic, where he describes the performing automata of the period, “Ingenious and 
beautiful as all these pieces of mechanism are, and surprising as their effects appear even to 
scientific spectators, the principal object of their inventions was to astonish and amuse the 
public” 643. Brewster isn’t alone in looking rather disparagingly on the frivolity of their 
application. Henry Hodge’s, Technology in the Ancient World 644 also reflects with some 
bewilderment at the early automaton makers Ctesibius and Heron. Despite the intelligence, 
skill, and sheer brilliance that these men displayed in their inventions, many historians have 
regarded the great Alexandrians as pas serieux” 645. In Grey Walter’s lifetime his tortoises, 
built with clear theoretical motivation, were often “dismissed by professional scientists as 
mere robotic ‘toys’” 646. What is perhaps too often missed is how the motivation to imitate life 
or particular features of living behaviour has inspired many of the innovations that have 
shaped the modern world. Vaucanson is cited most often for his Digesting Duck, not his 
contributions to the loom, the precursor the modern computer. De Kempelen, famous for the 
performance of his mechanical Turk, also invented printing methods to make books for the 
blind 647. The list is long, and a full account of the innovations that have emerged from the 
human impulse to imitate life could fill volumes. It seems the allure of machinic life is ancient 
and irresistible. The issue of seriousness might, in part, be in the perceived naivety of the 
subject that makes some serious academics across arts and sciences nervous. Editor of 
Animation Journal, Suzanne Buchan argues that the naive delight of animation is in fact its 
psychological strength rather than a regressive feature of the art, and needs scholarly study 
648. In theatre, puppetry was historically a somewhat diminutive or childish art form, but in the 
20th century it found its own unique aesthetics and theoretical discourse in the avant-garde, 
and in the 21st century, as I have discovered in the process of this thesis, will find new 
purpose in the emerging age of robotic agency. 
 “At every stage of technique...the ability of the artificer to produce a 
working simulacrum of a living organism has always intrigued people.” 649 
(Wiener, 1948) 
 
234 
In the 20th century, the study of feedback control mechanisms in the field of cybernetics led to 
a paradigmatic shift in how we systematically study biological behaviour, from single cell 
organisms to social populations, and with the same systematic approaches, the study and 
building of machines with life-like behaviour. With their disregard for traditional disciplinary 
boundaries, like the automaton makers before them, cyberneticians also had a difficult 
relationship with the siloed traditions of academia, inevitably ending in the bifurcation of the 
field into diverse new areas of study. The progeny includes computer science, robotics, 
human- computer and human-robotic interaction, machine learning and artificial intelligence. 
In biosciences, bionics, systems biology and ecology. In management, the study of 
organisation, and game theory. In mathematics, the study of complexity and non-linear 
dynamics and, in psychology, the study of neuroscience and cognitive behavioural 
psychology. 
I developed the critical position of this thesis by discussing the work of three pioneering 
cyberneticians, all of whom who reached across disciplinary boundaries, building machines 
that imitated animate behaviour driven by adaptive stimulus-response mechanisms. Ross 
Ashby’s Homeostat, William Grey Walter’s tortoises and Gordon Pask’s Musicolour, each 
illustrate how experimental machines shaped a theoretical framework for cognitive 
behaviour, grounded in a continuous and adaptive, performative exchange with the physical 
world. Their embodied practices lead to original insights into the self-organising systems of 
life and mind, that provided the foundations for theories of autopoiesis, and contemporary 
theories of embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended cognition. Their pioneering work, 
embodied in lively machines set in motion discourses that answered the problem of mind-
body dualism, and to exorcise what philosopher Gilbert Ryle called “the ghost in the 
machine” 650. 
However, the rise of digital computing in the 20th century precipitated a resurgent Classical 
Cognitivism seen, for example, in the symbol processing of Herbert A. Simon, or 
representationalism of Jerry Fodor, and reductionist tendencies of Computation Theories of 
Mind (CTM). The pervasive culture of computing, reinforced a reductive view of cognition as 
a rational processing of logical and discrete representations of an outside world, as opposed 
to an embodied, complex and continuous exchange situated and bound to a physical world. 
This Computational Cartesianism has increasingly and convincingly been argued to have 
curtailed developments in artificial intelligence and robotics. As Rolf Pfeifer and Fumiya Iida 
argue, “the classical approach has not contributed significantly to our understanding of, for 
example, perception, locomotion, manipulation, everyday speech and conversation, social 
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interaction in general, common sense, emotion, and so on” 651. 
In recent decades neo-cybernetic thinking has found renewed force, supported by progress 
in connectionist computing strategies and behavioural and morphological robotics. I have 
pointed to Research at UC Berkeley 652, conducted in the last couple of years, binding visual 
perception and motor skill training together with deep neural networks. The results, I believe, 
are compelling evidence that bottom- up strategies first conceptualised in cybernetics, may 
be to key to overcoming the limitations of classical robot control. It is too early to tell whether 
connectionist strategies will bring about a wholesale paradigmatic change on approaches to 
machine intelligence. If they do – and these neo-cybernetic approaches appear promising – 
then I believe the embodied performance of these machines will play a crucial role in 
changing popular conceptions of the nature of intelligence, and finally allow Descartes’ ghost 
to rest in peace. 
In the arts, where the continuity between our physical and psychological experience of our 
world is arguably better appreciated, the aesthetics of Lively Artefacts is increasingly 
appearing in robotic applications in theatre, galleries, public spaces and domestic contexts, 
from the scale of prosthetics to architectural constructs. In robotic arts, where work focuses 
primarily on expressive forms of intelligent behaviour, bottom-up, embodied approaches are 
widespread representing a renewed cybernetic attitude in contemporary practice and 
discourse. “The art is not in the machine, the machine is the art”, states Christian Kroos, Co-
editor of the recently published compendium Robots and Art: Exploring an Unlikely 
Symbiosis 653. Meanwhile, in the engineering departments of academic institutions, Cartesian 
traditions remain dominant. In Human–Robot Interaction (HRI) research, Computational 
Theories of Mind (CTM) are commonly employed as explanatory principles for analysing 
experience, though they remain irreconcilable with contemporary cognitive science. CTM’s 
narrow rationalising account of human encounters with robotic agency fail to account for the 
visceral embodied and aesthetic effects machines can inspire. Aesthetic experience “is not a 
theoretical postulation. It is not an equation or an algorithm, it is tangible, embodied, 
experiential and performative” 654. It is in the careful control of perceptual qualities, in the 
production of art, that artefacts can inspire instant, and visceral sensorial experience. 
However, in robotics design, aesthetic concerns are all too often reduced to matters of 
appearance. Hence, roboticists work with only a narrow-limited framework for understanding 
human-robotic interaction, both as experiences and as a design space. These limitations not 
only negatively affect robotics research, but also the application of the technology into the 
arts. 
 
236 
 
In the context of designing with robotics and experiences understood through contemporary 
cognitive discourses, this thesis asks the following questions: 
1. How do we perceive life in moving human artefacts, and are there notions of 
cognition that explain these perceptions? 
2. Why are perceptions of life so irresistible, both in the sense of being uncontrollable, 
and aesthetically enchanting? 
3. How might one go about making objects that are perceived as animate? 
6.2 Results 
I have interwoven two research methodologies throughout this thesis - one is scholarly and 
the other practical, involved the building of machines that I call Lively Artefacts, and that 
have been exhibited in public gallery contexts, internationally. 
This work has been grounded by what I have characterised as a neo-cybernetic approach, 
which has some key characteristics: 
1. Interdisciplinarity in the study of behaviour. 
2. A bottom-up approach to understanding and designing animate behaviour. 
3. A constructivist and ecological approach to analysing and discussing experience. 
4. The ability to describe systems in first-order and second-order modes. 
A first-order can produce a description of a system and its control arrangements, such as its 
various goals, mechanisms and stimulus relationships to its environment. In a limited 
technical role, this is useful for describing and building systems, such as robots. A second-
order includes the observer of a system and is able to address questions of the individual’s 
constructed experience of an observed system. 
This study includes first-order analysis, exploring the systems driving my robotic installations, 
and second-order analysis, incorporating observer experience. The first-order descriptions 
are straightforward and provide useful technical suggestions for others, on animating 
machines. The results of the second-order shift away from objective and reductive analysis, 
to examine the complex, layered experience of Lively Artefacts, foundationally based upon 
perceptual reflexes that build bottom up into higher-order cognitive processes that, in some 
cases, construct aesthetic experiences. Having first-order and second-order analysis does 
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not indicate a chronological sequence, nor that these are separate enquiries. Rather – to 
borrow Kenny Chow’s phrase – I see them are two sides of the same spinning coin. 
Below, I have chosen to structure these results by first examining experiences of animate 
artefacts from the bottom up, then sharing technical insights into making machines that elicit 
these animate aesthetic experiences. Taking a bottom-up approach, I take as a starting point 
the cybernetic research of Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and Pitts 655, and their observation 
that the visual cortex of the vertebrate eye includes active feature-detection for animate 
agents in our environment. An ecological perspective on cognition reveals there are clear 
evolutionary advantages to detecting life quickly, without the need for conscious processing. 
Due to the social nature of human beings, the eye has evolved not only to perceptually 
construct spatial, colour and motion information about the environment, but also its causal 
and the social structure. 
How do we Perceive Life? 
 “As we enter a room full of people, we instantly have a number of social 
perceptions, and most fundamentally, we know which objects in the room 
are animate and which are inanimate.” 656  
(Rutherford and Kuhlmeier, 2013) 
Motion perception of animacy is a primary percept upon which more complex social cognition 
arises. The experience of perceiving life in moving artefacts is generated by a 
heterogeneous group of interconnected phenomena, with qualities of ambiguity, presence 
and the uncanny, as central features. 
Movement has primacy in visual perception, and animacy detection is a priority in our 
processing of visual information. Our visual perceptual systems are highly attuned to cues for 
social cognition that can uncover not only the conscious, but also the unconscious state of 
other animate agents in our environment. Specialised heuristic traits of the human cognitive 
model have a deep evolutionary history, that automatically, or one might say irresistibly, 
trigger perceptions before conscious reasoning occurs further down-stream. These fast 
heuristic traits operate in visual-cortical hierarchy with parallel asynchronous computation. 
The eye can recognise animate behaviour through motion alone. There is an evolutionary 
advantage to this, and the architecture of the human eye detects motion information 
independently to colour and formal information in early visual processing. Causal and 
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animacy perception appear innate. Even with a lifetime of experience understanding the 
ontological differences between living and non-living entities, innate reflexes continue to 
interpret visual motion information and shape experience. As a result, robots, kinetic art, and 
geometric animations, can all appear irresistibly animate, without even the visual appearance 
of living entities.  
Entities that accelerate and change direction the greatest amount, have the highest animacy 
ratings. When an entity appears aligned to its direction of motion, particularly if it changes 
direction, it produces higher animacy ratings than misaligned movement. A small number of 
cues are central to fast heuristic detection of animate motion. Primary parameters are speed, 
acceleration and deceleration, change of direction, and orientation to direction of travel. 
These cues can function context-independent, however, context can intensify and supress 
perceptions of animacy. Animacy perception is increased, where there is perceived 
correlation between a subject’s movement and features of its environment indicating 
purposeful motion. 
The field of social perception, specifically visual motion perception has accumulated a variety 
of statistical information on motion profiles that trigger perception of animacy. In addition, 
primary behavioural typologies, such as chasing or evading, have been parametrised. 
Gravity also affects our perception of motion, which is likely a result of the gravitational 
environment in which this perceptual trait has evolved. Entities that move upward against 
gravitational force are more animate than those moving downward. Animacy perception, in 
itself, is not the end state of perceptual visual processing, rather it is only the beginning of 
downstream heuristic detection of a variety of behaviour typologies that remain under-
researched. Some perceptual phenomena that may powerfully shape our experience and 
interaction, are likely undocumented, such as the only recently discovered Wolfpack Effect. 
In their own experimental practices, artists are discovering and manipulating a variety of 
currently undocumented perceptual cues, which could be of benefit to scientific research into 
the perception of animacy. 
Why are Perceptions of Life so Irresistible? 
There’s a striking visual overlap between early 20th century abstract arts, from animation, to 
kinetic sculpture, and the scientific perceptual and psychophysical experiments that began to 
appear in the latter half of the century. Neuroaesthetic theory suggests artists are 
unknowingly experimenting with the organisation of the visual brain, and that abstract artists 
focus on particular stimuli, much in the same way scientists may try to limit variables, in order 
to test their affects. In puppetry, for example, the abandoning of figurative dolls, in favour of 
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found objects, abstract and non-anthropomorphic forms, embodied a searched for its own 
identity separate from theatre, with its own unique psychological effects – its ‘puppetness’. 
Neuroaesthetic theory proposes that, by isolating and amplifying particular sensory stimuli, 
aesthetic experience can be magnified. I have shared my concerns about using such a 
reductive theory to study an aesthetic experience, but from my own research and 
experience, I find the premise of reflex perceptions as aesthetic to be plausible, and as part 
of an aesthetic analysis, I find them provocatively useful. At the heart of puppetry, are effects 
that I believe are closely related to psychological affects of robotics, however, this is not 
appreciated in a field largely lead by engineers. 
We find ambiguity at the centre of all animated art forms. In the event of limited stimuli with 
which to make judgements on the status of objects in our environment, we rely on reflexive 
responses to these primary cues, and they are most powerful in these conditions. Ambiguity 
emerges within the conflict between fast heuristics and slower, higher-order cognition. The 
human mind is remarkably flexible in how it negotiates judgments of uncertain stimuli, be 
they visual, spatial, or social. When two interpretations share equal validity, we find our mind 
oscillating between competing perceptions. 
In animated art forms, the convergence of our instinctive and naïve perceptual reflexes meet 
contradictory rational understandings of the world. Ambiguity also drives participation, 
encouraging observers to seek to resolve the uncertainty through their own action. Abstract 
animated art forms whether spectated or actively interacted, shirk conceptualisation for the 
immediate - the essential bargain between performer and audience being a willing embrace 
of a naïve vision, an act unadulterated by intellectual rationalisation. 
Across the animated arts we find the common continuum between formal anthropomorphism 
and abstraction. In puppetry, on one side we have the illusionist and, on the other, the 
primitivist camp. The illusionist’s intention is to produce a stabile continuous life, the 
primitivists embrace fragmentation and instability, seeking short episodes or vignettes. The 
animate abstract, non- figurative objects require greater energy and commitment from the 
puppeteer and greater leaps of imagination in the audience. The result, puppeteers have 
argued, is more sophisticated and more intense. The audience’s oscillation of perception of 
life exaggerated, the object itself becomes a self-reflective device for questions about the 
vitalist nature of the objects and the “theatre of the possession”. 
The uncanny is a feature of ambiguity that has particularly strong aesthetic potency. In 
robotics, the uncanny is associated with Mori’s The Uncanny Valley, which is a narrow 
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reading of a richer phenomenon that is extensively discussed in animation and puppetry 
theory. The uncanny can be magnified by careful staging. Freud repeatedly mentions 
darkness in relation to that the uncanny. It is perhaps no wonder then, that in darkened 
theatres, the life of puppets draws out childhood fears of toys coming to life at night. 
Today, the venerable art form of puppetry finds new purpose in filling a theoretical vacuum 
surrounding the aesthetics of robotics. Largely a subject examined by engineers and social 
scientists, robotics fundamentally misunderstands aesthetics as only a matter of appearance. 
Aesthetics in robotics often leads to discussion about the uncanny valley and its aversion to 
it. The uncanny is often treated as a problem to engineer out of a design. Puppetry, by 
comparison, understands the uncanny as a source of a strange pleasure both frightening 
and at the same time compelling in its playfulness. It understands that fearfulness is 
overcome in the imaginative participation of the puppet performance, in the embrace of the 
spectacle and its artificiality. In this way, the puppet can invoke gasps of anxiety and 
moments later turn us to laughter, or even the sublime. Contemporary puppetry seeks to do 
more than merely imitate life, aiming instead to find freer, livelier, and surprising sensations 
of intelligent behaviour. It is my strong belief that the field of robotics would benefit greatly 
from examining this ancient art form to better understand its own potential. 
Perhaps less immediately obvious to roboticists, is the knowledge latent in the work of more 
experimental abstract animation. While orthodox animation seeks to sustain the life of 
moving characters, the appearance of lively artefacts in experimental work are more often 
unstable, fleeting and strange. Artists, architects and designers working with robotics may 
find the work of experimental animation offer a richer palate of inspiration for non-figurative, 
rhythmic and non-linear behaviour. Equally, I believe that cognitive research could benefit 
from drawing on experimental animation to discover stimuli that widen and deepening our 
understanding of what motion characteristics shape social perception. 
How to Make Artefacts ‘Come to Life’? 
Two factors are critical to making lively artefacts. The mechanisms that govern behaviour 
and motion qualities. These are not independent issues and overlap, but I will begin by 
highlighting key aspects of behaviour design, and finish with some observations about 
motion, drawn from different disciplinary perspectives. 
Lively Artefacts can be built as ‘Trivial Machines’ or ‘Non-Trivial Machines’. Purposeful 
motion is perceptually highly animate. For example, the ability for Grey Walter’s robot 
tortoises to steer towards light and avoid obstacles gave them a compelling appearance of 
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animacy, not previously available in predictably performing automaton. 
Trivial Machines, with the most primitive of fixed goal-directed behaviours can still exhibit 
complex animate behaviour, by being responsive to stimuli of a complex environment. A 
designer can craft animate behaviour through the design of an agent, but equally through the 
design of that agent’s environment. Cybernetics encourages designers to balance attention 
to problems of behavioural design between agent and environment. 
Complexity of behaviour is available with Trivial Machines, using the following approaches: 
• Human players often feed complexity into the system, and this is reflected back at 
them in the complexity of agent response. 
• Using multiple simultaneous goal-directed behaviours in a single agent can increase 
the complexity of behaviour. 
• State-Machines can store sets of rules that are transitioned between offering a multi-
dimensional set of behaviours. 
• A random function can introduce indeterminacy in ‘Trivial Machines’, modifying 
motion parameters, or rules of behaviour, or both. My experience tells me that the 
degree of random fed into control systems is best decided through observation. 
• Indeterminate motion can increase animacy perceptions, too much indeterminacy 
and behaviours appear chaotic, and inanimate. 
• In many situations trivial machines are sufficiently animate to not warrant the use of 
more complex Non-Trivial techniques. These include scenarios where human 
experience is relatively short, such as gallery visits. 
Complexity of behaviour is a feature of Non-Trivial Machines because they are adaptive to a 
history of interactions with their environment that makes behaviours purposeful, yet 
indeterminate. Simple statistical techniques can be used to give machines behaviours 
governed by a history of previous interactions. Looking to what governs living beings, we can 
also harness artificial life techniques, such as genetic algorithms and neural networks. 
• Non-Trivial machines with adaptive behaviours are more likely to maintain 
perceptions of animacy for longer. 
• They open up the potential for longer experiences of animate interaction and even 
emotional attachment, where human behavioural tendency toward nurturing infants is 
manipulated. Looking at the latest developments in embodied adaptive robotics, there 
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is something viscerally engaging about seeing a robot solving a visual-motor skill with 
uncanny similarity to an infant. It creates a deeper sense of an entity with its own life, 
making sense of the physical world, move by move. 
• The behavioural possibilities of self-generated motion strategies in robotics are 
fascinating on a functional level, for their ability to compensate for changing 
circumstances, whether this is mechanical damage or a change in their environment. 
They are also fascinating in my opinion on aesthetic grounds for the qualities of 
behaviour that we find emerging out of their embodied interaction with the world. 
• The growing number of institutions and companies, including Google, now taking 
bottom-up approaches, like those discussed at UC Berkeley, demonstrate a neo-
cybernetic shift towards cognition through embodied interaction built upon 
connectionist computation. The aesthetics of this shift are far more animate than 
those that have characterised robots in the 20th century. 
Cybernetic machines pursue the manageably complex from the chaotically complex, through 
continuous feedback control, in contrast to Classical Cartesian AI and digital ALife that 
pursue complexity from discrete simple rules. My observation in making machines has been 
that cybernetic bottom-up approaches seem to easily ‘come to life’ in complex environments, 
while top-down methods to intelligent behaviour can struggle to negotiate the complexity of 
analogue physical environments, and are better suited to computational simulations. The 
great virtue of developments in adaptive embodied robotics is that they can make explicit the 
relationship between the body and its intelligence. 
The parametric analysis available in scientific study of animacy perception is a useful 
resource for designing the behaviour and motion characteristics of virtual and physical 
agents. It can be combined and correlated with knowledge from animation that increasingly 
harnesses parametric techniques, to develop motion profiles that are highly animate. Smooth 
motion techniques are more animate than ‘mechanical’ motion. These are now easily 
accessed in animation software and can directly drive robotics. 
Animation techniques are typically useful for ‘canned motions’, where a library of behaviours 
have been pre-programmed and are performed linearly like mechanical automata. We have 
recently seen elements of the Principles of animation employed in robotics research projects 
657 and commercially available social robots like Jibo 658. Formal lessons from character 
animation have also encouraged robotics designers to appeal to our innate responses to 
childlike appearances. They can appear repetitive after extended periods of interaction. 
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Generative motions based on code, allow for a continuous responsiveness rather than a 
series of pre-choreographed performances. 
Accelerations in speed motion quickly illicit readings of animacy, but benefit from moments of 
relative stillness in between - although maintaining some hint of motion is recommended if 
the intention is to keep a continuous impression of life. When changes in speed and direction 
occur simultaneously, they appear to be controlled and more purposeful, so rules about 
changes in behaviour should adjust orientation and motion together. Upward motion, moving 
against gravity are most animate so a sense of lifting up as a starting move can add a sense 
of animacy. When an agent is not travelling, changes in orientation alone can create strong 
impressions of intention, and a sense of anticipation and tension. Motion profiles that are 
smooth may produce continuous impressions of animate behaviour, but stronger aesthetic 
responses can be elicited by exploring the contrasts of stillness and motion, as well as 
varying degrees of motion smoothing. These contrasting impressions can increase the 
oscillating experience of animate and inanimate perceptions, which adds drama and appears 
to increase aesthetic potency. 
6.3 Contribution 
Embodied cognitive theories of agency perception hypothesise a direct empathic corporal 
interface between our own bodily agency and that of other human beings, as well as 
animals, animated characters, puppets and robots. Moving bodies, that are not 
anthropomorphic, can still illicit visceral perceptions of life and emotional character. We feel, 
emotionally, the behaviour of others, not solely through rational reasoning, but also through 
deep unconscious processes of perception - both innate and learnt heuristics. Only through 
investigating these complex heterogeneous phenomena from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives, do we come to a deeper understanding of what shapes the aesthetics of 
animate art forms. 
Simon Penny’s publication earlier this year lays out a much-needed general theoretical 
framework for a post-cognitivist ‘Aesthetics of Behaviour’. As he himself admits, it only lays 
out the ‘rudiments’ of an aesthetic theory and is directed towards behavioural art forms in the 
many formats that new media arts manifest. The heterogeneous nature of behavioural 
media, the heterogeneous nature of contributing disciplines, and the challenges of 
synthesising disciplinary knowledge, expertise and technologies, makes a project of this type 
formidable, and necessitates focused contributions. 
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This thesis makes a contribution towards an ‘Aesthetics of Behaviour’, in the critical sub-
domain of animate behaviour in physical artefacts, limiting itself to the visual motion 
perception of animacy. Missing from Penny’s general theoretical framework, this contribution 
focuses upon puppetry, animation and visual perceptual science, working bottom-up from 
psychophysical responses to motion, to reflex-perceptions of social motion stimuli, to cross-
disciplinary discourses on fleeting qualities of presence, and to the uncanny and ambiguous 
animacy present in what I have called Lively Artefacts. 
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